An auction theoretical approach to fiscal wars

I examine a situation where a firm chooses to locate a new factory in one of several jurisdictions. The value of the factory may differ among jurisdictions and it depends on the private information held by each jurisdiction. Jurisdictions compete for the location of the new factory. This competition may take the form of expenditures already incurred on infrastructure, commitments to spend on infrastructure, tax incentives or even cash payments. The model combines two elements that are usually considered separately; competition is desirable because we want the factory to be located in the jurisdiction that values it the most, but competition in itself is wasteful. I show that the expected total amount paid to the firm under a large family of arrangements is the same. Moreover, I show that the ex-ante optimal mechanism that is, the mechanism that guarantees that the firm chooses the jurisdiction with the highest value for the factory, minimizes the total expected payment to the firm, and balances the budget in an ex-ante sense - can be implemented by running a standard auction and subsidizing participation.

Economic incentives for farmers in the Philippine uplands to adopt hedgerow intercropping

Land degradation in the Philippine uplands is severe and widespread. Most upland areas are steep, and intense rainfall on soils disturbed by intensive agriculture can produce high rates of soil loss. This has serious implications for the economic welfare of a growing upland population with few feasible livelihood alternatives. Hedgerow intercropping can greatly reduce soil loss from annual cropping systems and has been considered an appropriate technology for soil conservation research and extension in the Philippine uplands. However; adoption of hedgerow intercropping has been sporadic and transient, rarely continuing once external support has been withdrawn. The objective of this paper is to investigate the economic incentives for farmers in the Philippine uplands to adopt hedgerow intercropping relative to traditional open-field maize farming. Cost-benefit analysis is used to compare the economic viability of hedgerow intercropping, as it has been promoted to upland farmers, with the viability of traditional methods of open-field farming. The APSIM and SCUAF models were used to predict the effect of soil erosion on maize yields from open-field farming and hedgerow intercropping. The results indicate that there have been strong economic incentives for farmers with limited planning horizons to reject hedgerow intercropping because the benefits of sustained yields are not realized rapidly enough to compensate for high establishment costs. Alternative forms of hedgerow intercropping such as natural vegetation and grass strips reduce establishment and maintenance costs and are therefore more economically attractive to farmers than hedgerow intercropping with shrub legumes. The long-term economic viability of hedgerow intercropping depends on the economic setting and the potential for hedgerow intercropping to sustain maize production relative to traditional open-field farming. (C) 1998 Academic Press.

Economic Incentives to Conserve Wildlife on Private Lands: Analysis and Policy

Some believe that provision of private property rights in wildlife on private land can provide a powerful economic incentive for nature conservation because it enables property owners to market such wildlife or its attributes. If such marketing is profitable, private landholders will conserve the wildlife concerned and its required habitat. But land is not always most profitably used for exploitation of wildlife, and many economic values of wildlife (such as non-use economic values) cannot be marketed. The mobility of some wildlife (their fugitive nature) adds to the limitations of the private property approach. While some species may be conserved by this approach, it is suboptimal as a single policy approach to nature conservation. Nevertheless, it is being experimented with in the Northern Territory of Australia where landholders have the possibility of harvesting on their properties a quota of eggs and chicks of red-tailed black cockatoos for commercial sale. This scheme is expected to provide an incentive to private landholders to retain hollow trees essential for the nesting of these birds. Aspects of this approach are analysed using this case, and related ones, from Northern Australia. It is noted that the private property rights approach adopted in southern Africa is unlikely to be equally successful everywhere. The long-term survival of some species depends on their ability to use private lands without severe harassment, either for their migration or to supplement their available resources, for example, the Asian elephant in Sri Lanka. Nature conservation on private land is often a useful, if not essential, supplement to conservation on public lands. Community and public incentives for such conservation are outlined.

Economic incentives for global conservation of wildlife: New international policy directions

Growing economic globalisation by extending the operation of markets is a two-edged sword as far as nature conservation is concerned. In some circumstances, it threatens the conservation of nature and in other cases, it provides economic incentives that foster the conservation of biodiversity. This article shows how global policy directions have altered in that regard. Initially the World Conservation Union (IUCN) favoured bans on trade in endangered species. This view was enshrined in the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES). Subsequently, with the upsurge of support for market-based economic liberalism, IUCN recognised that economic and market incentives, if linked to appropriate property rights, could foster biodiversity conservation. This is reflected in the International Convention on Biological Diversity. While there is conflict between this convention and CITES, its extent has been exaggerated. As explained, in certain cases, trade restrictions of the type adopted in CITES are appropriate for nature conservation whereas the market-oriented policy of the Convention on Biological Diversity can be effective in some different situations. Whether or not the extension of markets in wildlife and wildlife products and growing economic globalisation favours nature conservation varies according to the circumstances.