Comment: The Instagram Lawscape

Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos has recently published a collection of what he calls “picpoems”, which were poems inspired by pictures that he took using an iPhone. The pictures were taken and subsequently listened to through a posthuman methodology, which resulted in his composition of the poems. This comment comprises a conversation between Pravin Jeyaraj and Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, in which Jeyaraj explores how the picpoems offer a visualisation of being inside the lawscape, which is an environment created by an invisible law. He argues that the role of law is to highlight the lack of control we have over our bodies and how suicide is the only way we can have any form of control over our escape.

“An Absurdly Quiet Spot”: The Spatial Justice of WW1 Fraternizations

Recent research on WW1 shows that incidents of fraternization across enemy lines took place regularly. However, fraternization remains a taboo in many contexts. The fact that the 2005 film Joyeux Noel by Christian Caron, which explicitly deals with the subject, encountered resistance from the authorities, is an indication of the kind of difficulty associated with the issue. I am drawing my inspiration from the way fraternizations are depicted in the film and in the literature in order to explore the concept of spatial justice. I define spatial justice as the question that emerges when a body desires to occupy the same space at the same time as another body. Defined like this, the question of spatial justice opens up in the dread of No Man’s Land and in particular the exchange of affects, objects and narratives that went on during fraternizations. I trace the movement of spatial justice as one of withdrawal from the asphyxiating atmosphere of the war and the propaganda machine. This withdrawal is not one of unpatriotic stance but of a courageous and difficult detachment from the supposed legality of the war that could only function on the basis of hate and demonization. While fraternizations did not end the war, they allowed for the possibility of spatial justice to emerge, as an opportunity to reorient the space and the bodies within.

Withdrawing from Atmosphere: An Ontology of Air partitioning and Affective Engineering

The main objective of this text is to warn against atmospherics. However comfortable it might appear, an atmosphere is politically suspicious because it numbs a body into an affective embrace of stability and permanence. It becomes doubly suspicious because a body desires to be part of the atmosphere. For this reason, I rethink both affect and atmosphere ontologically rather than phenomenologically. I argue that an atmosphere is engineered by subsuming individual affects to what I call, following Sloterdijk, an atmospheric glasshouse. I suggest that this happens in four steps: a distinction between inside and outside through partitioning; inclusion of the outside inside; illusion of synthesis; and dissimulation. In order to do this, I begin with air as the elemental paradox of ontological continuum and rupture. I carry on with the passage from air to atmosphere while retaining the discourse around continuum and rupture. Finally, I indicate a way of rupturing the atmospheric continuum through the ontological movement of withdrawal from the atmosphere. The ultimate goal of the article is to sketch a problematic of atmospherics that puts together without synthesising an elemental ontology of continuum and rupture.

Flesh of the Law: Material Metaphors

Existing legal metaphors, even the predominantly spatial and corporeal ones, paradoxically perpetuate a dematerialized impression of the law. This is because they depict the law as universal, adversarial, and court-based, thus ignoring alternative legalities. Instead, there is a need to employ more radically material metaphors, in line with the material turn in law and other disciplines, in order to allow law's materiality to come forth. I explore the connection between language and matter (the ‘flesh’ of the law) through legal, linguistic, and art theory, and conclude by suggesting four characteristics of material legal metaphors.