The battle of Cable Street

This witness seminar on the events in the East End of London of 4 October 1936, traditionally known as the ‘Battle of Cable Street’, was held at the Institute of Historical Research on 1 May 1991. It was chaired by Professor Geoffrey Alderman and introduced by Noreen Branson. The participants were Sid Bailey (former member of the BUF), Dr David Cesarani, Tony Gilbert, Charlie Goodman, Joyce Goodman, Professor Colin Holmes, Frank Lesser, Kevin Morgan (biographer of Harry Pollitt), Phil Piratin (Communist MP for Mile End 1945–50), Michael Quill, Jack Shaw, Harold Smith, Ronald F. Webb (former member of the BUF) and Len Wise (former member of the BUF). Yvonne Kapp was unable to attend but she sent a short account of her recollections of the event and this has been included with this transcript.

Introduction: the impact of the 'War on Terror' on executive–legislative relations: a global perspective

In democratic polities, constitutional equilibria or balances of power between the executive and the legislature shift over time. Normative and empirical political theorists have long recognised that war, civil unrest, economic and political crises, terrorist attacks, and other events strengthen the power of the executive, disrupt and threaten constitutional politics, and damage democratic institutions: crises require swift action and executives are thought to be more capable than parliaments and legislatures of taking such actions. The terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 and the ensuing so-called 'war on terror' declared by President Bush clearly constituted a crisis, not only in the United States but also in other political systems, in part because of the US's hegemonic position in defining and shaping many other states' foreign and domestic policies. Dicey, Schmitt, and Rossiter suggest that critical events and political crises inevitably trigger the concentration of (emergency) powers in the hands of the executive. Aristotle and Machiavelli questioned the inevitability of this process. This article and the articles that follow in this Special Issue utilise empirical evidence, through the use of case studies of the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, Australia, Israel, Italy and Indonesia, to address this debate. Specifically, the issue explores to what extent the external shock or crisis of 9/11 (and other terrorist attacks) and the ensuing 'war on terror' significantly changed the balance of executive-legislative relations from t (before the crisis) to t+1 (after the crisis) in these political systems, all of which were the targets of actual or foiled terrorist attacks. The most significant findings are that the shock of 9/11 and the 'war on terror' elicited varied responses by national executives and legislatures/parliaments and thus the balance of executive-legislative relations in different political systems; that, therefore, executive-legislative relations are positive rather than zero-sum; and that domestic political contexts conditioned these institutional responses.