Social Justice Cannot, in the Form Commonly Articulated, Meaningfully Guide Action

Nurses – along with many others – are often told that they should or must accept and work towards the promotion of social justice. Further, it is claimed that social justice represents or is a shared nursing value. This presentation challenges these assertions. Claims regarding shared values easily fall prey to forms of attribution error. Alternatively, while social justice is sometimes presented as a remedy or alternative to market disutility, the quality of arguments in which this linkage appears leave much to be desired and, in such instances, the robustness of these claims collapse. Or, assertions regarding social justice frequently appear without supporting explanation or justification. It is simply assumed that social justice (inadequately defined) is a ‘good thing’. This is not necessarily a problem. The normative strength of a claim does not rest only upon the arguments put forward in support of it. However, when social justice is advanced as mere assertion, often in a manner devoid of specificity, claims that the concept should be embraced and claims that the concept should or can promote action in the world, lack persuasive force. Moreover, in some articulations, the concept appears to generate illiberal and intolerant consequences. This presentation does not argue for inequality or social injustice. Rather, it suggests that underdeveloped and frail arguments require improvement or dismissal.

Exploring the Justificational Status of Assertions Made About Nursing’s Collective Beliefs

Nursing publications frequently reference groups (e.g. the group nurses). The nature and capabilities of group agents or collective subjects, and the relationship between nursing as a group and nurses as individuals is, however, rarely made explicit in these publications. Following Alvin Goldman, questions pertaining to groups can be classified as metaphysical or epistemic. Metaphysical questions take two forms. First, we might ask about the ontological status of group agents. For example, to what extent, if at all, do group agents exist and act independently of their constituent members? Second, we can ask whether group agents have psychological states or properties that can, for example, be formulated as propositional attitudes and, if they can, in what ways are group attitudes correlated with or tied to those of individual group members? In this presentation, having recognised the potential reality of group ontological and psychological being, I examine an under researched element of social epistemology. Specifically, the potential of non-individualist reliabilism (social process reliabilism) to justify doxastic group beliefs (i.e. statements such as “nurses believe that”) are considered. It is suggested that this issue has concrete implications for how we think about nursing.