Believing badly

This paper explores the grounds upon which moral judgment of a person's beliefs is properly made. The beliefs in question are non-moral beliefs and the objects of moral judgment are individual instances of believing. We argue that instances of believing may be morally wrong on any of three distinct grounds: (i) by constituting a moral hazard, (ii) by being the result of immoral inquiry, or (iii) by arising from vicious inner processes of belief formation. On this way of articulating the basis of moral judgment of belief it becomes clear that rational and epistemic norms do not exhaust the kinds of normative judgment properly made of a person's state of believing. We argue that there are instances of believing that are both rational and true and yet morally wrong.

New Treatments for Addiction: Behavioural, Ethical,Legal and Social Questions: Harwood & T. G. Myers eds (Book review)

This book is an exemplar of what the National Academy of Science does so well: to assemble a cast of very wellinformed and clever experts; to ask them to think hard and critically about an important issue over a substantial period of time; and to seek a consensus, if possible and failing that, to identify the critical issues on which wellinformed people disagree and to specify the evidence that has the greatest epistemic leverage in resolving disagreements.