Congressional acquiescence to presidentialism in the US ‘War on Terror’

Congressional dominance theory holds that not only can the US Congress control the executive, it does. The terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 and the Bush administration's ensuing global 'war on terror' suggest a different result. Bush's response to 9/11 signalled not only new directions in US foreign and domestic policy but a new stage in the aggrandisement of presidential power in the United States and a further step in the marginalisation of the Congress. Informed by a constitutional doctrine unknown to the framers of the US Constitution, the Bush administration pursued a presidentialist or 'ultra-separationist' governing strategy that was disrespectful to the legislature's intended role in the separated system. Using its unilateral powers, in public and in secret, claiming 'inherent' authority from the Constitution, and exploiting the public's fear of a further terrorist attack and of endangering the lives of US troops abroad, the administration skilfully drove its legislation through the Congress. Occasionally, the Congress was able to extract concessions - notably in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, when partisan control of the government was split - but more typically, for most of the period, the Congress acquiesced to administration demands, albeit with the consolation of minor concessions. The administration not only dominated the lawmaking process, it also cowed legislators into legitimating often highly controversial (and sometimes illegal) administration-determined definitions of counter-terrorism and national security policy. Certainly, the Congress undertook a considerable amount of oversight during the period of the 'war on terror'; lawmakers also complained. But the effects on policy were marginal. This finding held true for periods of Democratic as well as Republican majorities.

Be careful what you wish for: the legal parameters of EU withdrawal

Easiness with which the political circles talk about withdrawal from the European Union is rather surprising and proves that the legal parameters of an EU exit are not treated seriously enough. In theoretical terms Article 50 TEU allows for a unilateral exit as well as for a consensual divorce. Arguably, the first is an interesting abstract proposition, which, however, in practical terms seems to be an unworkable solution. Hence, the only realistic option is a proper divorce based on a withdrawal agreement. As per Article 50 TEU, it would be negotiated by the European Union with a departing country and should cover the terms of withdrawal and “take account of future relations” between the EU and the divorcee. It is submitted that in order to avoid a legal vacuum, this agreement should not only “take account of future relations” but actually deal with them thoroughly. This will make the negotiations difficult and, most likely, time consuming. One also has to envisage a scenario whereby a country leaving the European Union would join EFTA and become a EFTA-EU Member State of the European Economic Area. Should that happen the scope of a EU withdrawal agreement would be limited to the terms of exit, while future relations between the divorcee and the European Union would be mainly covered by the EEA Agreement. This chapter unlocks the mechanics of Article 50 TEU and the withdrawal procedure it provides for. It covers the issues that should be attended to by the negotiators and provides an overview of dossiers that are likely be covered in a withdrawal agreement.

Digital evidence as a means of proof before the International Court of Justice

This article discusses the use of digital evidence as a means of proof before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The absence of specific Court rules and procedures for digital evidence (with the exception of Practice Direction IX bis) is not necessarily an obstacle to its production and evaluation before the ICJ, as the general evidentiary rules can also be applied to digital evidence. The article first looks at the rules on the production of documentary evidence and then examines the specific issues related to audiovisual evidence. Finally, it examines the admissibility of digital evidence unlawfully obtained by a litigant through unilateral transborder access to data. The article concludes that, even if specific regulation may be needed as to the specific way in which authenticity and accuracy of digital evidence are to be established, the particular facts of the case and the grounds of challenge can vary widely, and it is doubtful that any regulation could be sufficiently flexible to deal with this in advance.