Familial influence on offspring gambling: a cognitive mechanism for transmission of gambling behavior in families

Background. The problem-gambling literature has identified a range of individual, cognitive, behavioral and emotional factors as playing important roles in the development, maintenance and treatment of problem gambling. However, familial factors have often been neglected. The current study aims to investigate the possible influence of parental factors on offspring gambling behavior. Method. A total of 189 families (546 individuals) completed several questionnaires including the South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS) and the Gambling Related Cognition Scale (GRCS). The relationships were examined using Pearson product-moment correlations and structural equation modeling (SEM) analyses. Results. Results showed that generally parents' (especially fathers') gambling cognitions and gambling behaviors positively correlated with offspring gambling behaviors and cognitions. However, SEM analyses showed that although parental gambling behavior was directly related to offspring gambling behavior, parental cognitions were not related to offspring gambling behavior directly but indirectly via offspring cognitions. Conclusion. The findings show that the influence of parental gambling cognition on offspring gambling behavior is indirect and via offspring cognitions. The results suggest a possible cognitive mechanism of transmission of gambling behavior in the family from one generation to the next.

Specializations of the granular prefrontal cortex of primates: Implications for cognitive processing

The biological underpinnings of human intelligence remain enigmatic. There remains the greatest confusion and controversy regarding mechanisms that enable humans to conceptualize, plan, and prioritize, and why they are set apart from other animals in their cognitive abilities. Here we demonstrate that the basic neuronal building block of the cerebral cortex, the pyramidal cell, is characterized by marked differences in structure among primate species. Moreover, comparison of the complexity of neuron structure with the size of the cortical area/region in which the cells are located revealed that trends in the granular prefrontal cortex (gPFC) were dramatically different to those in visual cortex. More specifically, pyramidal cells in the gPFC of humans had a disproportionately high number of spines. As neuron structure determines both its biophysical properties and connectivity, differences in the complexity in dendritic structure observed here endow neurons with different computational abilities. Furthermore, cortical circuits composed of neurons with distinguishable morphologies will likely be characterized by different functional capabilities. We propose that 1. circuitry in V1, V2, and gPFC within any given species differs in its functional capabilities and 2. there are dramatic differences in the functional capabilities of gPFC circuitry in different species, which are central to the different cognitive styles of primates. In particular, the highly branched, spinous neurons in the human gPFC may be a key component of human intelligence. (C) 2005 Wiley-Liss, Inc.

Cortex, cognition and the cell: New insights into the pyramidal neuron and prefrontal function

Arguably the most complex conical functions are seated in human cognition, the how and why of which have been debated for centuries by theologians, philosophers and scientists alike. In his best-selling book, An Astonishing Hypothesis: A Scientific Search for the Soul, Francis Crick refined the view that these qualities are determined solely by cortical cells and circuitry. Put simply, cognition is nothing more, or less, than a biological function. Accepting this to be the case, it should be possible to identify the mechanisms that subserve cognitive processing. Since the pioneering studies of Lorent de No and Hebb, and the more recent studies of Fuster, Miller and Goldman-Rakic, to mention but a few, much attention has been focused on the role of persistent neural activity in cognitive processes. Application of modern technologies and modelling techniques has led to new hypotheses about the mechanisms of persistent activity. Here I focus on how regional variations in the pyramidal cell phenotype may determine the complexity of cortical circuitry and, in turn, influence neural activity. Data obtained from thousands of individually injected pyramidal cells in sensory, motor, association and executive cortex reveal marked differences in the numbers of putative excitatory inputs received by these cells. Pyramidal cells in prefrontal cortex have, on average, up to 23 times more dendritic spines than those in the primary visual area. I propose that without these specializations in the structure of pyramidal cells, and the circuits they form, human cognitive processing would not have evolved to its present state. I also present data from both New World and Old World monkeys that show varying degrees of complexity in the pyramidal cell phenotype in their prefrontal cortices, suggesting that cortical circuitry and, thus, cognitive styles are evolving independently in different species.

The pyramidal neuron in occipital, temporal and prefrontal cortex of the owl monkey (Aotus trivirgatus): regional specialization in cell structure

Recent studies have revealed marked regional variation in pyramidal cell morphology in primate cortex. In particular, pyramidal cells in human and macaque prefrontal cortex (PFC) are considerably more spinous than those in other cortical regions. PFC pyramidal cells in the New World marmoset monkey, however, are less spinous than those in man and macaques. Taken together, these data suggest that the pyramidal cell has become more branched and more spinous during the evolution of PFC in only some primate lineages. This specialization may be of fundamental importance in determining the cognitive styles of the different species. However, these data are preliminary, with only one New World and two Old World species having been studied. Moreover, the marmoset data were obtained from different cases. In the present study we investigated PFC pyramidal cells in another New World monkey, the owl monkey, to extend the basis for comparison. As in the New World marmoset monkey, prefrontal pyramidal cells in owl monkeys have relatively few spines. These species differences appear to reflect variation in the extent to which PFC circuitry has become specialized during evolution. Highly complex pyramidal cells in PFC appear not to have been a feature of a common prosimian ancestor, but have evolved with the dramatic expansion of PFC in some anthropoid lineages.

Pyramidal neurons of granular prefrontal cortex of the galago: Complexity in evolution of the psychic cell in primates

Typically, cognitive abilities of humans have been attributed to their greatly expanded cortical mantle, granular prefrontal cortex (gPFC) in particular. Recently we have demonstrated systematic differences in microstructure of gPFC in different species. Specifically, pyramidal cells in adult human gPFC are considerably more spinous than those in the gPFC of the macaque monkey, which are more spinous than those in the gPFC of marmoset and owl monkeys. As most cortical dendritic spines receive at least one excitatory input, pyramidal cells in these different species putatively receive different numbers of inputs. These differences in the gPFC pyramidal cell phenotype may be of fundamental importance in determining the functional characteristics of prefrontal circuitry and hence the cognitive styles of the different species. However, it remains unknown as to why the gPFC pyramidal cell phenotype differs between species. Differences could be attributed to, among other things, brain size, relative size of gPFC, or the lineage to which the species belong. Here we investigated pyramidal cells in the dorsolateral gPFC of the prosimian galago to extend the basis for comparison. We found these cells to be less spinous than those in human, macaque, and marmoset. (c) 2005 Wiley-Liss, Inc.

Individual differences in motivated social cognition: The case of self-serving information processing

Three experiments examined the hypothesis that people show consistency in motivated social cognitive processing across self-serving domains. Consistent with this hypothesis, Experiment 1 revealed that people who rated a task at which they succeeded as more important than a task at which they failed also cheated on a series of math problems, but only when they could rationalize their cheating as unintentional. Experiment 2 replicated this finding and demonstrated that a self-report measure of self-deception did not predict this rationalized cheating. Experiment 3 replicated Experiments 1 and 2 and ruled out several alternative explanations. These experiments suggest that people who show motivated processing in ego-protective domains also show motivated processing in extrinsic domains. These experiments also introduce a new measurement procedure for differentiating between intentional versus rationalized cheating.