Law, technology and water conflicts in developing societies: a case study of tank systems in Tamil Nadu

The study examines the relationship between law, technology and water conflicts from colonial days to the present in traditional (water) tank systems in the south Indian state of Tamil Nadu. Tanks are man-made water systems developed for irrigation and many other purposes in semi-arid areas. The thesis adopts a historical approach to study the development of law, particularly property rights, and takes an empirical approach to investigate the tank conflicts. Archival documents on irrigation development, Case laws, Focus Group Discussions, Open ended Interviews and Field visits to selected tank chains are used as source material for the discussion. Case studies of conflicts are described and analyzed at three levels - Vaigai river basin for a macro level, Kothai Anicut system in Cauvery basin for a meso level, and twenty other interconnected tanks for a micro-level. The thesis deviates from the conventional understanding that tanks as traditional systems as simple and local technologies but considers them to be complex. It argues that the use of commonly held systems such as tanks within the colonial and post colonial laws as state ownership has been the source of many conflicts. In particular, it finds most tank conflicts are a product of progressive and absolute state control over water and the systems established using colonial land revenue administrative law. The law continues to treat tanks as pieces of landed property held by state and the individuals rather than as technology systems that presupposed the regime of property rights introduced after the colonial times. The modern interventions in water including the reservoir building, and altering the hydraulics of rivers and streams aggravate tank conflicts and lead to their further detriment. The study brings the focus to ground realities, and offers new perspectives on understanding tank systems in dynamic ways.

Task Competency in the Rights Analytic: Mental Health and the Justification for Rights and Duties

The paper concerns the moral status of persons for the purposes of rights-holding and duty-bearing. Developing from Gewirth’s argument to the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC) and Beyleveld et al.’s Principle of Precautionary Reasoning, I argue in favour of a capacity-based assessment of the task competencies required for choice-rights and certain duties (within the Hohfeldian analytic). Unlike other, traditional, theories of rights, I claim that precautionary reasoning as to agentic status holds the base justification for rights-holding. If this is the basis for generic legal rights, then the contingent argument must be used to explain communities of rights. Much in the same way as two ‘normal’ adult agents may not have equal rights to be an aeroplane pilot, not all adults hold the same task competencies in relation to the exercise of the generic rights to freedom derived from the PGC. In this paper, I set out to consider the rights held by children, persons suffering from mental illness and generic ‘full’ agents. In mapping the developing ‘portfolio’ of rights and duties that a person carries during their life we might better understand the legal relations of those who do not ostensibly fulfil the criteria of ‘full’ agent.

Law, Rights and Reproduction: Reproductive Autonomy in Ethical Rationalism

As medical technology has advanced, so too have our attitudes towards the level of control we can expect to hold over our procreative capacities. This creates a multi-dimensional problem for the law in terms of access to services which prevent conception, access to services which terminate a pregnancy and recompensing those whose choices to avoid procreating are frustrated. These developments go to the heart of our perception of autonomy. In order to evaluate these three issues in relation to reproductive autonomy, I set out to investigate how the Gewirthian theory of ethical rationalism can be used to understanding the intersection between law, rights, and autonomy. As such, I assert that it is because of agents’ ability to engage in practical reason that the concept of legal enterprise should be grounded in rationality. Therefore, any attempt to understand notions of autonomy must be based on the categorical imperative derived from the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC). As a result, I claim that (a) a theory of legal rights must be framed around the indirect application of the PGC and (b) a model of autonomy must account for the limitations drawn by the rational exercise of reason. This requires support for institutional policies which genuinely uphold the rights of agents. In so doing, a greater level of respect for and protection of reproductive autonomy is possible. This exhibits the full conceptual metamorphosis of the PGC from a rational moral principle, through an ethical collective principle, a constitutional principle of legal reason, a basis for rights discourse, and to a model of autonomy. Consequently, the law must be reformed to reflect the rights of agents in these situations and develop an approach which demonstrates a meaningful respect of autonomy. I suggest that this requires rights of access to services, rights to reparation and duties on the State to empower productive agency.