Can the European Union build a bridge over troubled waters? An analysis of the politicised and depoliticised legal approach between the European Union and Cyprus

The Cyprus dispute accurately portrays the evolution of the conflict from ‘warfare to lawfare’ enriched in politics; this research has proven that the Cyprus problem has been and will continue to be one of the most judicialised disputes across the globe. Notwithstanding the ‘normalisation’ of affairs between the two ethno-religious groups on the island since the division in 1974, the Republic of Cyprus’ (RoC) European Union (EU) membership in 2004 failed to catalyse reunification and terminate the legal, political and economic isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community. So the question is; why is it that the powerful legal order of the EU continuously fails to tame the tiny troublesome island of Cyprus? This is a thesis on the interrelationship of the EU legal order and the Cyprus problem. A literal and depoliticised interpretation of EU law has been maintained throughout the EU’s dealings with Cyprus, hence, pre-accession and post-accession. The research has brought to light that this literal interpretation of EU law vis-à-vis Cyprus has in actual fact deepened the division on the island. Pessimists outnumber optimists so far as resolving this problem is concerned, and rightly so if you look back over the last forty years of failed attempts to do just that, a diplomatic combat zone scattered with the bones of numerous mediators. This thesis will discuss how the decisions of the EU institutions, its Member States and specifically of the European Court of Justice, despite conforming to the EU legal order, have managed to disregard the principle of equality on the divided island and thus prevent the promised upgrade of the status of the Turkish Cypriot community since 2004. Indeed, whether a positive or negative reading of the Union’s position towards the Cyprus problem is adopted, the case remains valid for an organisation based on the rule of law to maintain legitimacy, democracy, clarity and equality to the decisions of its institutions. Overall, the aim of this research is to establish a link between the lack of success of the Union to build a bridge over troubled waters and the right of self-determination of the Turkish Cypriot community. The only way left for the EU to help resolve the Cyprus problem is to aim to broker a deal between the two Cypriot communities which will permit the recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) or at least the ‘Taiwanisation’ of Northern Cyprus. Albeit, there are many studies that address the impact of the EU on the conflict or the RoC, which represents the government that has monopolised EU accession, the argument advanced in this thesis is that despite the alleged Europeanisation of the Turkish Cypriot community, they are habitually disregarded because of the EU’s current legal framework and the Union’s lack of conflict transformation strategy vis-à-vis the island. Since the self-declared TRNC is not recognised and EU law is suspended in northern Cyprus in accordance with Protocol No 10 on Cyprus of the Act of Accession 2003, the Turkish-Cypriots represent an idiomatic partner of Brussels but the relations between the two resemble the experience of EU enlargement: the EU’s relevance to the community has been based on the prospects for EU accession (via reunification) and assistance towards preparation for potential EU integration through financial and technical aid. Undeniably, the pre-accession and postaccession strategy of Brussels in Cyprus has worsened the Cyprus problem and hindered the peace process. The time has come for the international community to formally acknowledge the existence of the TRNC.

Capital 2.0 capital formation and legal risk in a new global economic order from fiat to exit: including case studies of the proposed transatlantic trade and investment partnership between the United States and the European Union and the financing relation between the United States and the People’s Republic of China

Following the intrinsically linked balance sheets in his Capital Formation Life Cycle, Lukas M. Stahl explains with his Triple A Model of Accounting, Allocation and Accountability the stages of the Capital Formation process from FIAT to EXIT. Based on the theoretical foundations of legal risk laid by the International Bar Association with the help of Roger McCormick and legal scholars such as Joanna Benjamin, Matthew Whalley and Tobias Mahler, and founded on the basis of Wesley Hohfeld’s category theory of jural relations, Stahl develops his mutually exclusive Four Determinants of Legal Risk of Law, Lack of Right, Liability and Limitation. Those Four Determinants of Legal Risk allow us to apply, assess, and precisely describe the respective legal risk at all stages of the Capital Formation Life Cycle as demonstrated in case studies of nine industry verticals of the proposed and currently negotiated Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the United States of America and the European Union, TTIP, as well as in the case of the often cited financing relation between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. Having established the Four Determinants of Legal Risk and its application to the Capital Formation Life Cycle, Stahl then explores the theoretical foundations of capital formation, their historical basis in classical and neo-classical economics and its forefathers such as The Austrians around Eugen von Boehm-Bawerk, Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich von Hayek and most notably and controversial, Karl Marx, and their impact on today’s exponential expansion of capital formation. Starting off with the first pillar of his Triple A Model, Accounting, Stahl then moves on to explain the Three Factors of Capital Formation, Man, Machines and Money and shows how “value-added” is created with respect to the non-monetary capital factors of human resources and industrial production. Followed by a detailed analysis discussing the roles of the Three Actors of Monetary Capital Formation, Central Banks, Commercial Banks and Citizens Stahl readily dismisses a number of myths regarding the creation of money providing in-depth insight into the workings of monetary policy makers, their institutions and ultimate beneficiaries, the corporate and consumer citizens. In his second pillar, Allocation, Stahl continues his analysis of the balance sheets of the Capital Formation Life Cycle by discussing the role of The Five Key Accounts of Monetary Capital Formation, the Sovereign, Financial, Corporate, Private and International account of Monetary Capital Formation and the associated legal risks in the allocation of capital pursuant to his Four Determinants of Legal Risk. In his third pillar, Accountability, Stahl discusses the ever recurring Crisis-Reaction-Acceleration-Sequence-History, in short: CRASH, since the beginning of the millennium starting with the dot-com crash at the turn of the millennium, followed seven years later by the financial crisis of 2008 and the dislocations in the global economy we are facing another seven years later today in 2015 with several sordid debt restructurings under way and hundred thousands of refugees on the way caused by war and increasing inequality. Together with the regulatory reactions they have caused in the form of so-called landmark legislation such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, the JOBS Act of 2012 or the introduction of the Basel Accords, Basel II in 2004 and III in 2010, the European Financial Stability Facility of 2010, the European Stability Mechanism of 2012 and the European Banking Union of 2013, Stahl analyses the acceleration in size and scope of crises that appears to find often seemingly helpless bureaucratic responses, the inherent legal risks and the complete lack of accountability on part of those responsible. Stahl argues that the order of the day requires to address the root cause of the problems in the form of two fundamental design defects of our Global Economic Order, namely our monetary and judicial order. Inspired by a 1933 plan of nine University of Chicago economists abolishing the fractional reserve system, he proposes the introduction of Sovereign Money as a prerequisite to void misallocations by way of judicial order in the course of domestic and transnational insolvency proceedings including the restructuring of sovereign debt throughout the entire monetary system back to its origin without causing domino effects of banking collapses and failed financial institutions. In recognizing Austrian-American economist Schumpeter’s Concept of Creative Destruction, as a process of industrial mutation that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one, Stahl responds to Schumpeter’s economic chemotherapy with his Concept of Equitable Default mimicking an immunotherapy that strengthens the corpus economicus own immune system by providing for the judicial authority to terminate precisely those misallocations that have proven malignant causing default perusing the century old common law concept of equity that allows for the equitable reformation, rescission or restitution of contract by way of judicial order. Following a review of the proposed mechanisms of transnational dispute resolution and current court systems with transnational jurisdiction, Stahl advocates as a first step in order to complete the Capital Formation Life Cycle from FIAT, the creation of money by way of credit, to EXIT, the termination of money by way of judicial order, the institution of a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Court constituted by a panel of judges from the U.S. Court of International Trade and the European Court of Justice by following the model of the EFTA Court of the European Free Trade Association. Since the first time his proposal has been made public in June of 2014 after being discussed in academic circles since 2011, his or similar proposals have found numerous public supporters. Most notably, the former Vice President of the European Parliament, David Martin, has tabled an amendment in June 2015 in the course of the negotiations on TTIP calling for an independent judicial body and the Member of the European Commission, Cecilia Malmström, has presented her proposal of an International Investment Court on September 16, 2015. Stahl concludes, that for the first time in the history of our generation it appears that there is a real opportunity for reform of our Global Economic Order by curing the two fundamental design defects of our monetary order and judicial order with the abolition of the fractional reserve system and the introduction of Sovereign Money and the institution of a democratically elected Transatlantic Trade and Investment Court that commensurate with its jurisdiction extending to cases concerning the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership may complete the Capital Formation Life Cycle resolving cases of default with the transnational judicial authority for terminal resolution of misallocations in a New Global Economic Order without the ensuing dangers of systemic collapse from FIAT to EXIT.