Student Satisfaction Negates Pedagogic Rights, Theirs and Ours!

This article outlines how the potential for students to be co-participants, via a critical education, risks being further co-opted through the marketization of higher education by constructing students as consumers with power over academics to make judgments on pedagogic quality through student satisfaction ratings. We start by outlining the relevant components of marketization processes, and their associated practices of financialization and managerialism that have developed in response to the “legitimation crisis” in HE and argue that these have profoundly altered the university landscape with a significant impact on our working practices. Student engagement is increasingly being appropriated as a quantifiable measurement of “student satisfaction”, which then profoundly alters the teaching and learning experience with different understandings of what acquiring knowledge requires and what it feels like. We draw on our experience of working in the post 1992 sector to describe how we are increasingly working under conditions of “reified exchange” and how this affects our relationships with students, other academics and management, eroding our pedagogic rights and theirs in the process. Specifically, we conclude that marketization is likely to further reduce the institutional space and opportunities for both lecturers and students to exercise their “pedagogic rights” to personal enhancement, social inclusion and civic participation through education.

Before identity, gender and human rights

This is the beginning of an exploration of before as the thesis ‘before’ (temporally) and ‘be-fore’ (spatially) difference. Before denotes the origin and the desired destination. Before (in the double sense of ‘before’ and ‚be-in-the-fore’) opens up a space of pre-difference, of origin and of forgotten memory, as well as a space of desire, objective, illusion of teleology, unity, completion. Applied to the two domains of Human Rights and Sex/Gender, the space of ‘before’ yields two slightly different vistas: in human rights, a premodern, functionally undifferentiated society which had to invent human rights as its safeguards of functional differentiation. In Sex/Gender, 'before' brings a self-referential construction: that of ipseity, as the form of identity beyond comparison that does not play with id but with ipsum. Ipseity is inoperable but not useless. It is inoperable because it cannot be observed from anywhere without suffering rupture. It is not useless because it offers a ground for the reconceptualisation of difference, both through awe and desire.

Achieving human security through UN human rights law: prospects and challenges

This paper explores the prospects and challenges of achieving human security through United Nations (UN) human rights law. The paper does not aim to pronounce definitively on the achievement of human security by way of UN human rights law that is, to assess the achievement of human security per se 'as a future end state'. Rather the focus of the paper is firmly placed on the capacity of UN human rights law to achieve human security. The paper departs from the premise that if human rights define human security, international human rights law and UN human rights law in particular should have something to say about the achievement of human security.

Rights, Rationality and Reproduction: Balancing Interests in the Abortion Debate

As medical technology has advanced, so too have our attitudes towards the level of control we can or should expect to have over our procreative capacities. This creates a multidimensional problem for the law and family planning services in terms of access to services – whether to avoid conception or terminate a pregnancy – and the negligent provision of these services. These developments go to the heart of our perception of autonomy. Unsurprisingly, these matters also raise a moral dilemma for the law. Distinctively, discourse in this area is dominated by assertions of subjective moral value; in relation to life, to personal choice and to notions of the archetypal family. Against this, I stress that a model of objective morality can answer these challenging questions and resolve the inherent problems of legal regulation. Therefore, I argue that notions of autonomy must be based on a rational, action-based understanding of what it means to be a ‘moral agent’. I claim that from this we might support a legal standard, based on objective rational morality, which can frame our constitutional norms and our conception of justice in these contentious areas. This paper claims that the current regulation of abortion is outdated and requires radical reform. It proposes a scheme that would shift the choice towards the mother (and the father), remove the unnecessarily broad disability ground and involve doctors having a role of counsel (rather than gatekeeper).

Is there any room for the doctrine of fundamental rights of states in today's international law?

This article serves as a general substantive introduction to the special issue on the fundamental rights of states in international law. It introduces the concept in theoretical and doctrinal terms, and lays out the questions that will be addressed by the contributions to the special issue. These questions include: 1) What do attributes like ‘inherent’, ‘inalienable’ and ‘permanent’ mean with regard to state rights?; 2) Do they lead to identifying a unitary distinct category of fundamental rights of states?; 3) If so, what is their source and legal character?; 4) What are their legal implications, eg, when they come into conflict with other obligations of the right holder or with the actions of other states and international organisations?; and ultimately, 5) Is there still room in today’s international law for a doctrine of ‘fundamental’ rights of states? The article reviews the fundamental rights of states in positive law sources and in international legal scholarship, and identifies the reasons for a renaissance of attention for this doctrine.

Task Competency in the Rights Analytic: Mental Health and the Justification for Rights and Duties

The paper concerns the moral status of persons for the purposes of rights-holding and duty-bearing. Developing from Gewirth’s argument to the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC) and Beyleveld et al.’s Principle of Precautionary Reasoning, I argue in favour of a capacity-based assessment of the task competencies required for choice-rights and certain duties (within the Hohfeldian analytic). Unlike other, traditional, theories of rights, I claim that precautionary reasoning as to agentic status holds the base justification for rights-holding. If this is the basis for generic legal rights, then the contingent argument must be used to explain communities of rights. Much in the same way as two ‘normal’ adult agents may not have equal rights to be an aeroplane pilot, not all adults hold the same task competencies in relation to the exercise of the generic rights to freedom derived from the PGC. In this paper, I set out to consider the rights held by children, persons suffering from mental illness and generic ‘full’ agents. In mapping the developing ‘portfolio’ of rights and duties that a person carries during their life we might better understand the legal relations of those who do not ostensibly fulfil the criteria of ‘full’ agent.