Qualified exceptionalism: the US Congress in comparative perspective

The framers of the American Constitution devised a singular bicameral legislative body, which invested substantial power in both a broadly representative lower chamber and a second "deliberative" chamber that was both insulated from the voters and unrepresentative of the population as a whole. Until the early 20th Century, the singular U.S. Congress changed little, but with growing national responsibilities, it sought to construct organizational forms that could address a consistently stronger executive. Since the 1980s, the Congress has relied increasingly on stronger parties to organize its activities. This development, embraced in turn by Democrats and Republicans, has led to changes that have edged the Congress in the direction of parliamentary democracies. We conclude this analysis has real, but limited utility, as congressional party leaders continue to barter for votes and, in the context, of narrow chamber majorities, often rely heavily on presidential assistance on divisive issues that are important to their party brand. Yet, the traditional features of the American separated system - bicameralism, the committee systems, and the centrifugal forces emanating from diverse congressional districts, increasingly complex policy issues, and the fear of electoral retribution - also remain strong, and effectively constrain the influence of leaders.'Qualified exceptionalism' thus most aptly describes the contemporary American Congress, which remains 'exceptional,' but less than unique, as it responds to many of the same forces, in some of the same ways (e.g., strong parties), as do many other representative assemblies around the world.

Moment of stasis: the successful failure of a constitution for Europe

The 2005 French and Dutch negative votes on the Constitution open up a space of conceptualisation, not only of Europe's relation to its demos, but significantly to its failures. Through a critical analysis of mainly Niklas Luhmann's systems theory, the article proposes taking a distance from traditional constitutional dogmatics that are no longer capable of dealing with the paradox of contemporary society, and more specifically with the eventual resurgence of the European project as one of absence and stasis: the two terms are used to explain the need, on the one hand, to maintain the 'absent community' of Europe, and, on the other, to start realising that any conceptualisation of the European project will now have to take place in that space of instability and contingency revealed by the constitutional failure. The relation between law and politics, the location of a constitution, the distinction between social and normative legitimacy, the connection between European identity and demos, and the concept of continuity between constitutional text and context are revisited in an attempt to trace the constitutional failure as the constitutional moment par excellence.