Corruption and auctions

We investigate how corruption affects the outcome of a first-price auction (bidding behavior, efficiency and the seller's expected revenue). The auctioneer approaches the winner to offer the possibility of a reduction in his bid in exchange for a bribe. The bribe can be a percentage of the difference between the winning and the second-highest bid or a fixed amount. We show that there exists a symmetric bidding strategy equilibrium that is monotone, i.e., higher valuation buyers bid higher. Corruption does not affect efficiency but both the auctioneer's expected bribe and the seller's expected revenue depend on the format of the bribe payments. We also find the optimal bribe scheme.

Cultural Specific Training in Corruption Reporting for Pacific Island Journalists

Notes that very few journalists have formal training in corruption reporting. Discusses workshops held in 2000 and 2001 on the subject of corruption reporting for Pacific Island journalists. Explains the role of the media as an anti-corruption mechanism and the difficulty journalists face in identifying and sometimes stamping out corruption. Looks at the programs adopted and explains the responses of journalists.