Improving health and wellbeing independently of GDP: dividends of greener and prosoical economies

Increases in gross domestic product (GDP) beyond a threshold of basic needs do not lead to further increases in well-being. An explanation is that material consumption (MC) also results in negative health externalities. We assess how these externalities influence six factors critical for well-being: (i) healthy food; (ii) active body; (iii) healthy mind; (iv) community links; (v) contact with nature; and (vi) attachment to possessions. If environmentally sustainable consumption (ESC) were increasingly substituted for MC, thus improving well-being and stocks of natural and social capital, and sustainable behaviours involving non-material consumption (SBs-NMC) became more prevalent, then well-being would increase regardless of levels of GDP. In the UK, the individualised annual health costs of negative consumption externalities (NCEs) currently amount to £62 billion for the National Health Service, and £184 billion for the economy (for mental ill-health, dementia, obesity, physical inactivity, diabetes, loneliness and cardiovascular disease). A dividend is available if substitution by ESC and SBs-NMC could limit the prevalence of these conditions.

Impact of energy-using product policies

Energy-using products (EuPs), such as domestic appliances, audio-visual and ICT equipment contribute significantly to CO2 emissions, both in the domestic and non-domestic sectors. Policies that encourage the use of more energy efficient products can therefore generate significant reductions in overall energy consumption and hence, CO2 emissions. To the extent that these policies cause an increase the average production cost of EuPs, they may impose economic costs on producers, or on consumers, or on both. In this theoretical paper, an adaptation of a simple vertical product differentiation model – in which products are characterised in terms of their quality and their energy consumption – is used to analyse the impact of the different EuP polices on product innovation and to assess the resultant economic impacts on producers and consumers. It is shown that whereas the imposition of a binding product standard for energy efficiency unambiguously reduces aggregate profit and increases the average market price in the absence of any learning effects, the introduction or strengthening of demand-side measures (such as energy labelling) may reduce, or increase, aggregate profit. Even in the case where the overall impact is unambiguously negative, the effects of product innovation and learning can be in either direction.

Product innovation and the costs of energy-using product policies

Energy-using Products (EuPs) contribute significantly to the United Kingdom’s CO2 emissions, both in the domestic and non-domestic sectors. Policies that encourage the use of more energy efficient products (such as minimum performance standards, energy labelling, enhanced capital allowances, etc.) can therefore generate significant reductions in overall energy consumption and hence, CO2 emissions. While these policies can impose costs on the producers and consumers of these products in the short run, the process of product innovation may reduce the magnitude of these costs over time. If this is the case, then it is important that the impacts of innovation are taken into account in policy impact assessments. Previous studies have found considerable evidence of experience curve effects for EuP categories (e.g. refrigerators, televisions, etc.), with learning rates of around 20% for both average unit costs and average prices; similar to those found for energy supply technologies. Moreover, the decline in production costs has been accompanied by a significant improvement in the energy efficiency of EuPs. Building on these findings and the results of an empirical analysis of UK sales data for a range of product categories, this paper sets out an analytic framework for assessing the impact of EuP policy interventions on consumers and producers which takes explicit account of the product innovation process. The impact of the product innovation process can be seen in the continuous evolution of the energy class profiles of EuP categories over time; with higher energy classes (e.g. A, A+, etc.) entering the market and increasing their market share, while lower classes (e.g. E, F, etc.) lose share and then leave the market. Furthermore, the average prices of individual energy classes have declined over their respective lives, while new classes have typically entered the market at successively lower “launch prices”. Based on two underlying assumptions regarding the shapes of the “lifecycle profiles” for the relative sales and the relative average mark-ups of individual energy classes, a simple simulation model is developed that can replicate the observed market dynamics in terms of the evolution of market shares and average prices. The model is used to assess the effect of two alternative EuP policy interventions – a minimum energy performance standard and an energy-labelling scheme – on the average unit cost trajectory and the average price trajectory of a typical EuP category, and hence the financial impacts on producers and consumers.

Cross-Industry Product Diversification and Contagion in Risk and Return: The Case of Bank-Insurance and Insurance-Bank Takeovers

We investigate the impact of domestic/international bancassurance deals on the risk-return profiles of announcing and non-announcing banks and insurers within a GARCH model. Bank-insurance deals produce intra- and inter-industry contagion in both risk and return, with larger deals producing greater contagion. Bidder banks and peers experience positive abnormal returns, with the effects on insurer peers being stronger than those on bank peers. Insurance-bank deals produce insignificant excess returns for bidder and peer insurers and positive valuations for peer banks. Following the deal, the bank bidders’ idiosyncratic (systematic) risk falls (increases), while insurance bidders exhibit a lower systematic risk and maintain their idiosyncratic risk.