Statelessness as a Human Rights Issue: A Concept Whose Time Has Come?

The protection of stateless persons has long been understood as a challenge for the international community, yet for many of the past sixty years a prioritised focus on refugees has dominated, indeed arguably eclipsed, the plight and protection needs of stateless persons. Guy Goodwin-Gill has long argued for a refocus of international attention and effort on the plight, predicament and protection needs of stateless persons. In a seminal contribution over two decades ago he observed that at that time, statelessness was perceived by many as a mere ‘technical problem,’ yet ‘statelessness is indeed a broad human rights issue, even as it retains a distinct technical dimension.’ In this contribution, we examine the challenge set by Goodwin-Gill for the international community, namely, the need for greater recognition and protection of stateless persons, in light of developments over the more than two decades that have passed since his incisive analysis. We celebrate the positive developments and identify areas of ongoing challenge. We focus on the key initiatives he identified as requiring attention, and assess progress that has been made in relation to each, while concentrating predominantly on the need for closer attention to the relevance of developments in human rights law.

Law, Rights and Reproduction: Reproductive Autonomy in Ethical Rationalism

As medical technology has advanced, so too have our attitudes towards the level of control we can expect to hold over our procreative capacities. This creates a multi-dimensional problem for the law in terms of access to services which prevent conception, access to services which terminate a pregnancy and recompensing those whose choices to avoid procreating are frustrated. These developments go to the heart of our perception of autonomy. In order to evaluate these three issues in relation to reproductive autonomy, I set out to investigate how the Gewirthian theory of ethical rationalism can be used to understanding the intersection between law, rights, and autonomy. As such, I assert that it is because of agents’ ability to engage in practical reason that the concept of legal enterprise should be grounded in rationality. Therefore, any attempt to understand notions of autonomy must be based on the categorical imperative derived from the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC). As a result, I claim that (a) a theory of legal rights must be framed around the indirect application of the PGC and (b) a model of autonomy must account for the limitations drawn by the rational exercise of reason. This requires support for institutional policies which genuinely uphold the rights of agents. In so doing, a greater level of respect for and protection of reproductive autonomy is possible. This exhibits the full conceptual metamorphosis of the PGC from a rational moral principle, through an ethical collective principle, a constitutional principle of legal reason, a basis for rights discourse, and to a model of autonomy. Consequently, the law must be reformed to reflect the rights of agents in these situations and develop an approach which demonstrates a meaningful respect of autonomy. I suggest that this requires rights of access to services, rights to reparation and duties on the State to empower productive agency.