Winston Churchill as Chancellor of the Exchequer (1924-9) and the Return to the Gold Standard

This revisits Churchill's decision, as Chancellor of the Exchequer 1924-29, to restore the Gold Standard in 1925. This is considered within the wider context of the overall aims of Churchill's policies, including his efforts to: tackle Anglo-American economic and financial relations in the aftermath of the Great War; address budgetary pressures; widen the tax base through innovations such as the Betting Duty; spread the social burden of taxes; and revive the economy, not least through his de-rating scheme.

Churchill as Chancellor of the Exchequer (1924–9) and the return to the gold standard

The general election of 29 October 1924 saw Winston Churchill return to Parliament as Constitutionalist MP for Epping after two years in the political wilderness. It also saw Stanley Baldwin swept back to Number 10 on a Conservative landslide. Speculation about whether Baldwin would cement Churchill’s drift from the Liberal fold by offering him office surfaced during the election campaign. Churchill nevertheless thought ‘it very unlikely that I shall be invited to join the Government, as owing to the size of the majority it will probably be composed only of impeccable Conservatives’. [ 1 ] Because of his anti-socialist credentials, his ability to reassure wavering Liberals through his opposition to protectionism – dropped by Baldwin after its rejection in the 1923 general election – and concern he could prove a rallying point for backbench malcontents, there was however much to commend giving Churchill a post. To his surprise, Baldwin offered Churchill the long-coveted office of Chancellor of the Exchequer, briefly held by his father before his ill-conceived resignation in 1887. Having arranged a meeting with his Labour predecessor, Philip Snowden, about outstanding business the new Chancellor set to work. Marking his political transition, a few days later Churchill resigned from the National Liberal Club.

The Causal Links between FDI and Economic Growth in Developing Countries: A Case Study of the Republic of Rwanda

The study examines the short-run and long-run causality running from real economic growth to real foreign direct investment inflows (RFDI). Other variables such as education (involving combination of primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment as a proxy to education), real development finance, unskilled labour, to real RFDI inflows are included in the study. The time series data covering the period of 1983 -2013 are examined. First, I applied Augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) technique to test for unit root in variables. Findings shows all variables integrated of order one [I(1)]. Thereafter, Johansen Co-integration Test (JCT) was conducted to establish the relationship among variables. Both trace and maximum Eigen value at 5% level of significance indicate 3 co-integrated equations. Vector error correction method (VECM) was applied to capture short and long-run causality running from education, economic growth, real development finance, and unskilled labour to real foreign direct investment inflows in the Republic of Rwanda. Findings shows no short-run causality running from education, real development finance, real GDP and unskilled labour to real FDI inflows, however there were existence of long-run causality. This can be interpreted that, in the short-run; education, development finance, finance and economic growth does not influence inflows of foreign direct investment in Rwanda; but it does in long-run. From the policy perspective, the Republic of Rwanda should focus more on long term goal of investing in education to improve human capital, undertake policy reforms that promotes economic growth, in addition to promoting good governance to attract development finance – especially from Nordics countries (particularly Norway and Denmark).