Tackling the terrorists: the experience of internment without trial in Northern Ireland

In August 1971, the devolved Stormont administration in Northern Ireland introduced internment without trial of those suspected of involvement in IRA terrorism. Ever since, the policy has been regarded as an abject failure. This article will reassess many of the key questions about internment: why did the Northern Ireland government introduce it when it did? Why did the Westminster government agree to a measure without parallel in British peacetime history? Why did it fail, when it had worked before? Was internment always doomed, or only because it was badly implemented? What was the alternative? How does the liberal democratic state defend itself against violent subversion without itself resorting to brutality and violence? This article is based on archival research in Great Britain, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, and on interviews with former internees, politicians and civil servants, and former members of the security forces. It suggests that internment was a relatively humane and honest policy and might, in different circumstances, have spared Northern Ireland thirty years of murder and mayhem.

Assessing the influence of the Responsibility to Protect on the UN Security Council during the Arab Spring

This article challenges those perspectives which assert first, that the Security Council’s engagement with the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) during the Arab Spring evidences a generally positive trend, and second, that the response to the Arab Spring, particularly Syria, highlights the need for veto restraint. With respect to the first point, the evidence presented in this article suggests that the manner in which R2P has been employed by the Security Council during this period evidences three key trends: first, a willingness to invoke R2P only in the context of Pillar I; second, a pronounced lack of consensus surrounding Pillar III; and third, the persistent prioritisation of national interests over humanitarian concerns. With respect to veto restraint, this article argues that there is no evidence that this idea will have any significant impact on decision-making at the Security Council; the Council’s response to the Arab Spring suggests that national interests continue to trump humanitarian need.

The principle of legal certainty as a principle of economic efficiency

Legal certainty, a feature of the rule of law, constitutes a requirement for the operational necessities of market interactions. But, the compatibility of the principle of legal certainty with ideals such as liberalism and free market economy must not lead to the hastened conclusion that therefore the principle of legal certainty would be compatible and tantamount to the principle of economic efficiency. We intend to analyse the efficiency rationale of an important general principle of EU law—the principle of legal certainty. In this paper, we shall assert that not only does the EU legal certainty principle encapsulate an efficiency rationale, but most importantly, it has been interpreted by the ECJ as such. The economic perspective of the principle of legal certainty in the European context has, so far, never been adopted. Hence, we intend to fill in this gap and propose the representation of the principle of legal certainty as a principle of economic efficiency. After having deciphered the principle of legal certainty from a law and economics perspective (1), we shall delve into the jurisprudence of the ECJ so that the judicial reasoning of the Court as this reasoning proves the relevance of the proposed representation (2). Finally, we conclude in light of the findings of this paper (3).

Capital 2.0 capital formation and legal risk in a new global economic order from fiat to exit: including case studies of the proposed transatlantic trade and investment partnership between the United States and the European Union and the financing relation between the United States and the People’s Republic of China

Following the intrinsically linked balance sheets in his Capital Formation Life Cycle, Lukas M. Stahl explains with his Triple A Model of Accounting, Allocation and Accountability the stages of the Capital Formation process from FIAT to EXIT. Based on the theoretical foundations of legal risk laid by the International Bar Association with the help of Roger McCormick and legal scholars such as Joanna Benjamin, Matthew Whalley and Tobias Mahler, and founded on the basis of Wesley Hohfeld’s category theory of jural relations, Stahl develops his mutually exclusive Four Determinants of Legal Risk of Law, Lack of Right, Liability and Limitation. Those Four Determinants of Legal Risk allow us to apply, assess, and precisely describe the respective legal risk at all stages of the Capital Formation Life Cycle as demonstrated in case studies of nine industry verticals of the proposed and currently negotiated Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the United States of America and the European Union, TTIP, as well as in the case of the often cited financing relation between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. Having established the Four Determinants of Legal Risk and its application to the Capital Formation Life Cycle, Stahl then explores the theoretical foundations of capital formation, their historical basis in classical and neo-classical economics and its forefathers such as The Austrians around Eugen von Boehm-Bawerk, Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich von Hayek and most notably and controversial, Karl Marx, and their impact on today’s exponential expansion of capital formation. Starting off with the first pillar of his Triple A Model, Accounting, Stahl then moves on to explain the Three Factors of Capital Formation, Man, Machines and Money and shows how “value-added” is created with respect to the non-monetary capital factors of human resources and industrial production. Followed by a detailed analysis discussing the roles of the Three Actors of Monetary Capital Formation, Central Banks, Commercial Banks and Citizens Stahl readily dismisses a number of myths regarding the creation of money providing in-depth insight into the workings of monetary policy makers, their institutions and ultimate beneficiaries, the corporate and consumer citizens. In his second pillar, Allocation, Stahl continues his analysis of the balance sheets of the Capital Formation Life Cycle by discussing the role of The Five Key Accounts of Monetary Capital Formation, the Sovereign, Financial, Corporate, Private and International account of Monetary Capital Formation and the associated legal risks in the allocation of capital pursuant to his Four Determinants of Legal Risk. In his third pillar, Accountability, Stahl discusses the ever recurring Crisis-Reaction-Acceleration-Sequence-History, in short: CRASH, since the beginning of the millennium starting with the dot-com crash at the turn of the millennium, followed seven years later by the financial crisis of 2008 and the dislocations in the global economy we are facing another seven years later today in 2015 with several sordid debt restructurings under way and hundred thousands of refugees on the way caused by war and increasing inequality. Together with the regulatory reactions they have caused in the form of so-called landmark legislation such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, the JOBS Act of 2012 or the introduction of the Basel Accords, Basel II in 2004 and III in 2010, the European Financial Stability Facility of 2010, the European Stability Mechanism of 2012 and the European Banking Union of 2013, Stahl analyses the acceleration in size and scope of crises that appears to find often seemingly helpless bureaucratic responses, the inherent legal risks and the complete lack of accountability on part of those responsible. Stahl argues that the order of the day requires to address the root cause of the problems in the form of two fundamental design defects of our Global Economic Order, namely our monetary and judicial order. Inspired by a 1933 plan of nine University of Chicago economists abolishing the fractional reserve system, he proposes the introduction of Sovereign Money as a prerequisite to void misallocations by way of judicial order in the course of domestic and transnational insolvency proceedings including the restructuring of sovereign debt throughout the entire monetary system back to its origin without causing domino effects of banking collapses and failed financial institutions. In recognizing Austrian-American economist Schumpeter’s Concept of Creative Destruction, as a process of industrial mutation that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one, Stahl responds to Schumpeter’s economic chemotherapy with his Concept of Equitable Default mimicking an immunotherapy that strengthens the corpus economicus own immune system by providing for the judicial authority to terminate precisely those misallocations that have proven malignant causing default perusing the century old common law concept of equity that allows for the equitable reformation, rescission or restitution of contract by way of judicial order. Following a review of the proposed mechanisms of transnational dispute resolution and current court systems with transnational jurisdiction, Stahl advocates as a first step in order to complete the Capital Formation Life Cycle from FIAT, the creation of money by way of credit, to EXIT, the termination of money by way of judicial order, the institution of a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Court constituted by a panel of judges from the U.S. Court of International Trade and the European Court of Justice by following the model of the EFTA Court of the European Free Trade Association. Since the first time his proposal has been made public in June of 2014 after being discussed in academic circles since 2011, his or similar proposals have found numerous public supporters. Most notably, the former Vice President of the European Parliament, David Martin, has tabled an amendment in June 2015 in the course of the negotiations on TTIP calling for an independent judicial body and the Member of the European Commission, Cecilia Malmström, has presented her proposal of an International Investment Court on September 16, 2015. Stahl concludes, that for the first time in the history of our generation it appears that there is a real opportunity for reform of our Global Economic Order by curing the two fundamental design defects of our monetary order and judicial order with the abolition of the fractional reserve system and the introduction of Sovereign Money and the institution of a democratically elected Transatlantic Trade and Investment Court that commensurate with its jurisdiction extending to cases concerning the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership may complete the Capital Formation Life Cycle resolving cases of default with the transnational judicial authority for terminal resolution of misallocations in a New Global Economic Order without the ensuing dangers of systemic collapse from FIAT to EXIT.