Explaining party cohesion and discipline in democratic legislatures: purposiveness and contexts

Legislative party discipline and cohesion are important phenomena in the study of political systems. Unless assumptions are made that parties are cohesive and act as unified collectivities with reasonably well-defined goals, it is really difficult, if not impossible, to consider their electoral and legislative roles usefully. But levels of legislative party cohesiveness are also important because they provide us with crucial information about how legislatures/ parliaments function and how they interact with executives/governments. Without cohesive (or disciplined) parties,1 government survival in parliamentary systems is threatened because executive and legislative powers are fused while in separated systems presidents' bases of legislative support become less stable. How do we explain varying levels of legislative party cohesion? The first part of this article draws on the purposive literature to explore the benefits and costs to legislators in democratic legislatures of joining and acting collectively and individualistically within political parties. This leads on to a discussion of various conceptual and empirical problems encountered in analysing intra-party cohesion and discipline in democratic legislatures on plenary votes. Finally, the article reviews the extant empirical evidence on how a multiplicity of systemic, party-levels and situational factors supposedly impact cohesion/discipline levels. The article ends with a discussion of the possibilities and limitations of building comparative models of cohesion/discipline.

Handling the transfer of power: a note on the 1964 origins of the Douglas‐Home rules

Opposition is rarely a good preparation for government. The only post‐war government to enter office confident, well‐acquainted with the Civil Service and with a fund of administrative experience to draw on was the Attlee administration formed in 1945. The longer a party spends in opposition the more these assets disappear. Labour, by the end of the long period of Conservative rule in 1951–64, was largely unfamiliar with the burdens of office. This formed the background to the formulation of the Douglas‐Home rules, whereby informal contact is permitted between the Civil Service and the Opposition in advance of a general election. Since 1964 this arrangement has gradually become more extensive (especially after Neil Kinnock complained that the period for contact was too brief during the run‐up to the 1992 election) and more formalised. In late 1993 John Major agreed that contacts could be made from early 1996 in advance of the next election, rather than only during the last six months of a parliament, as had by then become the convention.’ The object of this short paper is, however, to explain how these rules originated.

Colour Sensation and Empathy: Arthur Schopenhauer's Negative Philosophy and Colour Theory as the Basis of an Elemental Colour Architecture

Arthur Schopenhauer proposed a theory of colour as a consequence of his first hand knowledge of J.W. Goethe’s experiments with color phenomena. This colour theory can be used to explore an interesting proposition Schopenhauer made about architecture. For Schopenhauer, architecture is about feelings, not about functions or forms, its purpose as an art is to reveal the principles of primitive forces, specifically gravity and rigidity. For Schopenhauer, architecture expresses these forces in the poised equilibrium of massive structures built out of stone. Schopenhauer was inclined to believed that architecture had already achieved its most perfect expression in Greek temple architecture. However; he did offer one possibility for architectural research: this was the suggestion that architecture was also concerned with the expression of light. It seems never to have occurred to Schopenhauer to use his colour theory to speculate about light in architecture. This paper explores some of the implications of Schopenhauer’s theory of colour for his aesthetics of architecture?