Habermas y el problema de la verdad

El texto revisa los problemas que ha suscitado el abandono, por parte de Habermas, de una concepción epistémica de la verdad. Este autor ha sostenido que los enunciados descriptivos pueden ser verdaderos o falsos (en un sentido no epistémico) y los juicios morales correctos o incorrectos (en un sentido epistémico). Las expresiones evaluativas no se encontrarían en ninguno de esos casos y no podrían aspirar a una validez independiente del contexto. El artículo examina —a la luz de la literatura— las críticas que esa posición ha suscitado. En general, se ha sostenido que mientras un enunciado descriptivo podría ser verdadero aunque no sepamos cómo justificarlo, no tendría sentido decir que un enunciado moral es correcto aunque no sepamos cómo justificarlo. Ello ocurriría porque mientras el concepto de verdad de Habermas es no epistémico, el concepto de corrección lo es. Para superar esa asimetría, McCarthy ha sugerido un concepto de corrección puramente procedimental; Putnam un concepto de verdad deflacionada; y Lafont una tesis realista tanto en el plano natural como moral.

Semantic change and intersubjectification: The origin of reprise evidential conditional in Old Catalan

The reprise evidential conditional (REC) is nowadays not very usual in Catalan: it is restricted to journalistic language and to some very formal genres (such as academic or legal language), it is not present in spontaneous discourse. On the one hand, it has been described among the rather new modality values of the conditional. On the other, the normative tradition tended to reject it for being a gallicism, or to describe it as an unsuitable neologism. Thanks to the extraction from text corpora, we surprisingly find this REC in Catalan from the beginning of the fourteenth century to the contemporary age, with semantic and pragmatic nuances and different evidence of grammaticalization. Due to the current interest in evidentiality, the REC has been widely studied in French, Italian and Portuguese, focusing mainly on its contemporary uses and not so intensively on the diachronic process that could explain the origin of this value. In line with this research, that we initiated studying the epistemic and evidential future in Catalan, our aim is to describe: a) the pragmatic context that could have been the initial point of the REC in the thirteenth century, before we find indisputable attestations of this use; b) the path of semantic change followed by the conditional from a ‘future in the past’ tense to the acquisition of epistemic and evidential values; and c) the role played by invited inferences, subjectification and intersubjectification in this change.