The need for competence tests : Queensland judicial perspectives on non-accused child witnesses in criminal proceedings : Part 1.

To examine the question of whether Queensland judicial officers endorse the need for competence tests for non-accused child witnesses in criminal proceedings, a mail survey was sent to judicial officers - questions considered the need to distinguish between children's sworn and unsworn evidence - relevance of age to competence - desirability of competence test formalities.

The content of competence tests: Queensland judicial perspectives on non-accused child witnesses in criminal proceedings: Part 2

Part 1 appeared in UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND LAW JOURNAL 22 (2) 2003 : 199-223 (AGIS 04/2890) - judicial perspectives on the content of competence tests for sworn and unsworn evidence - substantive criteria may vary according to whether a child is to testify sworn or unsworn - formal framing may vary given a judicial appraisal of a child's capacity and understanding - referability of competence tests to the Queensland legislation.

Precautionary principles: a jurisdiction-free framework for decision-making under risk

Fundamental principles of precaution are legal maxims that ask for preventive actions, perhaps as contingent interim measures while relevant information about causality and harm remains unavailable, to minimize the societal impact of potentially severe or irreversible outcomes. Such principles do not explain how to make choices or how to identify what is protective when incomplete and inconsistent scientific evidence of causation characterizes the potential hazards. Rather, they entrust lower jurisdictions, such as agencies or authorities, to make current decisions while recognizing that future information can contradict the scientific basis that supported the initial decision. After reviewing and synthesizing national and international legal aspects of precautionary principles, this paper addresses the key question: How can society manage potentially severe, irreversible or serious environmental outcomes when variability, uncertainty, and limited causal knowledge characterize their decision-making? A decision-analytic solution is outlined that focuses on risky decisions and accounts for prior states of information and scientific beliefs that can be updated as subsequent information becomes available. As a practical and established approach to causal reasoning and decision-making under risk, inherent to precautionary decision-making, these (Bayesian) methods help decision-makers and stakeholders because they formally account for probabilistic outcomes, new information, and are consistent and replicable. Rational choice of an action from among various alternatives-defined as a choice that makes preferred consequences more likely-requires accounting for costs, benefits and the change in risks associated with each candidate action. Decisions under any form of the precautionary principle reviewed must account for the contingent nature of scientific information, creating a link to the decision-analytic principle of expected value of information (VOI), to show the relevance of new information, relative to the initial ( and smaller) set of data on which the decision was based. We exemplify this seemingly simple situation using risk management of BSE. As an integral aspect of causal analysis under risk, the methods developed in this paper permit the addition of non-linear, hormetic dose-response models to the current set of regulatory defaults such as the linear, non-threshold models. This increase in the number of defaults is an important improvement because most of the variants of the precautionary principle require cost-benefit balancing. Specifically, increasing the set of causal defaults accounts for beneficial effects at very low doses. We also show and conclude that quantitative risk assessment dominates qualitative risk assessment, supporting the extension of the set of default causal models.

Judicial (in)activism in Australia's secular commonwealth

his article addresses two aspects of Australia's soft secular government. The first aspect explains how, and asks why, judges have been inactive in helping to draw the contours of secular government in Australia. The principal reason is that much of the social regulation that provokes the interest of faith-based groups is the constitutional concern of the States, and no State Constitution claims to coordinate relations between church and state. Moreover, the electorate has twice refused to pass referenda, in 1944 and 1988, for extending a constitutional demand of secular governance to the States. However, this is not so for the Commonwealth. It falls under the restrictions of section 116 of the federal Constitution, which states: The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any religion ('the establishment clause') or for imposing any religious observance, or for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion ('the free exercise clause'), and no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust under the Commonwealth. As will be explained, while methods of legal interpretation suggest that section 116's establishment clause could place mild demands of non-discrimination on the federal Parliament, judicial inactivity in policing such demands on the Commonwealth, paradoxically, has arguably been secured by judicial activism in the High Court. A second aspect of secular government addressed is the High Court's disposal of 'the separation of church and state' as a constitutional principle in Australia. The contrast, of course, is to the United States, where for sixty years 'separation' has been given uneven recognition as a rule of constitutional law, and has undoubtedly driven the development of hard forms of secular governance in that country. The centrepiece of American secular government is the 1971 decision in Lemon v Kurtzman, where the US Supreme Court held that valid legislation had to pass three tests, ie: First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion .. . finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion. The third 'entanglement' prong of Lemon is the modern, less ambitious, form of the 'wall of separation', prohibiting too close an engagement between church and state. As this paper will demonstrate, 'entanglement's' destiny shows how unlikely it is that 'separation' can survive as a meaningful constitutional principle in the USA. And, it will also be argued that 'separation' has even poorer prospects for import to Australia.