The causal relationship between private and public investment in Zimbabwe

Aims: The study examines the relationship between private and public investment in Zimbabwe utilizing yearly time series data for the period 1967 to 2004. Study Design: Time Series Study. Place and Duration of Study: Zimbabwe, May 2011 to July 2011. Methodology: Emphasis is placed on the direction of causality and the long run and short run effect of the two types of investment on each other. The paper constructs empirical models for both private and public investment, based on the flexible accelerator theory. Private investment is found to be cointegrated with public investment. A cointergration and VEC models are employed to assess the long and short run relationship existing between public and private investment. Conclusion: The relationship between private and public investment is found to be insignificant and the direction of causality found to be unidirectional. The results support the notion that private investment precedes public investment.

Private school quality in Italy

Private school enrolment may lead to worse subsequent performance in further education or in the labour market. If students differ in their ability not only to pay but to take advantage of educational opportunities (“talent” for short), private schools attract a worse pool of students when publicly funded schools are better suited to foster progress by more talented students. In the data we analyze, the impact of observable talent proxies on educational and labour market outcomes is indeed more positive for students who (endogenously) choose to attend public schools than for those who choose to pay for private education.

Public Interests, Private Disputes: Investment Arbitration and the Public Good

This paper seeks to investigate the bases for resistance to arbitration in general -and investor arbitration in particular- focusing on the way in which arbitral tribunals deal with notions of public interest and the public good. The paper hypothesises that while courts have within their terms of reference the capacity to consider notions of public interest, arbitral tribunals do not. It is this core difference in the scope of decision making between the two bodies that could render privately organised dispute resolution unsuitable for disputes that have public aspects, like investor-state disputes. The paper discusses the meaning of public interest and the public good as found in the literature. It then proceeds to consider how tribunals in the investment field have dealt with these concepts. This leads to a conclusion urging not abandonment of arbitration as a component of dispute resolution, but caution. It is argued that unchecked growth in private dispute resolution can threaten perceptions of legitimacy and democratic accountability. The paper adopts a socio-legal methodology in considering the effect of legal mechanisms on social and political phenomena. It is also informed by a law and economics methodology in addressing impacts of dispute resolution mechanisms on economic efficiency. The contribution of the paper rests on theorising motivations for resistance to private dispute resolution, a topical issue in light of the TTIP debate.