An invitation to an alcohol industry lobby to help decide public funding of alcohol research and professional training: a decision that should be reversed

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Optimal strategies in political elections

In the Majoritarian Parliamentary System, the government has a constitutional right to call an early election. This right provides the government a control to achieve its objective to remain in power for as long as possible. We model the early election problem mathematically using opinion polls data as a stochastic process to proxy the government's probability of re-election. These data measure the difference in popularity between the government and the opposition. We fit a mean reverting Stochastic Differential Equation to describe the behaviour of the process and consider the possibility for the government to use other control tools, which are termed 'boosts' to induce shocks to the opinion polls by making timely policy announcements or economic actions. These actions improve the government's popularity and have some impact upon the early-election exercise boundary. © Austral. Mathematical Soc. 2005.

Knowledge about a Species' Conservation Status and Funding for its Preservation: Analysis

Using a species' population to measure its conservation status, this paper explores how increased knowledge about a species' status changes the public's willingness to donate funds for its conservation. This is based on the behavioral relationship between the level of donations and a species' conservation status satisfying general mathematical properties. This level of donation increases, on average, with greater knowledge of a species' conservation status if it is endangered, but falls if it is secure. Modelling enables individuals' demand for extra information about the conservation status of species to be specified. While this model may suggest that conservation bodies could boost funds for conservation of species by exaggerating species' endangerment, such a strategy is shown to be potentially counterproductive. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.