Judicial (in)activism in Australia's secular commonwealth

his article addresses two aspects of Australia's soft secular government. The first aspect explains how, and asks why, judges have been inactive in helping to draw the contours of secular government in Australia. The principal reason is that much of the social regulation that provokes the interest of faith-based groups is the constitutional concern of the States, and no State Constitution claims to coordinate relations between church and state. Moreover, the electorate has twice refused to pass referenda, in 1944 and 1988, for extending a constitutional demand of secular governance to the States. However, this is not so for the Commonwealth. It falls under the restrictions of section 116 of the federal Constitution, which states: The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any religion ('the establishment clause') or for imposing any religious observance, or for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion ('the free exercise clause'), and no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust under the Commonwealth. As will be explained, while methods of legal interpretation suggest that section 116's establishment clause could place mild demands of non-discrimination on the federal Parliament, judicial inactivity in policing such demands on the Commonwealth, paradoxically, has arguably been secured by judicial activism in the High Court. A second aspect of secular government addressed is the High Court's disposal of 'the separation of church and state' as a constitutional principle in Australia. The contrast, of course, is to the United States, where for sixty years 'separation' has been given uneven recognition as a rule of constitutional law, and has undoubtedly driven the development of hard forms of secular governance in that country. The centrepiece of American secular government is the 1971 decision in Lemon v Kurtzman, where the US Supreme Court held that valid legislation had to pass three tests, ie: First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion .. . finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion. The third 'entanglement' prong of Lemon is the modern, less ambitious, form of the 'wall of separation', prohibiting too close an engagement between church and state. As this paper will demonstrate, 'entanglement's' destiny shows how unlikely it is that 'separation' can survive as a meaningful constitutional principle in the USA. And, it will also be argued that 'separation' has even poorer prospects for import to Australia.

Transnational organised crime and the International Criminal Court developments and debates

Limitation to jurisdiction of International Criminal Court (ICC) - proposal to strengthen the universal criminalisation of transnational organised crimes by enabling them to be prosecuted through an international authority - debate on whether existing offences under the ICC Statute encompass certain transnational organised crimes - whether the Statute should be expanded to include crimes that have been recognised in international treaties.

Transnational organised crime and international law: The Palermo Convention

The last decade has witnessed a significant growth in transnational organised crime activities. It has also seen multiple efforts by the international community to come to terms with this rise of organised crime and to work towards an international instrument to combat the activities of criminal organisations. In December 2000, the United Nations opened for signature the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2001), also known as the Palermo Convention, a treaty that is supplemented by three protocols on trafficking in persons, smuggling of migrants, and trafficking in firearms and ammunition. The conclusion of the Convention marks the end of more than eight years of consultations on a universal instrument to criminalise and counteract transnational criminal organisations. This article illustrates the developments that led to the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and reflects on the amendments and concessions that have been made to earlier proposals during the elaboration process. This article highlights the strengths of the Convention in the areas of judicial cooperation and mutual legal assistance, and the shortcomings of the new Convention, in particular in failing to establish a universal, unequivocal definition of “transnational organized crime”.