Withdrawing from Atmosphere: An Ontology of Air partitioning and Affective Engineering

The main objective of this text is to warn against atmospherics. However comfortable it might appear, an atmosphere is politically suspicious because it numbs a body into an affective embrace of stability and permanence. It becomes doubly suspicious because a body desires to be part of the atmosphere. For this reason, I rethink both affect and atmosphere ontologically rather than phenomenologically. I argue that an atmosphere is engineered by subsuming individual affects to what I call, following Sloterdijk, an atmospheric glasshouse. I suggest that this happens in four steps: a distinction between inside and outside through partitioning; inclusion of the outside inside; illusion of synthesis; and dissimulation. In order to do this, I begin with air as the elemental paradox of ontological continuum and rupture. I carry on with the passage from air to atmosphere while retaining the discourse around continuum and rupture. Finally, I indicate a way of rupturing the atmospheric continuum through the ontological movement of withdrawal from the atmosphere. The ultimate goal of the article is to sketch a problematic of atmospherics that puts together without synthesising an elemental ontology of continuum and rupture.

Withdrawing from atmosphere: An ontology of air partitioning and affective engineering

The main objective of this text is to warn against atmospherics. However comfortable it might appear, an atmosphere is politically suspicious because it numbs a body into an affective embrace of stability and permanence. It becomes doubly suspicious because a body desires to be part of the atmosphere. For this reason, I rethink both affect and atmosphere ontologically rather than phenomenologically. I argue that an atmosphere is engineered by subsuming individual affects to what I call, following Sloterdijk, an atmospheric glasshouse. I suggest that this happens in four steps: a distinction between inside and outside through partitioning; inclusion of the outside inside; illusion of synthesis; and dissimulation. In order to do this, I begin with air as the elemental paradox of ontological continuum and rupture. I carry on with the passage from air to atmosphere while retaining the discourse around continuum and rupture. Finally, I indicate a way of rupturing the atmospheric continuum through the ontological movement of withdrawal from the atmosphere. The ultimate goal of the article is to sketch a problematic of atmospherics that puts together without synthesising an elemental ontology of continuum and rupture.

Task Competency in the Rights Analytic: Mental Health and the Justification for Rights and Duties

The paper concerns the moral status of persons for the purposes of rights-holding and duty-bearing. Developing from Gewirth’s argument to the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC) and Beyleveld et al.’s Principle of Precautionary Reasoning, I argue in favour of a capacity-based assessment of the task competencies required for choice-rights and certain duties (within the Hohfeldian analytic). Unlike other, traditional, theories of rights, I claim that precautionary reasoning as to agentic status holds the base justification for rights-holding. If this is the basis for generic legal rights, then the contingent argument must be used to explain communities of rights. Much in the same way as two ‘normal’ adult agents may not have equal rights to be an aeroplane pilot, not all adults hold the same task competencies in relation to the exercise of the generic rights to freedom derived from the PGC. In this paper, I set out to consider the rights held by children, persons suffering from mental illness and generic ‘full’ agents. In mapping the developing ‘portfolio’ of rights and duties that a person carries during their life we might better understand the legal relations of those who do not ostensibly fulfil the criteria of ‘full’ agent.