Managing the core executive

In the build up to general elections there is invariably a wealth of discourse on constitutional and transitional issues and even on the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the civil service, but rarely is there any debate on the manner in which politicians manage the government machine. This article seeks to address this deficiency. It examines the operational factors common to the core executive, assesses the problems usually associated with the government as an organization and reviews alternative solutions. Finally, it offers managerially oriented advice, reasoning that it is the role of policy analysts to prescribe and that it is irresponsible to ignore this function. it is clearly emphasized that management solutions are not synonymous with business solutions. The article draws on universal principles of management, seeking to avoid normative suggestions and concentrating instead on practical considerations. Those considerations include personnel selection, collective responsibility, leadership style, organizational structure and team mentality. The conclusion is that strong managerially based leadership should not be dismissed as incompatible with the political constraints placed upon Prime Ministers but rather it should e the predominant impulse.

The resilience of democratic institutions in Britain, Australia and the United States under conditions of total war

To what extent are democratic institutions resilient when nation states mobilise for war? Normative and empirical political theorists have long argued that wars strengthen the executive and threaten constitutional politics. In modern democracies, national assemblies are supposed to hold the executive to account by demanding explanations for events and policies; and by scrutinising, reviewing and, if necessary, revising legislative proposals intended to be binding on the host society or policies that have been implemented already. This article examines the extent to which the British and Australian parliaments and the United States Congress held their wartime executives to account during World War II. The research finds that under conditions approaching those of total war, these democratic institutions not only continued to exist, but also proved to be resilient in representing public concerns and holding their executives to account, however imperfectly and notwithstanding delegating huge powers. In consequence, executives—more so British and Australian ministers than President Roosevelt—were required to be placatory as institutional and political tensions within national assemblies and between assemblies and executives continued, and assemblies often asserted themselves. In short, even under the most onerous wartime conditions, democratic politics mattered and democratic institutions were resilient.