Cruise Speed Reduction for Ground Delay Programs: A Case Study for San Francisco International Airport Arrivals

Ground Delay Programs (GDP) are sometimes cancelled before their initial planned duration and for this reason aircraft are delayed when it is no longer needed. Recovering this delay usually leads to extra fuel consumption, since the aircraft will typically depart after having absorbed on ground their assigned delay and, therefore, they will need to cruise at more fuel consuming speeds. Past research has proposed speed reduction strategy aiming at splitting the GDP-assigned delay between ground and airborne delay, while using the same fuel as in nominal conditions. Being airborne earlier, an aircraft can speed up to nominal cruise speed and recover part of the GDP delay without incurring extra fuel consumption if the GDP is cancelled earlier than planned. In this paper, all GDP initiatives that occurred in San Francisco International Airport during 2006 are studied and characterised by a K-means algorithm into three different clusters. The centroids for these three clusters have been used to simulate three different GDPs at the airport by using a realistic set of inbound traffic and the Future Air Traffic Management Concepts Evaluation Tool (FACET). The amount of delay that can be recovered using this cruise speed reduction technique, as a function of the GDP cancellation time, has been computed and compared with the delay recovered with the current concept of operations. Simulations have been conducted in calm wind situation and without considering a radius of exemption. Results indicate that when aircraft depart early and fly at the slower speed they can recover additional delays, compared to current operations where all delays are absorbed prior to take-off, in the event the GDP cancels early. There is a variability of extra delay recovered, being more significant, in relative terms, for those GDPs with a relatively low amount of demand exceeding the airport capacity.

Supply Chain Resilience? Definition of concept and its formative elements.

The objective of this paper is to conceptualize Supply Chain Resilience (SCRes) and identify which supply chain capabilities can support the containment of disruptions and how these capabilities affect SCRes. Through a systematic and structured review of literature, this paper provides insights into the conceptualization and research methodological background of the SCM field. A total of one hundred and thirty four carefully selected refereed journal articles were systematically analyzed leading to the introduction of a novel definition for SCRes, which the authors view as the as “the ability to proactively plan and design the Supply Chain network for anticipating unexpected disruptive (negative) events, respond adaptively to disruptions while maintaining control over structure and function and transcending to a post-event robust state of operations, if possible, more favorable than the one prior to the event, thus gaining competitive advantage”. Finally, a critical examination of existing conceptual frameworks for understanding the relationships between the SCRes concept and its identified formative elements, is taking place.

Can the European Union build a bridge over troubled waters? An analysis of the politicised and depoliticised legal approach between the European Union and Cyprus

The Cyprus dispute accurately portrays the evolution of the conflict from ‘warfare to lawfare’ enriched in politics; this research has proven that the Cyprus problem has been and will continue to be one of the most judicialised disputes across the globe. Notwithstanding the ‘normalisation’ of affairs between the two ethno-religious groups on the island since the division in 1974, the Republic of Cyprus’ (RoC) European Union (EU) membership in 2004 failed to catalyse reunification and terminate the legal, political and economic isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community. So the question is; why is it that the powerful legal order of the EU continuously fails to tame the tiny troublesome island of Cyprus? This is a thesis on the interrelationship of the EU legal order and the Cyprus problem. A literal and depoliticised interpretation of EU law has been maintained throughout the EU’s dealings with Cyprus, hence, pre-accession and post-accession. The research has brought to light that this literal interpretation of EU law vis-à-vis Cyprus has in actual fact deepened the division on the island. Pessimists outnumber optimists so far as resolving this problem is concerned, and rightly so if you look back over the last forty years of failed attempts to do just that, a diplomatic combat zone scattered with the bones of numerous mediators. This thesis will discuss how the decisions of the EU institutions, its Member States and specifically of the European Court of Justice, despite conforming to the EU legal order, have managed to disregard the principle of equality on the divided island and thus prevent the promised upgrade of the status of the Turkish Cypriot community since 2004. Indeed, whether a positive or negative reading of the Union’s position towards the Cyprus problem is adopted, the case remains valid for an organisation based on the rule of law to maintain legitimacy, democracy, clarity and equality to the decisions of its institutions. Overall, the aim of this research is to establish a link between the lack of success of the Union to build a bridge over troubled waters and the right of self-determination of the Turkish Cypriot community. The only way left for the EU to help resolve the Cyprus problem is to aim to broker a deal between the two Cypriot communities which will permit the recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) or at least the ‘Taiwanisation’ of Northern Cyprus. Albeit, there are many studies that address the impact of the EU on the conflict or the RoC, which represents the government that has monopolised EU accession, the argument advanced in this thesis is that despite the alleged Europeanisation of the Turkish Cypriot community, they are habitually disregarded because of the EU’s current legal framework and the Union’s lack of conflict transformation strategy vis-à-vis the island. Since the self-declared TRNC is not recognised and EU law is suspended in northern Cyprus in accordance with Protocol No 10 on Cyprus of the Act of Accession 2003, the Turkish-Cypriots represent an idiomatic partner of Brussels but the relations between the two resemble the experience of EU enlargement: the EU’s relevance to the community has been based on the prospects for EU accession (via reunification) and assistance towards preparation for potential EU integration through financial and technical aid. Undeniably, the pre-accession and postaccession strategy of Brussels in Cyprus has worsened the Cyprus problem and hindered the peace process. The time has come for the international community to formally acknowledge the existence of the TRNC.