Old conflicts, new rivals? Airline competition in the European market

Christoph Franz of Lufthansa recently identified Ryanair, easyJet, Air Berlin and Emirates as the company’s main competitors – gone are the days when it could benchmark itself against BA or Air France-KLM! This paper probes behind the headlines to assess the extent to which different airlines are in competition, using evidence from the UK and mainland European markets. The issue of route versus network competition is addressed. Many regulators have put an emphasis on the former whereas the latter, although less obvious, can be more relevant. For example, BA and American will cease to compete between London and Dallas Fort Worth if their alliance obtains anti-trust immunity but 80% of the passengers on this route are connecting at one or both ends and hence arguably belong to different markets (e.g. London-San Francisco, Zurich-Dallas, Edinburgh-New Orleans) which may be highly contested. The remaining 20% of local traffic is actually insufficient to support a single point to point service in its own right. Estimates are made of the seat capacity major airlines are offering to the local market as distinct from feeding other routes. On a sector such as Manchester–Amsterdam, 60% of KLM’s passengers are transferring at Schiphol as against only 1% of bmibaby’s. Thus although KLM operates 5 flights and 630 seats per day against bmibaby’s 2 flights and 298 seats, in the point to point market bmibaby offers more seats than KLM. The growth of the Low Cost Carriers (LCCs) means that competition increasingly needs to be viewed on city pair markets (e.g. London-Rome) rather than airport pair markets (e.g. Heathrow-Fiumicino). As the stronger LCCs drive out weaker rivals and mainline carriers retrench to their major hubs, some markets now have fewer direct options than existed prior to the low cost boom. Timings and frequencies are considered, in particular the extent to which services are a true alternative especially for business travellers. LCCs typically offer lower frequencies and more unsociable timings (e.g. late evening arrivals at remote airports) as they are more focused on providing the cheapest service rather than the most convenient schedule. Interesting findings on ‘monopoly’ services are presented (including alliances) - certain airlines have many more of these than others. Lufthansa has a significant number of sectors to itself whereas at the other extreme British Airways has direct competition on almost every route in its network. Ryanair and flybe have a higher proportion of monopoly routes than easyJet or Air Berlin. In the domestic US market it has become apparent since deregulation that better financial returns can come from dominating a large number of smaller markets rather than being heavily exposed in the major markets - which are hotly fought over. Regional niches that appear too thin for Ryanair to serve (with its all 189 seat 737-800 fleet) are identified. Fare comparisons in contrasting markets provide some insights to marketing and pricing strategies. Data sources used include OAG (schedules and capacity), AEA (traditional European airlines traffic by region), the UK CAA (airport, airline and route traffic plus survey information of passenger types) and ICAO (international route traffic and capacity by carrier). It is concluded that airlines often have different competitors depending on the context but in surprisingly many cases there are actually few or no direct substitutes. The competitive process set in train by deregulation of European air services in the 1990s is leading back to one of natural monopolies and oblique alternatives. It is the names of the main participants that have changed however!

Can the European low-cost airline boom continue? Implications for regional airports

At a time when the traditional major airlines have struggled to remain viable, the low-cost carriers have become the major success story of the European airline industry. This paper looks behind the headlines to show that although low-cost airlines have achieved much, they too have potential weaknesses and face a number of challenges in the years ahead. The secondary and regional airports that have benefited from low-cost carrier expansion are shown to be vulnerable to future changes in airline economics, government policy and patterns of air service. An analysis of routes from London demonstrates that the low-cost airlines have been more successful in some markets than others. To attractive and historically under-served leisure destinations in Southern Europe they have stimulated dramatic growth and achieved a dominant position. To major hub cities however they typically remain marginal players and to secondary points in Northern Europe their traffic has been largely diverted from existing operators. There is also evidence that the UK market is becoming saturated and new low-cost services are poaching traffic from other low-cost routes. Passenger compensation legislation and possible environmental taxes will hit the low-cost airline industry disproportionately hard. The high elasticities of demand to price in certain markets that these airlines have exploited will operate in reverse. One of the major elements of the low-cost business model involves the use of smaller uncongested airports. These offer faster turn-arounds and lower airport charges. In many cases, local and regional government has been willing to subsidise expansion of air services to assist with economic development or tourism objectives. However, recent court cases against Ryanair now threaten these financial arrangements. The paper also examines the catchment areas for airports with low-cost service. It is shown that as well as stimulating local demand, much traffic is captured from larger markets nearby through the differential in fare levels. This has implications for surface transport, as access to these regional airports often involves long journeys by private car. Consideration is then given to the feasibility of low-cost airlines expanding into the long-haul market or to regional operations with small aircraft. Many of the cost advantages are more muted on intercontinental services.

The challenge of managing airline delay costs

Estimates of airline delay costs as a function of delay magnitude are combined with fuel and (future) emissions charges to make cost-benefit trade-offs in the pre-departure and airborne phases. Hypothetical scenarios for the distribution of flow management slots are explored in terms of their cost and target-setting implications. The general superiority of passenger-centric metrics is of significance for delay measurement, although flight delays are still the only commonly-reported type of metric in both the US and Europe. There is a particular need for further research into reactionary (network) effects, especially with regard to passenger metrics and flow management delay.

Modelling the airline costs of delay propagation

Reactionary delays constitute nearly half of all delay minutes in Europe. A capped, multi-component model is presented for estimating reactionary delay costs, as a non-linear function of primary delay duration. Maximum Take-Off Weights, historically established as a charging mechanism, may be used to model delay costs. Current industry reporting on delay is flight-centric. Passenger-centric metrics are needed to better understand delay propagation. In ATM, it is important to take account of contrasting flight- and passenger-centric effects, caused by cancellations, for example. Costs to airlines and passenger disutility will both continue to be driven by delay relative to the original schedule.

A framework for evaluating the European airline costs of disabled persons and persons with reduced mobility

In recent years, airlines have been servicing a greater variety, and increasing numbers, of disabled persons and persons with reduced mobility (PRMs), particularly associated with ageing, obesity and medical needs. With the quantity of PRMs likely to increase in the future, there will be a growing impact on the airlines' associated actual and opportunity costs, about which there is minimal literature and data. Therefore the aim of this paper is to identify standard functional key factors (FKFs) with which airlines could audit their PRMs costs, and which could be used by other interested bodies, such as governments, when considering relevant aviation policy. These FKFs are related to nine areas, namely PRMs’ transfers; mobility aids; aircraft delays/diversions costs; staff training costs; staff health, safety and welfare; aircraft fixtures and equipment costs; airport costs; transaction costs; and opportunity costs. Further research is needed to obtain the data for these FKFs.

Clipped wings: corporate social and environmental responsibility in the airline industry

Within the developed world, airlines have responded to the advice of advocates for corporate social and environmental responsibility (CSER) to use the intertwined CSER dimensions of economics, society and environment to guide their business activities. However, disingenuously, the advocates and regulators frequently pay insufficient attention to the economics which are critical to airlines’ sustainability and profits. This omission pushes airlines into the unprofitable domain of CSERplus. The author identifies alleged market inefficiencies and failures, examines CSERplus impacts on international competition and assesses the unintended consequences of the regulations. She also provides innovative ideas for future-proofing airlines.　 Clipped Wings is a treatise for business professionals featuring academic research as well as industry anecdotes. It is written for airlines (including their owners, employees, passengers and suppliers), airports, trade associations, policy makers, educators, students, consultants, CSERplus specialists and anyone who is concerned about the future of competitive airlines.

The paradox of competition for airline passengers with reduced mobility (PRM)

Airline competition with customer service as product differentiator has forced down costs, air fares and investor returns. Two passenger markets operate in aviation: (a) able-bodied passengers for whom airlines compete and (b) passengers with reduced mobility (PRMs) – disabled by age, obesity or medical problems – for whom airlines do not compete. Government interference in the market intended to protect a minority of narrowly-defined PRMs has had unintended consequences of enabling increasing numbers of more widely-defined PRMs to access complimentary airline provisions. With growing ageing and overweight populations and long-haul travelling medical tourists such regulation could lead to even lower investors’ returns. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) (2013) examined the air transport value chain for competitiveness using Porter’s (2008) five forces but did not distinguish between able-bodied passengers and PRMs. Findings during an investigation of these two markets concurred with IATA-Porter that the markets for the bargaining powers of PRM buyers and PRM suppliers were highly competitive. However, in contrast to the IATA conclusions, intensity of competition, and threats from new entrants and substitute products for PRM travel were low. The conclusion is that airlines are strategically PRM defensive by omission. Paradoxically, the airline which delivers the best PRM customer service could become the least profitable.

The paradox of competition for airline passengers with reduced mobility (PRM)

Airline competition with customer service as product differentiator has forced down costs, air fares and investor returns. Two passenger markets operate in aviation: (1) able-bodied passengers for whom airlines openly compete and (2) passengers with reduced mobility (PRMs) – disabled by age, obesity or medical problems – for whom airlines do not compete. Government interference in the market intended to protect a minority of narrowly-defined PRMs has had unintended consequences of enabling increasing numbers of more widely-defined PRMs to access complimentary airline provisions. With growing ageing and overweight populations and long-haul travelling medical tourists such regulation could lead to even lower investors’ returns. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) (2013) examined the air transport value chain for competitiveness using Porter’s (2008) five forces but did not distinguish between able-bodied passengers and PRMs. Findings during an investigation of these two markets concurred with IATA-Porter that the markets for the bargaining powers of PRM customers and PRM suppliers were ‘highly competitive’. However, in contrast to the IATA conclusions the threats posed by new entrants, substitute products and intensity of competition for PRM passengers were all ‘low’. The conclusion is that airlines are strategically PRM defensive by omission. Paradoxically, the airline which delivers the best PRM customer service could become the least profitable.