16 resultados para 1899 Other Law and Legal Studies


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This paper concerns the origination, development and emergence of what might be termed ‘Olympic law’. This has an impact across borders and with transnational effect. It examines the unique process of creation of these laws, laws created by a national legislature to satisfy the commercial demands of a private body, the International Olympic Committee (IOC). It begins by critically locating the IOC and Olympic law and examining Olympic law as a transnational force. Using two case studies, those of ambush marketing and ticket touting, it demonstrates how private entities can be the drivers of specific, self-interested legislation when operating as a transnational organisation from within the global administrative space and notes the potential dangers of such legal transplants.

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Following the intrinsically linked balance sheets in his Capital Formation Life Cycle, Lukas M. Stahl explains with his Triple A Model of Accounting, Allocation and Accountability the stages of the Capital Formation process from FIAT to EXIT. Based on the theoretical foundations of legal risk laid by the International Bar Association with the help of Roger McCormick and legal scholars such as Joanna Benjamin, Matthew Whalley and Tobias Mahler, and founded on the basis of Wesley Hohfeld’s category theory of jural relations, Stahl develops his mutually exclusive Four Determinants of Legal Risk of Law, Lack of Right, Liability and Limitation. Those Four Determinants of Legal Risk allow us to apply, assess, and precisely describe the respective legal risk at all stages of the Capital Formation Life Cycle as demonstrated in case studies of nine industry verticals of the proposed and currently negotiated Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the United States of America and the European Union, TTIP, as well as in the case of the often cited financing relation between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. Having established the Four Determinants of Legal Risk and its application to the Capital Formation Life Cycle, Stahl then explores the theoretical foundations of capital formation, their historical basis in classical and neo-classical economics and its forefathers such as The Austrians around Eugen von Boehm-Bawerk, Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich von Hayek and most notably and controversial, Karl Marx, and their impact on today’s exponential expansion of capital formation. Starting off with the first pillar of his Triple A Model, Accounting, Stahl then moves on to explain the Three Factors of Capital Formation, Man, Machines and Money and shows how “value-added” is created with respect to the non-monetary capital factors of human resources and industrial production. Followed by a detailed analysis discussing the roles of the Three Actors of Monetary Capital Formation, Central Banks, Commercial Banks and Citizens Stahl readily dismisses a number of myths regarding the creation of money providing in-depth insight into the workings of monetary policy makers, their institutions and ultimate beneficiaries, the corporate and consumer citizens. In his second pillar, Allocation, Stahl continues his analysis of the balance sheets of the Capital Formation Life Cycle by discussing the role of The Five Key Accounts of Monetary Capital Formation, the Sovereign, Financial, Corporate, Private and International account of Monetary Capital Formation and the associated legal risks in the allocation of capital pursuant to his Four Determinants of Legal Risk. In his third pillar, Accountability, Stahl discusses the ever recurring Crisis-Reaction-Acceleration-Sequence-History, in short: CRASH, since the beginning of the millennium starting with the dot-com crash at the turn of the millennium, followed seven years later by the financial crisis of 2008 and the dislocations in the global economy we are facing another seven years later today in 2015 with several sordid debt restructurings under way and hundred thousands of refugees on the way caused by war and increasing inequality. Together with the regulatory reactions they have caused in the form of so-called landmark legislation such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, the JOBS Act of 2012 or the introduction of the Basel Accords, Basel II in 2004 and III in 2010, the European Financial Stability Facility of 2010, the European Stability Mechanism of 2012 and the European Banking Union of 2013, Stahl analyses the acceleration in size and scope of crises that appears to find often seemingly helpless bureaucratic responses, the inherent legal risks and the complete lack of accountability on part of those responsible. Stahl argues that the order of the day requires to address the root cause of the problems in the form of two fundamental design defects of our Global Economic Order, namely our monetary and judicial order. Inspired by a 1933 plan of nine University of Chicago economists abolishing the fractional reserve system, he proposes the introduction of Sovereign Money as a prerequisite to void misallocations by way of judicial order in the course of domestic and transnational insolvency proceedings including the restructuring of sovereign debt throughout the entire monetary system back to its origin without causing domino effects of banking collapses and failed financial institutions. In recognizing Austrian-American economist Schumpeter’s Concept of Creative Destruction, as a process of industrial mutation that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one, Stahl responds to Schumpeter’s economic chemotherapy with his Concept of Equitable Default mimicking an immunotherapy that strengthens the corpus economicus own immune system by providing for the judicial authority to terminate precisely those misallocations that have proven malignant causing default perusing the century old common law concept of equity that allows for the equitable reformation, rescission or restitution of contract by way of judicial order. Following a review of the proposed mechanisms of transnational dispute resolution and current court systems with transnational jurisdiction, Stahl advocates as a first step in order to complete the Capital Formation Life Cycle from FIAT, the creation of money by way of credit, to EXIT, the termination of money by way of judicial order, the institution of a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Court constituted by a panel of judges from the U.S. Court of International Trade and the European Court of Justice by following the model of the EFTA Court of the European Free Trade Association. Since the first time his proposal has been made public in June of 2014 after being discussed in academic circles since 2011, his or similar proposals have found numerous public supporters. Most notably, the former Vice President of the European Parliament, David Martin, has tabled an amendment in June 2015 in the course of the negotiations on TTIP calling for an independent judicial body and the Member of the European Commission, Cecilia Malmström, has presented her proposal of an International Investment Court on September 16, 2015. Stahl concludes, that for the first time in the history of our generation it appears that there is a real opportunity for reform of our Global Economic Order by curing the two fundamental design defects of our monetary order and judicial order with the abolition of the fractional reserve system and the introduction of Sovereign Money and the institution of a democratically elected Transatlantic Trade and Investment Court that commensurate with its jurisdiction extending to cases concerning the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership may complete the Capital Formation Life Cycle resolving cases of default with the transnational judicial authority for terminal resolution of misallocations in a New Global Economic Order without the ensuing dangers of systemic collapse from FIAT to EXIT.

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While spatial justice could be the most radical offspring of law’s recent spatial turn, it remains instead a geographically informed version of social justice. The majority of the existing literature on the subject has made some politically facile assumptions about space, justice and law, thereby subsuming the potentially radical into the banal. In this article, I suggest that the concept of spatial justice is the most promising platform on which to redefine, not only the connection between law and geography, but more importantly, the conceptual foundations of both law and space. More concretely, the article attempts two things: first, a radical understanding of legal spatiality. Space is not just another parameter for law, a background against which law takes place, or a process that the law needs to take into consideration. Space is intertwined with normative production in ways that law often fails to acknowledge, and part of this article is a re-articulation of the connection. Second, to suggest a conception of spatial justice that derives from a spatial law. Such a conception cannot rely on given concepts of distributive or social justice. Instead, the concept of spatial justice put forth here is informed by post-structural, feminist, post-ecological and other radical understandings of emplacement and justice, as well as arguably the most spatial of philosophical discourses, that of Deleuze–Guattari and the prescribed possibilities of space as manifold.

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Since creation of the European Communities the number of Member States has gradually increased from the original six to current twenty-eight. Enlargement has become an EU’s flagship external policy, demonstrating the EU’s ability to shape its neighbourhood and to serve as a catalyst of deep and multilayered reforms. The consecutive seven enlargement rounds went in parallel with widespread internal developments, culminating with the creation of the European Union and, most recently, entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. As this volume demonstrates, EU criminal law has evolved considerably from its early days under the legal framework laid down by the Treaty of Maastricht to its current post-Lisbon shape. On 1 December 2014, that is with expiry of a five year transitional regime for the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters became a fully fledged EU policy, governed largely by the same modus operandi as other areas of EU competence and with compulsory jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. As EU criminal law developed internally, so did its external dimension, including the role it plays in the enlargement policy. In case of the latter the expiry of the same transitional period has brought to an end a rather anomalous situation whereby the European Union had more enforcement tools before and after accession vis-à-vis its future/new Member States than it could employ against the old ones. This bifurcation, quite rightly, triggered a lot of discussions about double standards used by the European Union in its pre-accession policy. This is exacerbated by the fact that some of those standards are neither defined in EU law, nor pursued vis-à-vis the existing EU’s Member States. The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that evolution with particular emphasis on the role of EU Criminal Law in the policy currently employed by the European Union vis-à-vis candidate and potential candidate countries of the Western Balkans and to Turkey. Arguably, together with political conditionality, it has become one of the pillars of the enlargement process and, as the examples of accession negotiations with Montenegro and Serbia prove, its role is likely to increase as rapprochement of other candidates and potential candidates progresses to the next stages.

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Private law courts in the UK have maintained the de minimis threshold as a condition precedent for a successful claim for the infliction of mental harm. This de minimis threshold necessitates the presence of a ‘recognised psychiatric illness’ as opposed to ‘mere emotion’. This standard has also been adopted by the criminal law courts when reading the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 to include non-physical injury. In determining the cut-off point between psychiatric injury and mere emotion, the courts have adopted a generally passive acceptance of expert testimony and the guidelines used by mental health professionals to make diagnoses. Yet these guidelines were developed for use in a clinical setting, not a legal one. This article examines the difficulty inherent in utilising the ‘dimensional’ diagnostic criteria used by mental health professionals to answer ‘categorical’ legal questions. This is of particular concern following publication of the new diagnostic manual, DSM-V in 2013, which will further exacerbate concerns about compatibility. It is argued that a new set of diagnostic guidelines, tailored specifically for use in a legal context, is now a necessity.

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Among the diverse approaches to comparison in socio-legal studies those that employ qualitative research, richness of detail, and attention to context are the focus of this special issue. The Introduction draws on comparative law and social science literature to argue that comparison amongst studies of laws in contexts can follow different trajectories: the comparison may start from an assumption of similarity—in form, purposes, or context—in order to identify significant differences; or it may identify significant similarity across social and cultural divides. What unites many of the projects of comparison undertaken by qualitative empirical researchers is that the points of relevant comparison are identified within the complexity of the empirical studies at hand; and they are allowed to emerge, or change, as the researcher comes to understand the facts and issues more deeply.

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In considering contemporary accounts of the interrelations of economic, legal and urban forms of social relations in the emergence of a global capitalist modernity, this paper argues that politico-juridical imaginaries of new forms of transnational universality have tended to be limited by virtue of both an anachronistic recourse to spatial models of the polis and a failure to confront the ineliminability of abstraction to any idea of global social interconnectivity. In such terms, it argues, Lefebvre’s famous call for a ‘right to the city’ needs to be reinscribed as a properly modern right to the metropolis; one that would allow us to conceive of the possibility of new kinds of relation between individual and collective subjectivity and the development of abstract social forms.

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This is a thought-provoking contribution on the space of ontological vulnerability as the awareness of being existentially exposed. This space, conceptualised as a space of ‘the middle’ (as opposed, emphatically, to ‘the centre’) offers an opportunity to think away from the sterile debate on eco/anthropocentricity and from such limiting hierarchies as animal/human, human/environmental, natural/artificial. This new, vulnerable position of the middle allows the reconfiguration of ecological processes, and more specifically the position of environmental law in relation to them. Environmental law now finds itself amidst a new, moving, ‘open ecology’ of social, biological and ecological processes. This is a new, radical conceptualisation of what the author has called ‘critical environmental law,’ based upon an epistemology of observation and an ontology of being part of this open ecology. Environmental law, in this light, is simultaneously reformulated as an invitation to disciplinary and ontological openness and yet a call to remain immanent within existing legal structures. This finds expression in four critical environmental positions that set the stage for the further elaboration of a critical environmental law.

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The concept of guilt is seen here as debt beyond repayment. Following Derrida, the gesture of giving is placed in the economy of gift, an aneconomical gift that is not part of the exchange cycle. At the same time, guilt is linked to desire, the desire to give and to be free from guilt. Desire is described as the urge to cross over, to apprehend the non-identical and to give oneself away. In this reinforced crossing, where the improbability of giving conditions the improbability of reaching out, guilt and its impetus are found locked up in claustrophobic self-reference. For this reason, the author consults Kierkegaard and Luhmann whose contributions show that the gesture of giving acquires its relevance not so much on account of its recipient, but precisely because of the absence of such a recipient. The combination of an absent recipient and an absented giver fills the gift with an emptiness that can only be channelled back upon itself, in the autopoietics of guilt. This is exactly the fate of the law, which can deal with the guilty but never with guilt (in the above sense). In its attempt to give away guilt, the law attempts to become other than itself: justice. The improbability of crossing over becomes more obvious than ever.

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