Competition for procurement shares

We propose a new procurement procedure that allocates shares of the total amount to be procured depending on the bids of suppliers. Among the properties of the mechanism are the following: (i) Bidders have an incentive to participate in the procurement procedure, as equilibrium payoffs are strictly positive. (ii) The mechanism allows variations in the extent to which affirmative action objectives, like promoting local industries, are pursued. (iii) Surprisingly, even while accomplishing affirmative action goals, procurement expenditures might be lower than under a standard auction format.

The effects of economic crises on tourism success: an integrated model

This paper provides a theoretical model of the influence of economic crises on tourism destination performance. It discusses the temporary and permanent effects of economic crises on the global market shares of tourism destinations through a series of potential transmission mechanisms based on the main economic competitiveness determinants identified in the literature. The proposed model explains the non-neutrality of economic shocks in tourism competitiveness. The model is tested on Spain's tourism industry, which is among the leaders of the global tourism sector, for the period 1970–2013 using non-linear econometric techniques. The empirical analysis confirms that the proposed model is appropriate for explaining the changes in the market positions caused by the economic crises.