The brain-sex theory of occupational choice: a counterexample

The brain-sex theory of occupational choice suggests that males and females in male-typical careers show a male pattern of cognitive ability in terms of better spatial than verbal performance on cognitive tests with the reverse pattern for females and males in female-typical careers, These differences are thought to result from patterns of cerebral functional lateralisation. This study Sought Such occupationally related effects using synonym generation (verbal ability) and mental rotation (spatial ability) tasks used previously. It also used entrants to these careers as participants to examine whether patterns of cognitive abilities might predate explicit training and practice. Using a population of entrants to sex-differentiated University Courses, a moderate occupational effect on the synonym generation task was found, along with a weak (p<.10) sex effect on the mental rotation task. Highest performance on the mental rotation task was by female Students in fashion design, a female-dominated occupation which makes substantial visuospatial demands and attracts many students with literacy problems such as dyslexia. This group then appears to be a counterexample to the brain-sex theory. However, methodological issues Surrounding previous Studies are highlighted: the simple synonym task appears to show limited discrimination of the sexes, leading to questions concerning the legitimacy of inferences about lateralisation based on scores from that test. Moreover, the human figure-based mental rotation task appears to tap the wrong aspect of visuospatial skill, likely to be needed for male-typical courses such as engineering, Since the fashion-clesign career is also one that attracts disproportionately many male students whose sexual orientation is homosexual, data were examined for evidence of female-typical patterns of cognitive performance among that subgroup. This was not found. This study therefore provides Do evidence for the claim that female-pattern cerebral functional lateralisation is likely in gay males.

Corrections

Summary form only given, as follows. In Vol. 12, no. 3 (Summer 2007), page 9, bottom of the left column, in 'Computer Architecture and Amdahl??s Law' by Gene Amdahl, the claim about invalidating Amdahl??s Law in 1988 came from a team at Sandia National Laboratories, and not Los Alamos. The correct text should read: "Several years later I was informed of a proof that Amdahl's Law was invalidated by someone at Sandia National Laboratories, where a number of computers interconnected as an Ncube by communication lines, but with each computer also connected to I/O devices for loading the operating system, initial data, and results." On page 20 of the same issue, in the second sentence of the diagram explanation note by Justin Rattner, the percentage figures for the sequential and the system coordination parts of the workload were interchanged. The correct version of this sentence should read: "assuming a fixed sized problem, Amdahl speculated that most programs would require at least 10% of the computation to be sequential (only one instruction executing at a time), with overhead due to interprocessor coordination averaging 25%."

Critical autopoiesis and the materiality of law

Autopoietic theory is increasingly seen as a candidate for a radical theory of law, both in relation to its theoretical credentials and its relevance in terms of new and emerging forms of law. An aspect of the theory that has remained less developed, however, is its material side, and more concretely the theory’s accommodation of bodies, space, objects and their claim to legal agency. The present article reads Luhmann’s theory of autopoietic systems in a radical and material manner, linking it on the one hand to current post-structural theorisations of law and society, and on the other hand extending its ambit to accommodate the influx of material considerations that have been working their way through various other disciplines. The latter comprises both a materialisation of the theory itself and ways of conceptualising the legal system as material through and through. This I do by further developing what I have called Critical Autopoiesis, namely an acentric, topological, post-ecological and posthuman understanding of Luhmann’s theory, that draws on Deleuzian thought, feminist theory, geography, non-representational theory, and new material and object-oriented ontologies. These are combined with some well-rehearsed autopoietic concepts, such as distinction, environment and boundaries; Luhmann’s earlier work on materiality continuum; more recent work on bodies and space; as well as his work on form and medium in relation to art. The article concludes with five suggestions for an understanding of what critical autopoietic materiality might mean for law.

You Can't Always Get What You Want: A Gewirthian Model of Rational Autonomy in Abortion

The law regulating the availability of abortion is problematic both legally and morally. It is dogmatic in its requirements of women and doctors and ignorant of would-be fathers. Practically, its usage is liberal - with s1(1)(a) Abortion Act 1967 treated as a ‘catch all’ ground - it allows abortion on demand. Yet this is not reflected in the ‘law’. Against this outdated legislation I propose a model of autonomy which seeks to tether our moral concerns with a new legal approach to abortion. I do so by maintaining that a legal conception of autonomy is derivable from the categorical imperative resulting from Gewirth’s argument to the Principle of Generic Consistency: Act in accordance with the generic rights of your recipients as well as of yourself. This model of Gewirthian Rational Autonomy, I suggest, provides a guide for both public and private notions of autonomy and how our autonomous interests can be balanced across social structures in order to legitimately empower choice. I claim, ultimately, that relevant rights in the context of abortion are derivable from this model.

Rights, Rationality and Reproduction: Balancing Interests in the Abortion Debate

As medical technology has advanced, so too have our attitudes towards the level of control we can or should expect to have over our procreative capacities. This creates a multidimensional problem for the law and family planning services in terms of access to services – whether to avoid conception or terminate a pregnancy – and the negligent provision of these services. These developments go to the heart of our perception of autonomy. Unsurprisingly, these matters also raise a moral dilemma for the law. Distinctively, discourse in this area is dominated by assertions of subjective moral value; in relation to life, to personal choice and to notions of the archetypal family. Against this, I stress that a model of objective morality can answer these challenging questions and resolve the inherent problems of legal regulation. Therefore, I argue that notions of autonomy must be based on a rational, action-based understanding of what it means to be a ‘moral agent’. I claim that from this we might support a legal standard, based on objective rational morality, which can frame our constitutional norms and our conception of justice in these contentious areas. This paper claims that the current regulation of abortion is outdated and requires radical reform. It proposes a scheme that would shift the choice towards the mother (and the father), remove the unnecessarily broad disability ground and involve doctors having a role of counsel (rather than gatekeeper).

‘The Party’s Over’: Critical Junctures, Crises and the Politics of Housing Policy

The key argument set out in this article is that historical and comparative forms of investigation are necessary if we are to better understand the ambitions and scope of contemporary housing interventions. To demonstrate the veracity of our claim we have set out an analysis of UK housing polices enacted in the mid 1970s as a basis for comparison with those pursued forty years later. The article begins with a critical summary of some of the methodological approaches adopted by researchers used to interpret housing policy. In the main section we present our critical analysis of housing policy reforms (implemented by the Labour government between 1974 and 1979) noting both their achievements and limitations. In the concluding section, we use our interpretation of this period as a basis to judge contemporary housing policy and reflect on the methodological issues that arise from our analysis.

Brief response to Ashton and colleagues regarding Fractionating Human Intelligence

Ashton and colleagues concede in their response (Ashton, Lee, & Visser, in this issue), that neuroimaging methods provide a relatively unambiguous measure of the levels to which cognitive tasks co-recruit dif- ferent functional brain networks (task mixing). It is also evident from their response that they now accept that task mixing differs from the blended models of the classic literature. However, they still have not grasped how the neuroimaging data can help to constrain models of the neural basis of higher order ‘g’. Specifically, they claim that our analyses are invalid as we assume that functional networks have uncorrelated capacities. They use the simple analogy of a set of exercises that recruit multiple muscle groups to varying extents and highlight the fact that individual differences in strength may correlate across muscle groups. Contrary to their claim, we did not assume in the original article (Hampshire, High- field, Parkin, & Owen, 2012) that functional networks had uncorrelated capacities; instead, the analyses were specifically designed to estimate the scale of those correlations, which we referred to as spatially ‘diffuse’ factors

Task Competency in the Rights Analytic: Mental Health and the Justification for Rights and Duties

The paper concerns the moral status of persons for the purposes of rights-holding and duty-bearing. Developing from Gewirth’s argument to the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC) and Beyleveld et al.’s Principle of Precautionary Reasoning, I argue in favour of a capacity-based assessment of the task competencies required for choice-rights and certain duties (within the Hohfeldian analytic). Unlike other, traditional, theories of rights, I claim that precautionary reasoning as to agentic status holds the base justification for rights-holding. If this is the basis for generic legal rights, then the contingent argument must be used to explain communities of rights. Much in the same way as two ‘normal’ adult agents may not have equal rights to be an aeroplane pilot, not all adults hold the same task competencies in relation to the exercise of the generic rights to freedom derived from the PGC. In this paper, I set out to consider the rights held by children, persons suffering from mental illness and generic ‘full’ agents. In mapping the developing ‘portfolio’ of rights and duties that a person carries during their life we might better understand the legal relations of those who do not ostensibly fulfil the criteria of ‘full’ agent.