Rethinking crises and the accretion of executive power: the “War on Terror” and conditionality evidence from seven political systems

External shocks to democratic systems are likely to threaten the stability of relations between the executive and the representative assembly. This article investigates the impact of the so-called “war on terror” on executive-assembly relations in comparative perspective. We analyze data from seven countries, which varied in terms of form of government, level of democracy, culture, social structure, and geographic location, to evaluate its effects. We find that whereas in some systems the “war on terror” altered the balance of power between the executive and the assembly, in other cases the extant balance of power was preserved. We postulate various conditions under which the constitutionally sanctioned balance of power is most likely to be preserved in times of crisis.

Managing the core executive

In the build up to general elections there is invariably a wealth of discourse on constitutional and transitional issues and even on the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the civil service, but rarely is there any debate on the manner in which politicians manage the government machine. This article seeks to address this deficiency. It examines the operational factors common to the core executive, assesses the problems usually associated with the government as an organization and reviews alternative solutions. Finally, it offers managerially oriented advice, reasoning that it is the role of policy analysts to prescribe and that it is irresponsible to ignore this function. it is clearly emphasized that management solutions are not synonymous with business solutions. The article draws on universal principles of management, seeking to avoid normative suggestions and concentrating instead on practical considerations. Those considerations include personnel selection, collective responsibility, leadership style, organizational structure and team mentality. The conclusion is that strong managerially based leadership should not be dismissed as incompatible with the political constraints placed upon Prime Ministers but rather it should e the predominant impulse.