21 resultados para property rights
em University of Queensland eSpace - Australia
Resumo:
The relative merits of different systems of property rights to allocate water among different extractive uses are evaluated for the case where variability of supply is important. Three systems of property rights are considered. In the first, variable supply is dealt with through the use of water entitlements defined as shares of the total quantity available. In the second, there are two types of water entitlements, one for water with a high security of supply and the other a lower security right for the residual supply. The third is a system of entitlements specified as state-contingent claims. With zero transaction costs, all systems are efficient. In the realistic situation where transaction costs matter, the system based on state-contingent claims is globally optimal, and the system with high-security and lower security entitlements is preferable to the system with share entitlements.
Resumo:
Queensland, Australia, has a proud pastoral history; however, the private and social benefits of continued woodland clearing for pasture development are unlikely to be as pronounced as they had been in the past. The environmental benefits of tree retention in and regions of the State are now better appreciated and market opportunities have arisen for the unique timbers of western Queensland. A financial model is developed to facilitate a comparison of the private profitability of small-scale timber production from remnant Acacia woodlands against clearing for pasture development in the Mulga Lands and Desert Uplands bioregions of western Queensland. Four small-scale timber production scenarios, which differ in target markets and the extent of processing (value-adding), are explored within the model. Each scenario is examined for the cases where property rights to the timber are vested with the timber processor, and where royalties are payable. For both cases of resource ownership, at least one scenario generates positive returns from timber production, and exceeds the net farm income per hectare for an average grazing property in the study regions over the period 1989-1990 to 2000-2001. The net present value per hectare of selectively harvesting and processing high-value clearwood from remnant western Queensland woodlands is found to be greater than clearing for grazing. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Resumo:
Some believe that provision of private property rights in wildlife on private land provides a powerful economic incentive for nature conservation because it enables property owners to market such wildlife or its attributes. If such marketing is profitable, private landholders will conserve the wildlife concerned and its required habitat. But land is not always most profitably used for exploitation of wildlife, and many economic values of wildlife (such as non-use economic values) cannot be marketed. The mobility of some wildlife adds to the limitations of the private-property approach. While some species may be conserved by this approach, it is suboptimal as a single policy approach to nature conservation. Nevertheless, it is being experimented with, in the Northern Territory of Australia where landholders had a possibility of harvesting on their properties a quota of eggs and chicks of red-tailed black cockatoos for commercial sale. This scheme was expected to provide an incentive to private landholders to retain hollow trees essential for the nesting of these birds but failed. This case and others are analysed. Despite private-property failures, the long-term survival of some wildlife species depends on their ability to use private lands without severe harassment, either for their migration or to supplement their available resources, for example, the Asian elephant. Nature conservation on private land is often a useful, if not essential, supplement to conservation on public lands. Community and public incentives for such conservation are outlined.
Resumo:
The failures of traditional target-species management have led many to propose an ecosystem approach to fisheries to promote sustainability. The ecosystem approach is necessary, especially to account for fishery-ecosystem interactions, but by itself is not sufficient to address two important factors contributing to unsustainable fisheries: inappropriate incentives bearing on fishers and the ineffective governance that frequently exists in commercial, developed fisheries managed primarily by total-harvest limits and input controls. We contend that much greater emphasis must be placed on fisher motivation when managing fisheries. Using evidence from more than a dozen natural experiments in commercial fisheries, we argue that incentive-based approaches that better specify community and individual harvest or territorial rights and price ecosystem services and that are coupled with public research, monitoring, and effective oversight promote sustainable fisheries.
Resumo:
A theory of value sits at the core of every school of economic thought and directs the allocation of resources to competing uses. Ecological resources complicate the modem neoclassical approach to determining value due to their complex nature, considerable non-market values and the difficulty in assigning property rights. Application of the market model through economic valuation only provides analytical solutions based on virtual markets, and neither the demand nor supply-side techniques of valuation can adequately consider the complex set of biophysical and ecological relations that lead to the provision of ecosystem goods and services. This paper sets out a conceptual framework for a complex systems approach to the value of ecological resources. This approach is based on there being both an intrinsic quality of ecological resources and a subjective evaluation by the consumer. Both elements are necessary for economic value. This conceptual framework points the way towards a theory of value that incorporates both elements, so has implications for principles by which ecological resources can be allocated. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.