On absence: society’s return to barbarians

The problem of social exclusion is dealt here through the lens of a particularly radical social theory, that of autopoietic society by Niklas Luhmann. Here, exclusion is included in society, no longer as an issue for care, integration and therapy, but as a mechanism to show the importance of the visibility of exclusion. The inclusion of exclusion in autopoiesis is a far-reaching step that demands a revisiting of the concept of autopoietic society. This article proposes a radicalization of the concept on the basis of an acknowledgment of the impossibility of communication with the excluded. This acknowledgement conditions society from within. It is built upon the Luhmannian description of Barbarism as the included exclusion, and is further conceptualized as its excess, as a 'space of absence'. Within autopoiesis, absence is described as an aporetic rather than a paradoxical structure, a memento vanitas that irritates the system from within, constantly reminding it of its limitations.

Churchill as Chancellor of the Exchequer (1924–9) and the return to the gold standard

The general election of 29 October 1924 saw Winston Churchill return to Parliament as Constitutionalist MP for Epping after two years in the political wilderness. It also saw Stanley Baldwin swept back to Number 10 on a Conservative landslide. Speculation about whether Baldwin would cement Churchill’s drift from the Liberal fold by offering him office surfaced during the election campaign. Churchill nevertheless thought ‘it very unlikely that I shall be invited to join the Government, as owing to the size of the majority it will probably be composed only of impeccable Conservatives’. [ 1 ] Because of his anti-socialist credentials, his ability to reassure wavering Liberals through his opposition to protectionism – dropped by Baldwin after its rejection in the 1923 general election – and concern he could prove a rallying point for backbench malcontents, there was however much to commend giving Churchill a post. To his surprise, Baldwin offered Churchill the long-coveted office of Chancellor of the Exchequer, briefly held by his father before his ill-conceived resignation in 1887. Having arranged a meeting with his Labour predecessor, Philip Snowden, about outstanding business the new Chancellor set to work. Marking his political transition, a few days later Churchill resigned from the National Liberal Club.

Winston Churchill as Chancellor of the Exchequer (1924-9) and the Return to the Gold Standard

This revisits Churchill's decision, as Chancellor of the Exchequer 1924-29, to restore the Gold Standard in 1925. This is considered within the wider context of the overall aims of Churchill's policies, including his efforts to: tackle Anglo-American economic and financial relations in the aftermath of the Great War; address budgetary pressures; widen the tax base through innovations such as the Betting Duty; spread the social burden of taxes; and revive the economy, not least through his de-rating scheme.

How the sublime became "now": time, modernity and aesthetics in Lyotard's rewriting of Kant

Writing in the late 1980s, Nancy gives as examples of the "recent fashion for the sublime" not only the theoreticians of Paris, but the artists of Los Angeles, Berlin, Rome, and Tokyo. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the sublime may of course no longer seem quite so "now" as it did back then, whether in North America, Europe, or Japan. Simon Critchley, for one, has suggested that, at least as regards the issue of its conceptual coupling to "postmodernism," the "debate" concerning the sublime "has become rather stale and the discussion has moved on." Nonetheless, if that debate has indeed "moved on"-and thankfully so-it is not without its remainder, particularly in the very contemporary context of a resurgence of interest in explicitly philosophical accounts of art, in the wake of an emergent critique of cultural studies and of the apparent waning of poststructuralism's influence-a resurgence that has led to a certain "return to aesthetics" in recent Continental philosophy and to the work of Kant, Schelling, and the German Romantics. Moreover, as Nancy's precise formulations suggest, the "fashion" [mode] through which the sublime "offers itself"-as "a break within or from aesthetics"-clearly contains a significance that Critchley's more straightforward narration of shifts in theoretical chic cannot encompass. At stake in this would be the relation between the mode of fashion and art's "destiny" within modernity itself, from the late eighteenth century onwards. Such a conception of art's "destiny," as inextricably linked to that of the sublime, is not unique to recent French theory. In a brief passage in Aesthetic Theory, Adorno also suggests that the "sublime, which Kant reserved exclusively for nature, later became the historical constituent of art itself.... [I]n a subtle way, after the fall of formal beauty, the sublime was the only aesthetic idea left to modernism." As such, although the term has its classical origins in Longinus, its historical character for "us," both Nancy and Adorno argue, associates it specifically with the emergence of the modern. As another philosopher states: "It is around this name [of the sublime] that the destiny of classical poetics was hazarded and lost; it is in this name that ... romanticism, in other words, modernity, triumphed."

Transgender Freedom and the Law: A Liberal-Poststructural Discussion on McNally

In R v McNally, gender deception is found capable of leading to the vitiation of consent to sexual intercourse and, in so doing, places restriction on the freedom of transgendered individuals in favour of cisgendered freedom. This paper seeks to challenge the standing of this decision by adopting a combined methodological approach between Deleuzian post-structuralism and Gewirthian legal idealism. In so doing, we attempt to show that the combination offers a novel and productive approach to contentious decisions, such as that in McNally. Our approach brings together post-structuralist corporeality which conceives of the body as material and productive, and Gewirth’s ‘agent’ to conceptualise the legal body as an entity which can, and should, shape judicial reasoning. It does this by employing the criterion of categorically necessary freedom on institutionalised practical reasoning. These ‘bodies of agents’ can be conceived as the underpinning and justificatory basis for the authority of the law subject to the morally rational Principle of Generic Consistency. This egalitarian condition precedent requires individualisation and the ability to accept self-differentiation in order to return to a status, which can be validly described as “law”. Ultimately, we argue that this theoretical combination responds to a call to problematise the connection made between gender discourse and judicial reasoning, whilst offering the opportunity to further our conceptions of law and broaden the theoretical armoury with which to challenge judicial reasoning in McNally. That is, a ‘good faith’ attempt to further and guarantee transgender freedoms.