EU Criminal Law and Enlargement

Since creation of the European Communities the number of Member States has gradually increased from the original six to current twenty-eight. Enlargement has become an EU’s flagship external policy, demonstrating the EU’s ability to shape its neighbourhood and to serve as a catalyst of deep and multilayered reforms. The consecutive seven enlargement rounds went in parallel with widespread internal developments, culminating with the creation of the European Union and, most recently, entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. As this volume demonstrates, EU criminal law has evolved considerably from its early days under the legal framework laid down by the Treaty of Maastricht to its current post-Lisbon shape. On 1 December 2014, that is with expiry of a five year transitional regime for the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters became a fully fledged EU policy, governed largely by the same modus operandi as other areas of EU competence and with compulsory jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. As EU criminal law developed internally, so did its external dimension, including the role it plays in the enlargement policy. In case of the latter the expiry of the same transitional period has brought to an end a rather anomalous situation whereby the European Union had more enforcement tools before and after accession vis-à-vis its future/new Member States than it could employ against the old ones. This bifurcation, quite rightly, triggered a lot of discussions about double standards used by the European Union in its pre-accession policy. This is exacerbated by the fact that some of those standards are neither defined in EU law, nor pursued vis-à-vis the existing EU’s Member States. The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that evolution with particular emphasis on the role of EU Criminal Law in the policy currently employed by the European Union vis-à-vis candidate and potential candidate countries of the Western Balkans and to Turkey. Arguably, together with political conditionality, it has become one of the pillars of the enlargement process and, as the examples of accession negotiations with Montenegro and Serbia prove, its role is likely to increase as rapprochement of other candidates and potential candidates progresses to the next stages.

Flesh of the Law: Material Metaphors

Existing legal metaphors, even the predominantly spatial and corporeal ones, paradoxically perpetuate a dematerialized impression of the law. This is because they depict the law as universal, adversarial, and court-based, thus ignoring alternative legalities. Instead, there is a need to employ more radically material metaphors, in line with the material turn in law and other disciplines, in order to allow law's materiality to come forth. I explore the connection between language and matter (the ‘flesh’ of the law) through legal, linguistic, and art theory, and conclude by suggesting four characteristics of material legal metaphors.

A ‘right to have rights’ in the EU public sphere? An Arendtian justification for the application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights

This paper discusses the Court’s reasoning in interpreting the EU Charter, using recent case law on horizontal effect as a case study. It identifies two possible means of interpreting the provisions of the Charter: firstly, an approach based on common values (e.g. equality or solidarity) and, secondly, an approach based on access to the public sphere. It argues in favour of the latter. Whereas an approach based on common values is more consonant with the development of the case law so far, it is conceptually problematic: it involves subjective assessments of the importance and degree of ‘sharedness’ of the value in question, which can undermine the equal constitutional status of different Charter provisions. Furthermore, it marginalises the Charter’s overall politically constructional character, which distinguishes it from other sources of rights protection listed in Art 6 TEU. The paper argues that, as the Charter’s provisions concretise the notion of political status in the EU, they have a primarily constitutional, rather than ethical, basis. Interpreting the Charter based on the very commitment to a process of sharing, drawing on Hannah Arendt’s idea of the ‘right to have rights’ (a right to access a political community on equal terms), is therefore preferable. This approach retains the pluralistic, post-national fabric of the EU polity, as it accommodates multiple narratives about its underlying values, while also having an inclusionary impact on previously underrepresented groups (e.g. non-market-active citizens or the sans-papiers) by recognising their equal political disposition.