Perceived Social Pressures and the Internalization of the Mesomorphic Ideal: the Role of Drive for Muscularity and Autonomy in Physically Active Men

BACKGROUND: Researchers have tested the beliefs of sportspeople and sports medicine specialists that cognitive strategies influence strength performance. Few investigators have synthesised the literature. OBJECTIVES: The specific objectives were to review evidence regarding (a) the cognitive strategy-strength performance relationship; (b) participant skill level as a moderator; and (c) cognitive, motivational, biomechanical/physiological, and emotional mediators. METHOD: Studies were sourced via electronic databases, reference lists of retrieved articles, and manual searches of relevant journals. Studies had to be randomised or counterbalanced experiments with a control group or condition, repeated measures, and a quality control score above 0.5 (out of 1). Cognitive strategies included goal setting, imagery, self-talk, preparatory arousal, and free choice. Dependent variables included maximal strength, local muscular endurance, or muscular power. RESULTS: Globally, cognitive strategies were reliability associated with increased strength performance (results ranged from 61 to 65 %). Results were mixed when examining the effects of specific strategies on particular dependent variables, although no intervention had an overall negative influence. Indeterminate relationships emerged regarding hypothesised mediators (except cognitive variables) and participant skill level as a moderator. CONCLUSIONS: Although cognitive strategies influence strength performance, there are knowledge gaps regarding specific types of strength, especially muscular power. Cognitive variables, such as concentration, show promise as possible mediators.

Dis)located Olympic Patriots: Sporting Connections, Administrative Communications and Imperial Ether in Interwar New Zealand

During the interwar period (1919-1939) protagonists of the early New Zealand Olympic Committee [NZOC] worked to renegotiate and improve the country’s international sporting participation and involvement in the International Olympic Committee [IOC]. To this end, NZOC effectively used its locally based administrators and well-placed expatriates in Britain to variously assert the organisation’s nascent autonomy, independence and political power, progress Antipodean athlete’s causes, and, counter any potential doubt about the nation’s peripheral position in imperial sporting dialogues. Adding to the corpus of scholarship on New Zealand’s ties and tribulations with imperial Britain (in and beyond sport) (e.g. Beilharz and Cox 2007; Belich 2001, 2007; Coombes 2006; MacLean 2010; Phillips 1984, 1987; Ryan 2004, 2005, 2007), in this paper I examine how the political actions and strategic location of three key NZOC agents (specifically, administrator Harry Amos and expatriates Arthur Porritt and Jack Lovelock) worked in their own particular ways to assert the position of the organisation within the global Olympic fraternity. I argue that the efforts of Amos, Porritt and Lovelock also concomitantly served to remind Commonwealth sporting colleagues (namely Britain and Australia) that New Zealand could not be characterised as, or relegated to being, a distal, subdued, or subservient colonial sporting partner. Subsequently I contend that NZOC’s development during the interwar period, and particularly the utility of expatriate agents, can be contextualised against historiographical shifts that encourage us to rethink, reimagine, and rework narratives of empire, colonisation, national identity, commonwealth and belonging.

(Dis)located Olympic Patriots: Sporting Connections, Administrative Communications and Imperial Ether in Interwar New Zealand

During the interwar period (1919–1939), protagonists of the early New Zealand Olympic Committee (NZOC) worked to renegotiate and improve the country's international sporting participation and involvement in the International Olympic Committee. To this end, NZOC effectively used its locally based administrators and well-placed expatriates in Britain to variously assert the organization's nascent autonomy, independence and political power, progress Antipodean athlete's causes and counter any potential doubt about the nation's peripheral position in imperial sporting dialogues. Adding to the corpus of scholarship on New Zealand's ties and tribulations with imperial Britain, both in and beyond sport (e.g. Beilharz and Cox, 2007, “Settler Capitalism Revisited,” Thesis Eleven 88: 112–124; Belich, 2001, Paradise Reforged: A History of the New Zealanders from the 1880s to the Year 2000, Auckland: Allen Lane; Belich, 2007, Making Peoples: A History of the New Zealanders from Polynesian Settlement to the End of the Nineteenth Century, Auckland: The Penguin Group; Coombes, 2006, Rethinking Settler Colonialism: History and Memory in Australia, Canada, Aotearoa New Zealand and South Africa, Manchester: Manchester University Press; MacLean, 2010, “New Zealand (Aotearoa),” In Routledge Companion to Sports History, edited by Steve W. Pope and John Nauright, 510–525, London: Routledge; Phillips, 1984, “Rugby, War and the Mythology of the New Zealand Male,” The New Zealand Journal of History 18 (1): 83–103; Phillips, 1987, A Man's Country: The Image of the Pakeha Male, Auckland: Penguin Books; Ryan, 2004, The Making of New Zealand Cricket, 1832–1914, London: Frank Cass; Ryan, 2005, Tackling Rugby Myths: Rugby and New Zealand Society 1854–2004, Dunedin: University of Otago Press; Ryan, 2007, “Sport in 19th-Century Aotearoa/New Zealand: Opportunities and Constraints,” In Sport in Aotearoa/New Zealand Society, edited by Chris Collins and Steve Jackson, 96–111, Auckland: Thomson), I will examine how the political actions and strategic location of three key NZOC agents (specifically, administrator Harry Amos and expatriates Arthur Porritt and Jack Lovelock) worked in their own particular ways to assert the position of the organization within the global Olympic fraternity. I argue that the efforts of Amos, Porritt and Lovelock also concomitantly served to remind Commonwealth sporting colleagues (namely Britain and Australia) that New Zealand could not be characterized as, or relegated to being, a distal, subdued or subservient colonial sporting partner. Subsequently, I contend that NZOC's development during the interwar period, and particularly the utility of expatriate agents, can be contextualized against historiographical shifts that encourage us to rethink, reimagine and rework narratives of empire, colonization, national identity, commonwealth and belonging.