Review and extension of the McCabe-Thiele method covering multiple feeds, products and heat transfer stages

The McCabe-Thiele method is a classical approximate graphical method for the conceptual design of binary distillation columns which is still widely used, mainly for didactical purposes, though it is also valuable for quick preliminary calculations. Nevertheless, no complete description of the method has been found and situations such as different thermal feed conditions, multiple feeds, possibilities to extract by-products or to add or remove heat, are not always considered. In the present work we provide a systematic analysis of such situations by developing the generalized equations for: a) the operating lines (OL) of each sector, and b) the changeover line that provides the connection between two consecutive trays of the corresponding sectors separated by a lateral stream of feed, product, or a heat removal or addition.

Developing Semantic Rich Internet Applications with the Sm4RIA Extension for OIDE

This paper introduces the Sm4RIA Extension for OIDE, which implements the Sm4RIA approach in OIDE (OOH4RIA Integrated Development Environment). The application, based on the Eclipse framework, supports the design of the Sm4RIA models as well as the model-to-model and model-to-text transformation processes that facilitate the generation of Semantic Rich Internet Applications, i.e., RIA applications capable of sharing data as Linked data and consuming external data from other sources in the same manner. Moreover, the application implements mechanisms for the creation of RIA interfaces from ontologies and the automatic generation of administration interfaces for a previously design application.

Losses from Horizontal Merger: an Extension to a Successive Oligopoly Model with Product Differentiation

This paper generalizes the model of Salant et al. (1983; Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 98, pp. 185–199) to a successive oligopoly model with product differentiation. Upstream firms produce differentiated goods, retailers compete in quantities, and supply contracts are linear. We show that if retailers buy from all producers, downstream mergers do not affect wholesale prices. Our result replicates that of Salant's, where mergers are not profitable unless the size of the merged firm exceeds 80 per cent of the industry. This result is robust to the type of competition.