Third-party complaints and firm performance: an application in Spanish banking

This article focuses on the impact of third-party complaints on firm performance. We propose two research hypotheses, which are developed from the literature of dissatisfaction, emotions, and economics. The methodology is based on an event study to estimate variation in firm share returns in the stock market due to the publication of the Annual Complaints Service Report by the Bank of Spain; as well as a regression analysis to examine the impact of the number of complaints per branch on the variation obtained. The empirical focus is on a sample of eleven banks to which complaints were made and which were quoted on the Spanish Stock Exchange between 1992 and 2001. The results show a negative impact of the publication of these annual complaint reports on the share returns of the banks concerned. Additionally, these returns have a negative relationship with the number of complaints per branch.

Nonlinear dynamics in discretionary accruals: An analysis of bank loan-loss provisions

Several studies have analyzed discretionary accruals to address earnings-smoothing behaviors in the banking industry. We argue that the characteristic link between accruals and earnings may be nonlinear, since both the incentives to manipulate income and the practical way to do so depend partially on the relative size of earnings. Given a sample of 15,268 US banks over the period 1996–2011, the main results in this paper suggest that, depending on the size of earnings, bank managers tend to engage in earnings-decreasing strategies when earnings are negative (“big-bath”), use earnings-increasing strategies when earnings are positive, and use provisions as a smoothing device when earnings are positive and substantial (“cookie-jar” accounting). This evidence, which cannot be explained by the earnings-smoothing hypothesis, is consistent with the compensation theory. Neglecting nonlinear patterns in the econometric modeling of these accruals may lead to misleading conclusions regarding the characteristic strategies used in earnings management.

Who performs a stronger response to whom? Detecting individual competitive actions and reactions

This study analyzes the degree of competition through individual actions and reactions. Empirical support for this analysis has derived mainly from structural econometric models describing the nature of competition. This analysis extends the existing literature by empirically considering a direct measurement of competition through the analysis of the competitive actions and responses, and describing how firms compete within and between strategic groups. We estimate the firms’ conduct in the Spanish deposits market with 146 firms and 18,888 observations. This is a specially compelling context for the banking industry, in which a deregulation process gives rise to the adoption of aggressive strategies seeking to increase the market shares of deposit accounts; thus, producing a turbulent situation of increasing rivalry. Our results offer a deeper understanding of the firms’ competitive behavior, since we identify different patterns of actions and reactions depending upon the strategic group the firm belongs to.