The resilience of democratic institutions in Britain, Australia and the United States under conditions of total war

To what extent are democratic institutions resilient when nation states mobilise for war? Normative and empirical political theorists have long argued that wars strengthen the executive and threaten constitutional politics. In modern democracies, national assemblies are supposed to hold the executive to account by demanding explanations for events and policies; and by scrutinising, reviewing and, if necessary, revising legislative proposals intended to be binding on the host society or policies that have been implemented already. This article examines the extent to which the British and Australian parliaments and the United States Congress held their wartime executives to account during World War II. The research finds that under conditions approaching those of total war, these democratic institutions not only continued to exist, but also proved to be resilient in representing public concerns and holding their executives to account, however imperfectly and notwithstanding delegating huge powers. In consequence, executives—more so British and Australian ministers than President Roosevelt—were required to be placatory as institutional and political tensions within national assemblies and between assemblies and executives continued, and assemblies often asserted themselves. In short, even under the most onerous wartime conditions, democratic politics mattered and democratic institutions were resilient.

Managing the core executive

In the build up to general elections there is invariably a wealth of discourse on constitutional and transitional issues and even on the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the civil service, but rarely is there any debate on the manner in which politicians manage the government machine. This article seeks to address this deficiency. It examines the operational factors common to the core executive, assesses the problems usually associated with the government as an organization and reviews alternative solutions. Finally, it offers managerially oriented advice, reasoning that it is the role of policy analysts to prescribe and that it is irresponsible to ignore this function. it is clearly emphasized that management solutions are not synonymous with business solutions. The article draws on universal principles of management, seeking to avoid normative suggestions and concentrating instead on practical considerations. Those considerations include personnel selection, collective responsibility, leadership style, organizational structure and team mentality. The conclusion is that strong managerially based leadership should not be dismissed as incompatible with the political constraints placed upon Prime Ministers but rather it should e the predominant impulse.

Departmental Select Committees

The idea of departmental select committees in the House of Commons was floated as long ago as the Haldane Report in 1918 and periodically mooted by figures from both left and right as varied as Amery and Laski in the inter‐war years. It was raised again during the wartime investigations of the Machinery of Government committee, only to be shot down by the then Cabinet Secretary, Sir Edward Bridges, on the grounds that it would constrain the frankness with which the Civil Service could advise ministers. Departmental select committees were not to be introduced until 1979. Ten years ago the Institute of Contemporary British History organised a symposium to review their progress. On 31 January 1996 in committee room 10 at the House of Commons the ICBH, in conjunction with the Hansard Society, held another seminar to re‐examine the development of the departmental select committee system, its successes and failings. It was chaired by George Cunningham (Labour MP 1970–82, SDP MP 1982–83). The principal participants were Sir Peter Kemp (Deputy Secretary, Treasury 1983–88, Next Steps Project Manager, Cabinet Office, 1988–92), Douglas Millar (Clerk of Select Committees, House of Commons since 1994), Dr Ann Robinson (author of Parliament and Public Spending, head of the policy unit at the Institute of Directors [IOD], 1989–95 and Director‐General of the National Association of Pension Funds Ltd since 1995), Robert Sheldon (Labour MP since 1964, Financial Secretary to the Treasury 1974–75, member of the Public Accounts Committee [PAC] 1965–70 and 1975–79 and chairman since 1983, member, Public Expenditure Committee 1972–74, and member of the Treasury and Civil Service Committee [TCSC] 1979–81) and Sandy Walkington (head of corporate affairs at BT [British Telecom] plc), with further contributions from Peter Riddell (assistant editor: politics, The Times, since 1993), Chloe Miller, Sean McDougall, Tim King and Chris Stevens.

An ethnographic investigation into gender and language in the Northern Ireland Assembly

This paper investigates the extent to which the negative evaluation of one of the women Ministers in the Northern Ireland Assembly can be attributed to gender. Interviews with politicians as well as the Minister herself illuminate this discussion by identifying the ‘gendered discourses’ that are drawn upon when describing the Minister’s communicative style in debates. Close analyses of transcripts of debates offer a description of some elements of this style, and find that while the Minister is confrontational in debates and ‘stands her ground’, she does not take part in illegal interventions that disrupt the debate floor and are characteristic of the Assembly as a whole. Although the construction of the Minister’s unpopularity can be attributed to a complex interplay of factors, it can be concluded that it is partly the way she draws on gendered linguistic resources that leads her to be negatively judged by her peers.