Inflation targeting and the consistency of monetary policy decisions in Mexico: an empirical analysis with discrete choice models

This paper examines the nature of monetary policy decisions in Mexico using discrete choice models applied to the Central Bank's explicit monetary policy instrument. We find that monetary policy adjustments in Mexico have been strongly consistent with the CB's inflation targeting strategy. We also find evidence that monetary policy responds in a forward-looking manner to deviations of inflation from the target and that observed policy adjustments exhibit asymmetric features, with stronger responses to positive than to negative deviations of inflation from the target and a greater likelihood of policy persistence during periods when monetary policy is tightened, compared with periods when policy is loosened.

How Formal and Informal Institutions of Middle Eastern Countries Influence Managerial Discretion: An Empirical Investigation

Managerial discretion is the focal theme bridging the clash between two schools of thoughts; whether executives have greater influence on their firms’ outcomes or other factors restrain their actions (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). It is argued that constraints come from inertial, normative and environmental forces (e.g. DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Of these restraints is the institutional environment in which a firm is headquartered. Our paper falls within this research stream and provides an extension for Crossland and Hambrick (2007, 2011) work. We investigate the national level of discretion in new cross-cultural contexts, provide deeper understanding of its concept, and shed the light on undiscovered discretion’s antecedents and consequences. We adopt a quantitative approach in which questionnaires represent our data collection instrument. We anticipate that in high discretion countries firms tend to follow what Miles & Snow (1978) labeled ‘Prospector’ strategy as opposed to low discretion countries in which firms incline to implement a ‘Defender’ strategy.