Internalising the external costs of light goods vehicle transport in Britain

Report produced as part of the Green Logistics project (EPSRC and Department for Transport funded). To what extent do the taxes paid by the light goods vehicles (LGVs) users in Britain cover their allocated infrastructural, environmental and congestion costs? This report is a continuation of a study on the internalisation of the external costs of heavy goods vehicle activity. Research undertaken jointly by the Transport Studies Group at University of Westminster and Logistics Research Centre at Heriot-Watt University has attempted to answer this question using official government transport statistics and monetary valuations for the external costs.

Internalising the external costs of light goods vehicle transport in Britain

To what extent do the taxes paid by the light goods vehicles (LGVs) users in Britain cover their allocated infrastructural, environmental and congestion costs? This report is a continuation of a study on the internalisation of the external costs of heavy goods vehicle activity. Research undertaken jointly by the Transport Studies Group at University of Westminster and Logistics Research Centre at Heriot-Watt University has attempted to answer this question using official government transport statistics and monetary valuations for the external costs.

Cross-Industry Product Diversification and Contagion in Risk and Return: The Case of Bank-Insurance and Insurance-Bank Takeovers

We investigate the impact of domestic/international bancassurance deals on the risk-return profiles of announcing and non-announcing banks and insurers within a GARCH model. Bank-insurance deals produce intra- and inter-industry contagion in both risk and return, with larger deals producing greater contagion. Bidder banks and peers experience positive abnormal returns, with the effects on insurer peers being stronger than those on bank peers. Insurance-bank deals produce insignificant excess returns for bidder and peer insurers and positive valuations for peer banks. Following the deal, the bank bidders’ idiosyncratic (systematic) risk falls (increases), while insurance bidders exhibit a lower systematic risk and maintain their idiosyncratic risk.