Speaking with different voices: the problems with English law and psychiatric injury

Private law courts in the UK have maintained the de minimis threshold as a condition precedent for a successful claim for the infliction of mental harm. This de minimis threshold necessitates the presence of a ‘recognised psychiatric illness’ as opposed to ‘mere emotion’. This standard has also been adopted by the criminal law courts when reading the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 to include non-physical injury. In determining the cut-off point between psychiatric injury and mere emotion, the courts have adopted a generally passive acceptance of expert testimony and the guidelines used by mental health professionals to make diagnoses. Yet these guidelines were developed for use in a clinical setting, not a legal one. This article examines the difficulty inherent in utilising the ‘dimensional’ diagnostic criteria used by mental health professionals to answer ‘categorical’ legal questions. This is of particular concern following publication of the new diagnostic manual, DSM-V in 2013, which will further exacerbate concerns about compatibility. It is argued that a new set of diagnostic guidelines, tailored specifically for use in a legal context, is now a necessity.

Transgender Freedom and the Law: A Liberal-Poststructural Discussion on McNally

In R v McNally, gender deception is found capable of leading to the vitiation of consent to sexual intercourse and, in so doing, places restriction on the freedom of transgendered individuals in favour of cisgendered freedom. This paper seeks to challenge the standing of this decision by adopting a combined methodological approach between Deleuzian post-structuralism and Gewirthian legal idealism. In so doing, we attempt to show that the combination offers a novel and productive approach to contentious decisions, such as that in McNally. Our approach brings together post-structuralist corporeality which conceives of the body as material and productive, and Gewirth’s ‘agent’ to conceptualise the legal body as an entity which can, and should, shape judicial reasoning. It does this by employing the criterion of categorically necessary freedom on institutionalised practical reasoning. These ‘bodies of agents’ can be conceived as the underpinning and justificatory basis for the authority of the law subject to the morally rational Principle of Generic Consistency. This egalitarian condition precedent requires individualisation and the ability to accept self-differentiation in order to return to a status, which can be validly described as “law”. Ultimately, we argue that this theoretical combination responds to a call to problematise the connection made between gender discourse and judicial reasoning, whilst offering the opportunity to further our conceptions of law and broaden the theoretical armoury with which to challenge judicial reasoning in McNally. That is, a ‘good faith’ attempt to further and guarantee transgender freedoms.

Flesh of the Law: Material Metaphors

Existing legal metaphors, even the predominantly spatial and corporeal ones, paradoxically perpetuate a dematerialized impression of the law. This is because they depict the law as universal, adversarial, and court-based, thus ignoring alternative legalities. Instead, there is a need to employ more radically material metaphors, in line with the material turn in law and other disciplines, in order to allow law's materiality to come forth. I explore the connection between language and matter (the ‘flesh’ of the law) through legal, linguistic, and art theory, and conclude by suggesting four characteristics of material legal metaphors.

British torture in the 'war on terror'

Despite longstanding allegations of UK involvement in prisoner abuse during counterterrorism operations as part of the US-led ‘war on terror’, a consistent narrative emanating from British government officials is that Britain neither uses, condones nor facilitates torture or other cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment and punishment. We argue that such denials are untenable. We have established beyond reasonable doubt that Britain has been deeply involved in post-9/11 prisoner abuse, and we can now provide the most detailed account to date of the depth of this involvement. We argue that it is possible to identify a peculiarly British approach to torture in the ‘war on terror’, which is particularly well-suited to sustaining a narrative of denial. To explain the nature of UK involvement, we argue that it can be best understood within the context of how law and sovereign power have come to operate during the ‘war on terror’. We turn here to the work of Judith Butler, and explore the role of Britain as a ‘petty sovereign’, operating under the state of exception established by the US Executive. UK authorities have not themselves suspended the rule of law so overtly, and indeed have repeatedly insisted on their commitment to it. They have nevertheless been able to construct a rhetorical, legal and policy ‘scaffold’ that has enabled them to demonstrate at least procedural adherence to human rights norms, while at the same time allowing UK officials to acquiesce in the arbitrary exercise of sovereignty over individuals who are denied any access to appropriate representation or redress in compliance with the rule of law.

What do we expect from an ombudsman? Narratives of everyday engagement with the informal justice system in Germany and the UK

This paper looks at expectations people have of informal justice mechanisms through a rich empirical dataset of 2775 recent ombudsman users in Germany and the United Kingdom. In a cross-cultural comparison the ombudsman, as a model of justice is explored. Not much is known about people’s expectations towards the ombudsman model; this paper starts to fill the gap. Four roles became apparent as cross-cultural narratives in the dataset; people who interact with ombudsmen expect them to be interpreters, advocates, allies and instruments. The identified roles are largely common to both countries, but in some aspects they show national specificities. These national specificities are seen mainly in the use of language; in Germany it is more legalistic in comparison to the UK. I argue that this might be related to what has been described as the general legal culture of each country and the institutional set-up.