Giving guilt: the aneconomy of law and justice

The concept of guilt is seen here as debt beyond repayment. Following Derrida, the gesture of giving is placed in the economy of gift, an aneconomical gift that is not part of the exchange cycle. At the same time, guilt is linked to desire, the desire to give and to be free from guilt. Desire is described as the urge to cross over, to apprehend the non-identical and to give oneself away. In this reinforced crossing, where the improbability of giving conditions the improbability of reaching out, guilt and its impetus are found locked up in claustrophobic self-reference. For this reason, the author consults Kierkegaard and Luhmann whose contributions show that the gesture of giving acquires its relevance not so much on account of its recipient, but precisely because of the absence of such a recipient. The combination of an absent recipient and an absented giver fills the gift with an emptiness that can only be channelled back upon itself, in the autopoietics of guilt. This is exactly the fate of the law, which can deal with the guilty but never with guilt (in the above sense). In its attempt to give away guilt, the law attempts to become other than itself: justice. The improbability of crossing over becomes more obvious than ever.

Network mechanisms of intentional learning

The ability to learn new tasks rapidly is a prominent characteristic of human behaviour. This ability relies on flex- ible cognitive systems that adapt in order to encode temporary programs for processing non-automated tasks. Previous functional imaging studies have revealed distinct roles for the lateral frontal cortices (LFCs) and the ven- tral striatum in intentional learning processes. However, the human LFCs are complex; they house multiple dis- tinct sub-regions, each of which co-activates with a different functional network. It remains unclear how these LFC networks differ in their functions and how they coordinate with each other, and the ventral striatum, to support intentional learning. Here, we apply a suite of fMRI connectivity methods to determine how LFC networks activate and interact at different stages of two novel tasks, in which arbitrary stimulus-response rules are learnt either from explicit instruction or by trial-and-error. We report that the networks activate en masse and in synchrony when novel rules are being learnt from instruction. However, these networks are not homogeneous in their functions; instead, the directed connectivities between them vary asymmetrically across the learning timecourse and they disengage from the task sequentially along a rostro-caudal axis. Furthermore, when negative feedback indicates the need to switch to alternative stimulus–response rules, there is additional input to the LFC networks from the ventral striatum. These results support the hypotheses that LFC networks interact as a hierarchical system during intentional learning and that signals from the ventral striatum have a driving influence on this system when the internal program for processing the task is updated.