Turning around the poorest neighbourhoods: learning the lessons from twenty years of neighbourhood-based regeneration strategies in England

In the past two decades governments in Britain have launched a series of initiatives designed to reduce the disparities between areas of affluence and deprivation. These initiatives were funded by central government and were delivered through a series of partnership boards operating at the neighbourhood level in areas with high levels of deprivation. Drawing on similar approaches in the US War on Poverty, the engagement of residents in the planning and delivery of projects was a major priority. This chapter draws on the national evaluations of three of these programmes in England: the Single Regeneration Budget, the New Deal for Communities and the Neighbourhood Management Pathfinders. The chapter begins by identifying the common characteristics of these programmes, known as area-based initiatives because they targeted areas of concentrated deprivation with a population of about 10,000 people each. It then goes on to discuss the three national programmes and summarises the main findings in relation to how far key indicators changed for the better. The final section sets out the ways in which policy objectives changed in 2010 after the election of a coalition government. This produced a shift to what was called the ‘Big Society’ where the rhetoric favoured a transfer of power away from central government towards the local, neighbourhood, level. This approach favoured self-help and a call to volunteering rather than channelling resources to the areas in greatest need. The chapter closes by reviewing the relatively modest achievements of this centralist, big-state approach to distressed neighbourhoods of 1990–2010.

Resilience and the ‘everyday’: beyond the paradox of ‘liberal peace’

Over the last decade there has been a shift towards critical understandings of ‘liberal peace’ approaches to international intervention, which argue that local culture holds the key to the effectiveness of peace interventions. In this ‘bottom-up’ approach, peace, reconciliation, and a ‘culture of law’ then become secondary effects of sociocultural norms and values. However, these liberal peace critiques have remained trapped in the paradox of liberal peace: the inability to go beyond the binaries of liberal universalism and cultural relativism. This understanding will be contrasted with the rise of ‘resilience’ approaches to intervention – which build on this attention to the particular context of application but move beyond this paradox through philosophical pragmatism and the focus on concrete social practices. This article clarifies the nature of this shift through the focus on the shifting understanding of international intervention to address the failings of the ‘war on drugs’ in the Americas.

Short Film about War

A Short film about War is a narrative documentary artwork made entirely from information found on the worldwide web. In ten minutes this two screen gallery installation takes viewers around the world to a variety of war zones as seen through the collective eyes of the online photo sharing community Flickr, and as witnessed by a variety of existing military and civilian bloggers. As the ostensibly documentary 'film' plays itself out, a second screen logs the provenance of images, blog fragments and gps locations of each element comprising the work, so that the same information is simultaneously communicated to the viewer in two parallel formats -on one hand as a dramatised reportage and on the other hand as a text log. In offerring this tautology, we are attempting to explore and reveal the way in which information changes as it is gathered, edited and then mediated through networked communications technologies or broadcast media, and how that changes and distorts meaning -especially for (the generally wealthy minority of) the world's users of high speed broadband networks, who have become used to the treacherously persuasive panoptic view that google earth (and the worldwide web) appears to give us.

The resilience of democratic institutions in Britain, Australia and the United States under conditions of total war

To what extent are democratic institutions resilient when nation states mobilise for war? Normative and empirical political theorists have long argued that wars strengthen the executive and threaten constitutional politics. In modern democracies, national assemblies are supposed to hold the executive to account by demanding explanations for events and policies; and by scrutinising, reviewing and, if necessary, revising legislative proposals intended to be binding on the host society or policies that have been implemented already. This article examines the extent to which the British and Australian parliaments and the United States Congress held their wartime executives to account during World War II. The research finds that under conditions approaching those of total war, these democratic institutions not only continued to exist, but also proved to be resilient in representing public concerns and holding their executives to account, however imperfectly and notwithstanding delegating huge powers. In consequence, executives—more so British and Australian ministers than President Roosevelt—were required to be placatory as institutional and political tensions within national assemblies and between assemblies and executives continued, and assemblies often asserted themselves. In short, even under the most onerous wartime conditions, democratic politics mattered and democratic institutions were resilient.

Handling the transfer of power: a note on the 1964 origins of the Douglas‐Home rules

Opposition is rarely a good preparation for government. The only post‐war government to enter office confident, well‐acquainted with the Civil Service and with a fund of administrative experience to draw on was the Attlee administration formed in 1945. The longer a party spends in opposition the more these assets disappear. Labour, by the end of the long period of Conservative rule in 1951–64, was largely unfamiliar with the burdens of office. This formed the background to the formulation of the Douglas‐Home rules, whereby informal contact is permitted between the Civil Service and the Opposition in advance of a general election. Since 1964 this arrangement has gradually become more extensive (especially after Neil Kinnock complained that the period for contact was too brief during the run‐up to the 1992 election) and more formalised. In late 1993 John Major agreed that contacts could be made from early 1996 in advance of the next election, rather than only during the last six months of a parliament, as had by then become the convention.’ The object of this short paper is, however, to explain how these rules originated.

The British Army of the Rhine: Turning Nazi Enemies into Cold War Partners

Between 1945 and 1957, West Germany made a dizzying pivot from Nazi bastion to Britain's Cold War ally against the Soviet Union. Successive London governments, though faced with bitter public and military opposition, tasked the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) to serve as a protecting force while strengthening West German integration into the Western defense structure. Peter Speiser charts the BAOR's fraught transformation from occupier to ally by looking at the charged nexus where British troops and their families interacted with Germany's civilian population. Examining the relationship on many levels, Speiser ranges from how British mass media representations of Germany influenced BAOR troops to initiatives taken by the Army to improve relations. He also weighs German perceptions, surveying clashes between soldiers and civilians and comparing the popularity of the British services with that of the other occupying powers. As Speiser shows, the BAOR's presence did not improve the relationship between British servicemen and the German populace, but it did prevent further deterioration during a crucial and dangerous period of the early Cold War. An incisive look at an under-researched episode, The British Army of the Rhine sheds new light on Anglo-German diplomatic, political, and social relations after 1945, and evaluates their impact on the wider context of European integration in the postwar era.