The rise and fall of Monica Felton, British town planner and peace activist, 1930s to 1950s

This article reflects growing academic interest in the careers and historical significance of professional women town planners, an interest clearly registered in Planning Perspectives and other publications. Unlike other women town planners, however, the career of Monica Felton remains largely obscure. It was certainly short-lived, beginning as it did on the London County Council in 1937 and ending spectacularly while she was Chairman of Stevenage Development Corporation in 1951. Felton became an outcast from both her profession and her country when she gave up on new town development to campaign against British and American involvement in the Korean War in 1951. This article emphasizes her distinctive contribution to the evolving roles of women in British town planning during the mid-twentieth century and shows how this contribution was obscured by her fall from grace.

Transgender Freedom and the Law: A Liberal-Poststructural Discussion on McNally

In R v McNally, gender deception is found capable of leading to the vitiation of consent to sexual intercourse and, in so doing, places restriction on the freedom of transgendered individuals in favour of cisgendered freedom. This paper seeks to challenge the standing of this decision by adopting a combined methodological approach between Deleuzian post-structuralism and Gewirthian legal idealism. In so doing, we attempt to show that the combination offers a novel and productive approach to contentious decisions, such as that in McNally. Our approach brings together post-structuralist corporeality which conceives of the body as material and productive, and Gewirth’s ‘agent’ to conceptualise the legal body as an entity which can, and should, shape judicial reasoning. It does this by employing the criterion of categorically necessary freedom on institutionalised practical reasoning. These ‘bodies of agents’ can be conceived as the underpinning and justificatory basis for the authority of the law subject to the morally rational Principle of Generic Consistency. This egalitarian condition precedent requires individualisation and the ability to accept self-differentiation in order to return to a status, which can be validly described as “law”. Ultimately, we argue that this theoretical combination responds to a call to problematise the connection made between gender discourse and judicial reasoning, whilst offering the opportunity to further our conceptions of law and broaden the theoretical armoury with which to challenge judicial reasoning in McNally. That is, a ‘good faith’ attempt to further and guarantee transgender freedoms.