Ends, means, beginnings: environmental technocracy, ecological deliberation or embodied disagreement

Technocratic attitudes suggest that decisions about environmental policy should be led by scientific experts. Such decisions, it is expected, will be more rational than any arrived at by a democratic mediation between the narrow, short-term interests and uninformed preferences of the general public. Within green political theory, deliberative democracy has emerged as the dominant repost to technocracy, offering an account of how democratic polities can deal with complex scientific and technological decisions through the emergence of communicative rationality. This article argues that neither appeals to expert knowledge, nor communicative rationality, are likely to deliver the optimal green outcomes that proponents suggest, but rather will cover up the inevitable disagreements over environmental policy making. Instead the article suggests that more ecologically-sensitive and democratic decision making about complex scientific and technological issues can emerge if we acknowledge the differently embodied perspectives of decision-makers – from scientists to citizens. This prioritises democratic means over green ends, yet incorporates the environment at the beginning of the decision-making process. The article aims to sketch out the theoretical and practical implications of such an embodied turn for responding to the anti-democratic tendencies of environmental technocracy.

Why is “blindsight” blind? A new perspective on primary visual cortex, recurrent activity and visual awareness

The neuropsychological phenomenon of blindsight has been taken to suggest that the primary visual cortex (V1) plays a unique role in visual awareness, and that extrastriate activation needs to be fed back to V1 in order for the content of that activation to be consciously perceived. The aim of this review is to evaluate this theoretical framework and to revisit its key tenets. Firstly, is blindsight truly a dissociation of awareness and visual detection? Secondly, is there sufficient evidence to rule out the possibility that the loss of awareness resulting from a V1 lesion simply reflects reduced extrastriate responsiveness, rather than a unique role of V1 in conscious experience? Evaluation of these arguments and the empirical evidence leads to the conclusion that the loss of phenomenal awareness in blindsight may not be due to feedback activity in V1 being the hallmark awareness. On the basis of existing literature, an alternative explanation of blindsight is proposed. In this view, visual awareness is a “global” cognitive function as its hallmark is the availability of information to a large number of perceptual and cognitive systems; this requires inter-areal long-range synchronous oscillatory activity. For these oscillations to arise, a specific temporal profile of neuronal activity is required, which is established through recurrent feedback activity involving V1 and the extrastriate cortex. When V1 is lesioned, the loss of recurrent activity prevents inter-areal networks on the basis of oscillatory activity. However, as limited amount of input can reach extrastriate cortex and some extrastriate neuronal selectivity is preserved, computations involving comparison of neural firing rates within a cortical area remain possible. This enables “local” read-out from specific brain regions, allowing for the detection and discrimination of basic visual attributes. Thus blindsight is blind due to lack of “global” long-range synchrony, and it functions via “local” neural readout from extrastriate areas.

Embodied perspective-taking indicated by selective disruption from aberrant self motion

Spatial perspective-taking that involves imagined changes in one’s spatial orientation is facilitated by vestibular stimulation inducing a congruent sensation of self-motion. We examined further the role of vestibular resources in perspective-taking by evaluating whether aberrant and conflicting vestibular stimulation impaired perspective-taking performance. Participants (N = 39) undertook either an “own body transformation” (OBT)task, requiring speeded spatial judgments made from the perspective of a schematic figure, or a control task requiring reconfiguration of spatial mappings from one’s own visuo-spatial perspective. These tasks were performed both without and with vestibular stimulation by whole-body Coriolis motion, according to a repeated measures design, balanced for order. Vestibular stimulation was found to impair performance during the first minute post stimulus relative to the stationary condition. This disruption was task-specific, affecting only the OBT task and not the control task, and dissipated by the second minute post-stimulus. Our experiment thus demonstrates selective temporary impairment of perspective-taking from aberrant vestibular stimulation, implying that uncompromised vestibular resources are necessary for efficient perspective-taking. This finding provides evidence for an embodied mechanism for perspective-taking whereby vestibular input contributes to multisensory processing underlying bodily and social cognition. Ultimately, this knowledge may contribute to the design of interventions that help patients suffering sudden vertigo adapt to the cognitive difficulties caused by aberrant vestibular stimulation.

Is conscious awareness needed for all working memory processes?

Stein and colleagues argue there is no yet conclusive evidence for nonconscious working memory (WM) and that is critical to probe WM while ensuring null sensitivity to memory cues. While this stringent approach reduces the likelihood of nonconscious signaling for WM, we discuss existing work meeting this null sensitivity criteria, and, related work on nonconscious cognition in keeping with WM/awareness dissociations on the basis of a functional operational definition of WM. Further, because it is likely that WM is a nonunitary functional construct and visual awareness a gradual phenomenon, we propose that delineating the neural mechanisms for distinct WM types across different levels of awareness may prove the most fruitful approach for understanding the interplay between WM and consciousness.

Language Teaching Methodologies, Intercultural Awareness and Autonomous Learning

This paper will examine familiar reasons for including the teaching of intercultural competence within Language Teaching before adding some less familiar ones. It will focus in particular on the question of how far intercultural competence can be learned when students are formally studying languages and how far such competence needs to be acquired autono-mously. It will though also ask to what extent being initiated to the very varied facets of in-tercultural competence during formal language study plays an important role in allowing ef-fective autonomous acquisition to take place. The paper will conclude that a significant part of the intercultural development that students need to undertake if they are to be able to communicate effectively in a foreign language must happen autonomously, but that it is, nonetheless, vital that language courses at least sow the seeds of intercultural learning in ways that will facilitate autonomous learning. As such, language courses, if they are genuinely to meet student needs, should incorporate elements of intercultural training. The paper also concludes by outlining the type of empirical research that would need to be carried out for these claims to be fully substantiated.