Consumer confidence indices and stock markets’ meltdowns

Consumer confidence indices (CCIs) are a closely monitored barometer of countries’ economic health and an informative forecasting tool. Using European and US data, we provide a case study of the two recent stock market meltdowns (the post-dotcom bubble correction of 2000–2002 and the 2007–2009 decline at the beginning of the financial crisis) to contribute to the discussion on their appropriateness as proxies for stock markets’ investor sentiment. Investor sentiment should positively covary with stock market movements (DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann 1990); however, we find that the CCI–stock market relationship is not universally positive.We also do not find support for the information effect documented in the previous literature, but identify a more subtle relationship between consumer expectations about future household finances and stock market fluctuations.

Board attributes that increase firm risk - evidence from the UK

Purpose – The aim of the paper is to identify the board attributes that significantly increase firm risk. The study aims to find if board size, percentage of non-executive directors, women on the board, a powerful CEO, equity ownership amongst executive board directors and institutional investor ownership, are associated with firm risk. This is the first study that examines which board attributes increase firm risk using a UK based sample. Design/methodology/approach – This empirical study collected secondary data from Bloomberg and Morningstar databases. The data sample is an unbalanced panel of 260 companies’ secondary data on FTSE 350 index in the UK, from 2005 to 2010. The data was statistically analysed using STATA. Findings – The study establishes the board attributes that were significantly related to firm risk. The results show that a board which can increase firm risk is one that is small in size,has high equity ownership amongst executive board directors and has high institutional investor ownership. Research limitations/implications – The governance culture and regulatory system in the UK is different from other countries. Since the data is a UK based sample, the results can lack generalisability. Practical implications – The results are useful for investors who invest in large firms, to have the knowledge about the board attributes that can increase firm risk. Regulators can also use the results to strengthen regulatory guidelines. Originality/value – This study fills the gap in knowledge in UK governance literature on the board attributes that can increase firm risk.

Public Interests, Private Disputes: Investment Arbitration and the Public Good

This paper seeks to investigate the bases for resistance to arbitration in general -and investor arbitration in particular- focusing on the way in which arbitral tribunals deal with notions of public interest and the public good. The paper hypothesises that while courts have within their terms of reference the capacity to consider notions of public interest, arbitral tribunals do not. It is this core difference in the scope of decision making between the two bodies that could render privately organised dispute resolution unsuitable for disputes that have public aspects, like investor-state disputes. The paper discusses the meaning of public interest and the public good as found in the literature. It then proceeds to consider how tribunals in the investment field have dealt with these concepts. This leads to a conclusion urging not abandonment of arbitration as a component of dispute resolution, but caution. It is argued that unchecked growth in private dispute resolution can threaten perceptions of legitimacy and democratic accountability. The paper adopts a socio-legal methodology in considering the effect of legal mechanisms on social and political phenomena. It is also informed by a law and economics methodology in addressing impacts of dispute resolution mechanisms on economic efficiency. The contribution of the paper rests on theorising motivations for resistance to private dispute resolution, a topical issue in light of the TTIP debate.

To ISDS or not to ISDS: A question of legitimacy in dispute resolution

Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) has gained prominence in recent years with an explosion in the number of investor claims against states. While the evolution of this type of arbitration was expected, its focus and context was not. Investors are currently bringing actions against developed states in unanticipated policy areas. Greece, facing actions from investors challenging its debt haircut and Spain, battling investor challenges to its revamped energy policy are examples of the use of arbitration as a political as well as a dispute resolution tool. It is for this reason why the proposal for the inclusion of ISDS in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) has caused so much heated discussion. This paper examines the recent evolution and likely trajectory of investor state dispute settlement, reflecting on consequences for perceptions of arbitration and its links with politics and economics.

The paradox of competition for airline passengers with reduced mobility (PRM)

Airline competition with customer service as product differentiator has forced down costs, air fares and investor returns. Two passenger markets operate in aviation: (a) able-bodied passengers for whom airlines compete and (b) passengers with reduced mobility (PRMs) – disabled by age, obesity or medical problems – for whom airlines do not compete. Government interference in the market intended to protect a minority of narrowly-defined PRMs has had unintended consequences of enabling increasing numbers of more widely-defined PRMs to access complimentary airline provisions. With growing ageing and overweight populations and long-haul travelling medical tourists such regulation could lead to even lower investors’ returns. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) (2013) examined the air transport value chain for competitiveness using Porter’s (2008) five forces but did not distinguish between able-bodied passengers and PRMs. Findings during an investigation of these two markets concurred with IATA-Porter that the markets for the bargaining powers of PRM buyers and PRM suppliers were highly competitive. However, in contrast to the IATA conclusions, intensity of competition, and threats from new entrants and substitute products for PRM travel were low. The conclusion is that airlines are strategically PRM defensive by omission. Paradoxically, the airline which delivers the best PRM customer service could become the least profitable.

The paradox of competition for airline passengers with reduced mobility (PRM)

Airline competition with customer service as product differentiator has forced down costs, air fares and investor returns. Two passenger markets operate in aviation: (1) able-bodied passengers for whom airlines openly compete and (2) passengers with reduced mobility (PRMs) – disabled by age, obesity or medical problems – for whom airlines do not compete. Government interference in the market intended to protect a minority of narrowly-defined PRMs has had unintended consequences of enabling increasing numbers of more widely-defined PRMs to access complimentary airline provisions. With growing ageing and overweight populations and long-haul travelling medical tourists such regulation could lead to even lower investors’ returns. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) (2013) examined the air transport value chain for competitiveness using Porter’s (2008) five forces but did not distinguish between able-bodied passengers and PRMs. Findings during an investigation of these two markets concurred with IATA-Porter that the markets for the bargaining powers of PRM customers and PRM suppliers were ‘highly competitive’. However, in contrast to the IATA conclusions the threats posed by new entrants, substitute products and intensity of competition for PRM passengers were all ‘low’. The conclusion is that airlines are strategically PRM defensive by omission. Paradoxically, the airline which delivers the best PRM customer service could become the least profitable.