A public-professional web-bridge for vaccines and vaccination: User concerns about vaccine safety

Vacunas.org (http://www.vacunas.org), a website founded by the Spanish Association of Vaccinology offers a personalized service called Ask the Expert, which answers any questions posed by the public or health professionals about vaccines and vaccination. The aim of this study was to analyze the factors associated with questions on vaccination safety and determine the characteristics of questioners and the type of question asked during the period 2008–2010. A total of 1341 questions were finally included in the analysis. Of those, 30% were related to vaccine safety. Questions about pregnant women had 5.01 higher odds of asking about safety (95% CI 2.82–8.93) than people not belonging to any risk group. Older questioners (>50 years) were less likely to ask about vaccine safety compared to younger questioners (OR: 0.44, 95% CI 0.25–0.76). Questions made after vaccination or related to influenza (including H1N1) or travel vaccines were also associated with a higher likelihood of asking about vaccine safety. These results identify risk groups (pregnant women), population groups (older people) and some vaccines (travel and influenza vaccines, including H1N1) where greater efforts to provide improved, more-tailored vaccine information in general and on the Internet are required.

Relative Concerns on Visible Consumption: A Source of Economic Distortions

Do relative concerns on visible consumption give rise to economic distortions? We re-examine the question posited by Arrow and Dasgupta (2009) building upon their general framework but recognizing that relative concerns can only apply to visible goods (e.g., cars, clothing, jewelry) and that households consume both visible and non-visible goods. Contrary to Arrow and Dasgupta (2009), the answer to this question turns to be always affirmative: the competitive equilibrium will always be different than the socially optimal one, since individuals do not take into account the negative externality they exert on others through the consumption of the visible good, while the social planner does. If one invokes separability assumptions, then the steady state competitive equilibrium consumption of non-visible goods will be strictly lower than the socially optimal one.