The 'emotionalization of the 'war on terror'': counter-terrorism, fear, risk, insecurity and helplessness

The ‘war on terror’ has marked the existence of exceptional measures involving military action abroad and the introduction of counter-terrorism legislation in the United Kingdom. Within this context fear, risk and insecurity have been intrinsic in legitimizing the measures created as being necessary to maintain national security. This article presents the findings from a study investigating the impact of the ‘war on terror’ on British Muslims’ emotions. The study revealed how facets of the ‘war on terror’, including ‘human rights and policing’, ‘What if? and pre-emption’, ‘geopolitics and reflexive fear and risk’ and ‘fear from inside the binary’ impacted participants’ emotions. Through exploring how thepolicy measures implemented in the ‘war on terror’ have influenced British Muslims’ emotions, the article takes a small step in addressing the analytical gap in criminological research on emotions in the ‘war on terror’.

Congressional acquiescence to presidentialism in the US ‘War on Terror’

Congressional dominance theory holds that not only can the US Congress control the executive, it does. The terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 and the Bush administration's ensuing global 'war on terror' suggest a different result. Bush's response to 9/11 signalled not only new directions in US foreign and domestic policy but a new stage in the aggrandisement of presidential power in the United States and a further step in the marginalisation of the Congress. Informed by a constitutional doctrine unknown to the framers of the US Constitution, the Bush administration pursued a presidentialist or 'ultra-separationist' governing strategy that was disrespectful to the legislature's intended role in the separated system. Using its unilateral powers, in public and in secret, claiming 'inherent' authority from the Constitution, and exploiting the public's fear of a further terrorist attack and of endangering the lives of US troops abroad, the administration skilfully drove its legislation through the Congress. Occasionally, the Congress was able to extract concessions - notably in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, when partisan control of the government was split - but more typically, for most of the period, the Congress acquiesced to administration demands, albeit with the consolation of minor concessions. The administration not only dominated the lawmaking process, it also cowed legislators into legitimating often highly controversial (and sometimes illegal) administration-determined definitions of counter-terrorism and national security policy. Certainly, the Congress undertook a considerable amount of oversight during the period of the 'war on terror'; lawmakers also complained. But the effects on policy were marginal. This finding held true for periods of Democratic as well as Republican majorities.

Russia and the Arab Spring: supporting the counter-revolution

Russia’s response to the Arab Spring ranged from apprehension to deep anxiety and diverged significantly from the US and the EU responses. While initially welcoming the popular demands for political reform in North Africa, the Russian reaction rapidly became more critical as a result of Western military intervention into Libya and the threat of the spread of Islamist extremism. It was these twin fears which prompted the Russian leadership to adopt an uncompromizing stance towards Syria. While geopolitical factors certainly played a role in driving Russian strategy, domestic political factors were also more significant. As the Russian leadership felt internally threatened by the growing opposition within the country, conflict in the Middle East highlighted the perceived flaws of the imposition of Western liberal democracy and the virtues of Russia’s own model of state-managed political order. There was, as such, a significant ideational and ideological dimension to the Russian response to the Arab Spring.

Did We Fail? (Counter-)Transference in a Qualitative Media Research Interview

Drawing on Joke Hermes’ (2006) account of a troubling interview, this article reproduces and reflects on passages from a qualitative interview with a user of a social networking site that was experienced as uncomfortable by both interviewee and interviewer (myself). The psychoanalytic concept of (counter-)transference is used to analyse the possible processes that led to the emergence of two narratives by the interviewee and interviewer and resulted in an unsuccessful research encounter. It is suggested that the analysis of the interview narratives may contribute to Wanda S. Pillow’s (2003) notion of an ‘uncomfortable reflexivity’. It may further add to methodological discussions of the interview in media research by placing an emphasis on a complex theory of the subject and intersubjective dynamics.