The Increasing Power of the European Parliament: Negotiating the EU-India Free Trade Agreement

Since the Lisbon Treaty increased the legal role of the European Parliament (EP) in EU trade policy, there has been a debate about the extent to which these legal competencies have translated into actual influence over the content and outcome of EU trade negotiations. Using the case study of the on-going trade negotiations between the EU and India, this article argues that the impact of the EP has indeed been significant. Through two-level game analysis, which extends its domestic focus to include the EP as a domestic constituent, it demonstrates how the EP has affected the EU win-set in ways that have both hindered and facilitated agreement at the international level between the EU and India. It also shows how the EP has affected the negotiating dynamics and how the EU negotiators have had their preferences somewhat compromised by the EP in their attempt at reaching an agreement with India.

Capital 2.0 capital formation and legal risk in a new global economic order from fiat to exit: including case studies of the proposed transatlantic trade and investment partnership between the United States and the European Union and the financing relation between the United States and the People’s Republic of China

Following the intrinsically linked balance sheets in his Capital Formation Life Cycle, Lukas M. Stahl explains with his Triple A Model of Accounting, Allocation and Accountability the stages of the Capital Formation process from FIAT to EXIT. Based on the theoretical foundations of legal risk laid by the International Bar Association with the help of Roger McCormick and legal scholars such as Joanna Benjamin, Matthew Whalley and Tobias Mahler, and founded on the basis of Wesley Hohfeld’s category theory of jural relations, Stahl develops his mutually exclusive Four Determinants of Legal Risk of Law, Lack of Right, Liability and Limitation. Those Four Determinants of Legal Risk allow us to apply, assess, and precisely describe the respective legal risk at all stages of the Capital Formation Life Cycle as demonstrated in case studies of nine industry verticals of the proposed and currently negotiated Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the United States of America and the European Union, TTIP, as well as in the case of the often cited financing relation between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. Having established the Four Determinants of Legal Risk and its application to the Capital Formation Life Cycle, Stahl then explores the theoretical foundations of capital formation, their historical basis in classical and neo-classical economics and its forefathers such as The Austrians around Eugen von Boehm-Bawerk, Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich von Hayek and most notably and controversial, Karl Marx, and their impact on today’s exponential expansion of capital formation. Starting off with the first pillar of his Triple A Model, Accounting, Stahl then moves on to explain the Three Factors of Capital Formation, Man, Machines and Money and shows how “value-added” is created with respect to the non-monetary capital factors of human resources and industrial production. Followed by a detailed analysis discussing the roles of the Three Actors of Monetary Capital Formation, Central Banks, Commercial Banks and Citizens Stahl readily dismisses a number of myths regarding the creation of money providing in-depth insight into the workings of monetary policy makers, their institutions and ultimate beneficiaries, the corporate and consumer citizens. In his second pillar, Allocation, Stahl continues his analysis of the balance sheets of the Capital Formation Life Cycle by discussing the role of The Five Key Accounts of Monetary Capital Formation, the Sovereign, Financial, Corporate, Private and International account of Monetary Capital Formation and the associated legal risks in the allocation of capital pursuant to his Four Determinants of Legal Risk. In his third pillar, Accountability, Stahl discusses the ever recurring Crisis-Reaction-Acceleration-Sequence-History, in short: CRASH, since the beginning of the millennium starting with the dot-com crash at the turn of the millennium, followed seven years later by the financial crisis of 2008 and the dislocations in the global economy we are facing another seven years later today in 2015 with several sordid debt restructurings under way and hundred thousands of refugees on the way caused by war and increasing inequality. Together with the regulatory reactions they have caused in the form of so-called landmark legislation such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, the JOBS Act of 2012 or the introduction of the Basel Accords, Basel II in 2004 and III in 2010, the European Financial Stability Facility of 2010, the European Stability Mechanism of 2012 and the European Banking Union of 2013, Stahl analyses the acceleration in size and scope of crises that appears to find often seemingly helpless bureaucratic responses, the inherent legal risks and the complete lack of accountability on part of those responsible. Stahl argues that the order of the day requires to address the root cause of the problems in the form of two fundamental design defects of our Global Economic Order, namely our monetary and judicial order. Inspired by a 1933 plan of nine University of Chicago economists abolishing the fractional reserve system, he proposes the introduction of Sovereign Money as a prerequisite to void misallocations by way of judicial order in the course of domestic and transnational insolvency proceedings including the restructuring of sovereign debt throughout the entire monetary system back to its origin without causing domino effects of banking collapses and failed financial institutions. In recognizing Austrian-American economist Schumpeter’s Concept of Creative Destruction, as a process of industrial mutation that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one, Stahl responds to Schumpeter’s economic chemotherapy with his Concept of Equitable Default mimicking an immunotherapy that strengthens the corpus economicus own immune system by providing for the judicial authority to terminate precisely those misallocations that have proven malignant causing default perusing the century old common law concept of equity that allows for the equitable reformation, rescission or restitution of contract by way of judicial order. Following a review of the proposed mechanisms of transnational dispute resolution and current court systems with transnational jurisdiction, Stahl advocates as a first step in order to complete the Capital Formation Life Cycle from FIAT, the creation of money by way of credit, to EXIT, the termination of money by way of judicial order, the institution of a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Court constituted by a panel of judges from the U.S. Court of International Trade and the European Court of Justice by following the model of the EFTA Court of the European Free Trade Association. Since the first time his proposal has been made public in June of 2014 after being discussed in academic circles since 2011, his or similar proposals have found numerous public supporters. Most notably, the former Vice President of the European Parliament, David Martin, has tabled an amendment in June 2015 in the course of the negotiations on TTIP calling for an independent judicial body and the Member of the European Commission, Cecilia Malmström, has presented her proposal of an International Investment Court on September 16, 2015. Stahl concludes, that for the first time in the history of our generation it appears that there is a real opportunity for reform of our Global Economic Order by curing the two fundamental design defects of our monetary order and judicial order with the abolition of the fractional reserve system and the introduction of Sovereign Money and the institution of a democratically elected Transatlantic Trade and Investment Court that commensurate with its jurisdiction extending to cases concerning the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership may complete the Capital Formation Life Cycle resolving cases of default with the transnational judicial authority for terminal resolution of misallocations in a New Global Economic Order without the ensuing dangers of systemic collapse from FIAT to EXIT.

The trade specialization of SANE: evidence from manufacturing industries

This paper studies the evolution of the foreign trade specialization in manufacturing sectors of South Africa, Algeria, Nigeria and Egypt. These four countries, the so-called SANE, have recently been viewed as Africa’s best chance of producing an economic bloc whose role for Africa might be comparable to that of the BRIC economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China for the world economy. Using data on trade flows since mid-1970s, the results show that the SANE group has experienced few changes in its trade structure, which is still based on low-technology and slow-growth world demand sectors. The degree of persistence in the specialization model is higher in the case of Algeria and Nigeria, where the dependence on products based on natural resources is stronger.

Lobbying by Trade Associations on EU Climate Policy

Climate change has been recognised as one of the greatest challenges of the 21st Century. Its impacts, and they way that we choose to deal with them will profoundly affect how business and society operates. This report focuses on European Union (EU) climate policy – the governance structures, rules and regulations that have been put in place at the EU level to attempt to mitigate and adapt to the impacts of climate change. Specifically, it focuses on how trade associations representing industrial sectors or broader business interest have lobbied on EU climate policy, and the impact that they have had on the policymaking process. The report then goes on to discuss whether the impacts of this lobbying align with the stated policies of the companies that are members of these trade associations.

Controller Time and Delay Costs - a Trade-off Analysis

Air traffic controller shortages remain a significant challenge in European ATM. Comparing different rules, we quantify the cost effectiveness of adding controller hours to Area Control Centre regulations to avert the delay cost impact on airlines. Typically, adding controller hours results in a net benefit. Distributions of delay duration and aircraft weight play an important role in determining the total cost of a regulation. Errors are likely to be incurred when analysing performance based on average delay values, particularly at the disaggregate level.

European route choice determinants

Different charging zones are found within European airspace. This allows airlines to select different routes between origin and destination that have different lengths and en-route charges. There is a trade- off between the shortest available route and other routes that might have different charges. This paper analyses the routes submitted by airlines to be operated on a given day and compares the associated costs of operating those routes with the shortest available at the time, in terms of en-route charges and fuel consumption. The flights are characterised by different variables with the idea of identifying a behaviour or pattern based on the airline or flight characteristics. Results show that in some areas of the European airspace there might be an incentive to select a longer route, leading to both a lower charge and a lower total cost. However, more variables need to be considered and other techniques used, such as factor analysis, to be able to identify the behaviour within an airline category.

EU South African Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement: Bane or boon for socio-economic rights under the South African Constitution?

How does the EU–South African Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement serve as a tool to ensure that basic services recognised under the South African Constitution are secured and reinforced so that the most vulnerable are protected? Benefits under the agreement will be hardly maximised by South Africans if political institutions and those who serve in them fail to duly channel the benefits of the agreement to the people while at the same time minimising potential deleterious effects of the liberalisation fallout engendered by the agreement.