You Can't Always Get What You Want: A Gewirthian Model of Rational Autonomy in Abortion

The law regulating the availability of abortion is problematic both legally and morally. It is dogmatic in its requirements of women and doctors and ignorant of would-be fathers. Practically, its usage is liberal - with s1(1)(a) Abortion Act 1967 treated as a ‘catch all’ ground - it allows abortion on demand. Yet this is not reflected in the ‘law’. Against this outdated legislation I propose a model of autonomy which seeks to tether our moral concerns with a new legal approach to abortion. I do so by maintaining that a legal conception of autonomy is derivable from the categorical imperative resulting from Gewirth’s argument to the Principle of Generic Consistency: Act in accordance with the generic rights of your recipients as well as of yourself. This model of Gewirthian Rational Autonomy, I suggest, provides a guide for both public and private notions of autonomy and how our autonomous interests can be balanced across social structures in order to legitimately empower choice. I claim, ultimately, that relevant rights in the context of abortion are derivable from this model.

High level student autonomy in a virtual learning environment

This case study explores the experiences of a group of students (the authors) working as a tutor-less group (TLG) that developed during a web-based MEd programme. We describe the development and life cycle of the TLG, the experiences of the students and the effects on those who continued to work in a tutored environment. Members of the TLG demonstrated high levels of autonomy and group work. The relationship between the TLG and communities of practice is considered.

The causal relationship between private and public investment in Zimbabwe

Aims: The study examines the relationship between private and public investment in Zimbabwe utilizing yearly time series data for the period 1967 to 2004. Study Design: Time Series Study. Place and Duration of Study: Zimbabwe, May 2011 to July 2011. Methodology: Emphasis is placed on the direction of causality and the long run and short run effect of the two types of investment on each other. The paper constructs empirical models for both private and public investment, based on the flexible accelerator theory. Private investment is found to be cointegrated with public investment. A cointergration and VEC models are employed to assess the long and short run relationship existing between public and private investment. Conclusion: The relationship between private and public investment is found to be insignificant and the direction of causality found to be unidirectional. The results support the notion that private investment precedes public investment.

Private school quality in Italy

Private school enrolment may lead to worse subsequent performance in further education or in the labour market. If students differ in their ability not only to pay but to take advantage of educational opportunities (“talent” for short), private schools attract a worse pool of students when publicly funded schools are better suited to foster progress by more talented students. In the data we analyze, the impact of observable talent proxies on educational and labour market outcomes is indeed more positive for students who (endogenously) choose to attend public schools than for those who choose to pay for private education.

Public Interests, Private Disputes: Investment Arbitration and the Public Good

This paper seeks to investigate the bases for resistance to arbitration in general -and investor arbitration in particular- focusing on the way in which arbitral tribunals deal with notions of public interest and the public good. The paper hypothesises that while courts have within their terms of reference the capacity to consider notions of public interest, arbitral tribunals do not. It is this core difference in the scope of decision making between the two bodies that could render privately organised dispute resolution unsuitable for disputes that have public aspects, like investor-state disputes. The paper discusses the meaning of public interest and the public good as found in the literature. It then proceeds to consider how tribunals in the investment field have dealt with these concepts. This leads to a conclusion urging not abandonment of arbitration as a component of dispute resolution, but caution. It is argued that unchecked growth in private dispute resolution can threaten perceptions of legitimacy and democratic accountability. The paper adopts a socio-legal methodology in considering the effect of legal mechanisms on social and political phenomena. It is also informed by a law and economics methodology in addressing impacts of dispute resolution mechanisms on economic efficiency. The contribution of the paper rests on theorising motivations for resistance to private dispute resolution, a topical issue in light of the TTIP debate.