Do expert drivers have a reduced illusion of superiority?

It is well established that people tend to rate themselves as better than average across many domains. To maintain these illusions, it is suggested that people distort feedback about their own and others' performance. This study examined expert/novice differences in self-ratings when people compared themselves with others of the same level of expertise and background as themselves. Given that a key expert characteristic is increased self-monitoring, we predicted that experts in a domain may have a reduced illusion of superiority because they are more aware of their actual ability. We compared expert police drivers with novice police drivers and found that this prediction was not supported. Expert police drivers rated themselves as superior to equally qualified drivers, to the same degree as novices, Cohen's d = .03 ns. Despite their extensive additional training and experience, experts still appear to be as susceptible to illusions of superiority Lis everyone else. (C) 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Drivers' ratings of different components of their own driving skill: A greater illusion of superiority for skills that relate to accident involvement

Different components of driving skill relate to accident involvement in different ways. For instance, while hazard-perception skill has been found to predict accident involvement, vehicle-control skill has not. We found that drivers rated themselves superior to both their peers and the average driver on 18 components of driving skill (N = 181 respondents). These biases were greater for hazard-perception skills than for either vehicle-control skills or driving skill in general. Also, ratings of hazard-perception skill related to self-perceived safety after overall skill was controlled for. We suggest that although drivers appear to appreciate the role of hazard perception in safe driving, any safety benefit to be derived from this appreciation may be undermined by drivers' inflated opinions of their own hazard-perception skill. We also tested the relationship between illusory beliefs about driving skill and risk taking and looked at ways of manipulating drivers' illusory beliefs.

Motorcycle accident risk could be inflated by a time to arrival illusion

Purpose. Drivers adopt smaller safety margins when pulling out in front of motorcycles compared with cars. This could partly account for why the most common motorcycle/car accident involves a car violating a motorcyclist's right of way. One possible explanation is the size-arrival effect in which smaller objects are perceived to arrive later than larger objects. That is, drivers may estimate the time to arrival of motorcycles to be later than cars because motorcycles are smaller. Methods. We investigated arrival time judgments using a temporal occlusion paradigm. Drivers recruited from the student population (n = 28 and n = 33) saw video footage of oncoming vehicles and had to press a response button when they judged that vehicles would reach them. Results. In experiment 1, the time to arrival of motorcycles was estimated to be significantly later than larger vehicles (a car and a van) for different approach speeds and viewing times. In experiment 2, we investigated an alternative explanation to the size-arrival effect: that the smaller size of motorcycles places them below the threshold needed for observers to make an accurate time to arrival judgment using tau. We found that the motorcycle/car difference in arrival time estimates was maintained for very short occlusion durations when tau could be estimated for both motorcycles and cars. Conclusions. Results are consistent with the size-arrival effect and are inconsistent with the tau threshold explanation. Drivers estimate motorcycles will reach them later than cars across a range of conditions. This could have safety implications.

Competition between disorder and exchange splitting in superconducting ZrZn2

We propose a simple picture for the occurrence of superconductivity and the pressure dependence of the superconducting critical temperature, T-SC, in ZrZn2. According to our hypothesis the pairing potential is independent of pressure, but the exchange splitting, E-xc leads to a pressure dependence in the (spin dependent) density of states at the Fermi level, D-sigma (epsilon(F)). Assuming p-wave pairing T-SC is dependent on D-sigma (epsilonF) which ensures that, in the absence of non-magnetic impurities, T-SC decreases as pressure is applied until it reaches a minimum in the paramagnetic state. Disorder reduces this minimum to zero, this gives the illusion that the superconductivity disappears at the same pressure as ferromagnetism does.

Two envelope problems and the roles of ignorance

Four variations on Two Envelope Paradox are stated and compared. The variations are employed to provide a diagnosis and an explanation of what has gone awry in the paradoxical modeling of the decision problem that the paradox poses. The canonical formulation of the paradox underdescribes the ways in which one envelope can have twice the amount that is in the other. Some ways one envelope can have twice the amount that is in the other make it rational to prefer the envelope that was originally rejected. Some do not, and it is a mistake to treat them alike. The nature of the mistake is diagnosed by the different roles that rigid designators and definite descriptions play in unproblematic and in untoward formulations of decision tables that are employed in setting out the decision problem that gives rise to the paradox. The decision maker’s knowledge or ignorance of how one envelope came to have twice the amount that is in the other determines which of the different ways of modeling his decision problem is correct. Under this diagnosis, the paradoxical modeling of the Two Envelope problem is incoherent.

Human behaviour modelled as a statistico-deterministic turing machine

'Free will' and its corollary, the concept of individual responsibility are keystones of the justice system. This paper shows that if we accept a physics that disallows time reversal, the concept of 'free will' is undermined by an integrated understanding of the influence of genetics and environment on human behavioural responses. Analysis is undertaken by modelling life as a novel statistico-deterministic version of a Turing machine, i.e. as a series of transitions between states at successive instants of time. Using this model it is proven by induction that the entire course of life is independent of the action of free will. Although determined by prior state, the probability of transitions between states in response to a standard environmental stimulus is not equal to 1 and the transitions may differ quantitatively at the molecular level and qualitatively at the level of the whole organism. Transitions between states correspond to behaviours. It is shown that the behaviour of identical twins (or clones), although determined, would be incompletely predictable and non-identical, creating an illusion of the operation of 'free will'. 'Free will' is a convenient construct for current judicial systems and social control because it allows rationalization of punishment for those whose behaviour falls outside socially defined norms. Indeed, it is conceivable that maintenance of ideas of free will has co-evolved with community morality to reinforce its operation. If the concept is free will is to be maintained it would require revision of our current physical theories.

The gambling related cognitions scale (GRCS): development, confirmatory factor validation and psychometric properties

Aims The aims of this study are to develop and validate a measure to screen for a range of gambling-related cognitions (GRC) in gamblers. Design and participants A total of 968 volunteers were recruited from a community-based population. They were divided randomly into two groups. Principal axis factoring with varimax rotation was performed on group one and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used on group two to confirm the best-fitted solution. Measurements The Gambling Related Cognition Scale (GRCS) was developed for this study and the South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS), the Motivation Towards Gambling Scale (MTGS) and the Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS-2 1) were used for validation. Findings Exploratory factor analysis performed using half the sample indicated five factors, which included interpretative control/bias (GRCS-IB), illusion of control (GRCS-IC), predictive control (GRCS-PC), gambling-related expectancies (GRCS-GE) and a perceived inability to stop gambling (GRCS-IS). These accounted for 70% of the total variance. Using the other half of the sample, CFA confirmed that the five-factor solution fitted the data most effectively. Cronbach's alpha coefficients for the factors ranged from 0.77 to 0.91, and 0.93 for the overall scale. Conclusions This paper demonstrated that the 23-item GRCS has good psychometric properties and thus is a useful instrument for identifying GRC among non-clinical gamblers. It provides the first step towards devising/adapting similar tools for problem gamblers as well as developing more specialized instruments to assess particular domains of GRC.

Do you know where your arm is if you think your head has moved?

Reproduction of a previously presented elbow position is affected by changes in head position. As movement of the head is associated with local biomechanical changes, the aim of the present study was to determine if illusory changes in head position could induce similar effects on the reproduction of elbow position. Galvanic vestibular stimulation (GVS) was applied to healthy subjects in supine lying. The stimulus was applied during the presentation of an elbow position, which the subject then reproduced without stimulation. In the first study, 13 subjects received 1.5 mA stimuli, which caused postural sway in standing, confirming that the firing of vestibular afferents was affected, but no illusory changes in head position were reported. In the second study, 13 subjects received 2.0-3.0 mA GVS. Six out of 13 subjects reported consistent illusory changes in head position, away from the side of the anode. In these subjects, anode right stimulation induced illusory left lateral flexion and elbow joint position error towards extension (p=0.03), while anode left tended to have the opposite effect (p=0.16). The GVS had no effect on error in subjects who did not experience illusory head movement with either 1.5 mA stimulus (p=0.8) or 2.0-3.0 mA stimulus (p=0.7). This study demonstrates that the accuracy of elbow repositioning is affected by illusory changes in head position. These results support the hypothesis that the perceived position of proximal body segments is used in the planning and performance of accurate upper limb movements.

Disrupted cortical proprioceptive representation evokes symptoms of peculiarity, foreignness and swelling, but not pain

Objectives. It has been proposed that disruption of the internal proprioceptive representation, via incongruent sensory input, may underpin pathological pain states, but experimental evidence relies on conflicting visual input, which is not clinically relevant. We aimed to determine the symptomatic effect of incongruent proprioceptive input, imparted by vibration of the wrist tendons, which evokes the illusion of perpetual wrist flexion and disrupts cortical proprioceptive representation. Methods. Twenty-nine healthy and naive volunteers reported symptoms during five conditions: control, active and passive wrist flexion, extensor carpi radialis tendon vibration to evoke illusion of perpetual wrist flexion, and ulnar styloid (sham) vibration. No advice was given about possible illusions. Results. Twenty-one subjects reported the illusion of perpetual wrist flexion during tendon vibration. There was no effect of condition or of whether or not subjects reported an illusion on discomfort/pain (P > 0.28). Peculiarity, swelling and foreignness were greater during tendon vibration than during the other conditions, and greater during tendon vibration in those who reported an illusion of wrist flexion than in those who did not (P < 0.05 for all). Symptoms were reported by at least two subjects in each condition and four subjects reported systemic symptoms (e.g. nausea). Conclusions. In healthy volunteers, incongruent proprioceptive input does not cause discomfort or pain but does evoke feelings of peculiarity, swelling and foreignness in the limb.

The temporal and spatial limits of compensation for fixational eye movements

High-fidelity eye tracking is combined with a perceptual grouping task to provide insight into the likely mechanisms underlying the compensation of retinal image motion caused by movement of the eyes. The experiments describe the covert detection of minute temporal and spatial offsets incorporated into a test stimulus. Analysis of eye motion on individual trials indicates that the temporal offset sensitivity is actually due to motion of the eye inducing artificial spatial offsets in the briefly presented stimuli. The results have strong implications for two popular models of compensation for fixational eye movements, namely efference copy and image-based models. If an efference copy model is assumed, the results place constraints on the spatial accuracy and source of compensation. If an image-based model is assumed then limitations are placed on the integration time window over which motion estimates are calculated. (c) 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.